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Various streams of foundational management literatures imply that corporate managers can 
play a role in the management of intra-organizational innovation processes. However, management 
scholars have largely assumed that corporate managers do not become actively involved in the 
management of intra-organizational innovation processes occurring within multidivisional firms. 
This assumption contrasts with the importance given in the management literature to innovation 
as an enabler of organizational long-term survival. To address this contrast, my dissertation 
explores why and how corporate managers adopt an active approach to the management of intra-
organizational innovation processes in complex multidivisional firms. 
In the first paper, I map extant knowledge of innovation mechanisms onto an evolutionary 
multilevel framework. I synthesize uncovered mechanisms into structural, behavioural, and 
routinized corporate approaches to innovation management. I conclude this paper by proposing a 
comprehensive research agenda for exploring complex interactions between top-down and bottom-
up innovation processes occurring within a multidivisional firm. 
In the second paper, I propose a mid-range theory of corporate innovation activism 
elaborating two novel concepts. The corporate innovation synergy concept encapsulates 
mechanisms available to corporate managers to increase the efficiency of intra-organizational 
innovation processes. The corporate innovation value-added concept concerns mechanisms 
available to corporate managers to qualitatively improve intra-organizational innovation processes 
in ways unavailable at the business unit level. I organize my arguments into a theoretical model 
and discuss limitations of my theory, offering important opportunities for future research. 
In the third paper, I explore the genesis of corporate managers’ capability to influence 
innovation management in a multidivisional firm; I call this the corporate innovation function. I 
combine proprietary narrative data with archival records to study the development of the corporate 
innovation function in 20 large multidivisional firms. Based on my observations of 17 corporate 
ii 
 
innovation processes, I develop a corporate innovation function typology comprised of 
collaborative, parallel-capability, and sponsorship corporate innovation function models. I link 
differences across the corporate innovation function configurations to firm-level innovation 
performance. 
In the fourth paper, I elaborate on the concept of dynamic corporate innovation capability, 
which enables a multidivisional firm to continuously discover, evaluate, and monetize innovations 
that are novel to the firm and the markets in which the firm operates. Exploiting further the 
proprietary narrative and archival dataset, I first establish the prototypical role of a senior 
innovation manager and identify four underlying mechanisms that enable the establishment of a 
dynamic corporate innovation capability: senior innovation manager legitimacy, corporate 
innovation ambition, corporate innovation processes, and corporate innovation routines. Using a 
system dynamics approach, I synthesize my findings in a dynamic model, disentangling the 
complex process of maintaining exploration in an organizational environment biased towards 
exploitation. 
  
Keywords: Corporate strategy, corporate function, corporate manager, chief innovation officer, 
multidivisional firm, innovation management, innovation processes, strategy implementation, 





The fourth chapter of my dissertation is a result of some collaboration. I started to work on 
this chapter in January 2014 at the inception of my visiting research appointment at the Wharton 
School at the University of Pennsylvania. As a solo author, I identified the research opportunity, 
formulated the research question, conducted the literature review, selected the methodological 
approach, obtained competitive research funding for data collection, assembled the dataset, 
analyzed the data, interpreted results, and presented findings and conceptual models at two 
refereed academic conferences. Dr. Andreas Schotter joined the work on this chapter as a second 
author in October 2015. As the first and principal author, I continued to independently develop 
further all sections of this chapter, synthesized the findings into updated conceptual models, 
developed theoretical claims, produced complete manuscripts, and presented findings at another 
refereed academic conference. Dr. Schotter contributed by recommending the use of qualitative 
analytical templates from previously published research, suggesting additional literatures, and 
providing comments and edits on completed manuscripts. In acknowledgement of this 
collaboration, I use “we” and “us” throughout the fourth chapter. With the above exception, I 
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Although determining the optimal balance between exploitation and exploration is not 
ordinarily feasible in an organizational setting, it may be possible to anticipate some 
of these ways in which adaptive dynamics lead to imbalances. Such awareness is a 
basis for timely interventions based on knowledge about risk preferences, 
communication, and conflict in organizations. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 TOPIC AND MOTIVATION 
In this dissertation, I study the relationship between interventions by corporate managers 
in intra-organizational innovation processes and a multidivisional firm’s capability to continuously 
discover, evaluate, and monetize novel ideas. Specifically, I explore the rationale, origins, and 
evolution of corporate managers’ motivation and ability to engage in corporate innovation 
activism. I define corporate innovation activism as purposeful actions by corporate managers to 
manage intra-organizational innovation processes within a multidivisional firm. The key idea is 
that in a multidivisional organizational design, corporate managers’ interventions in intra-
organizational innovation processes qualitatively differ from interventions occurring at the 
business unit level. My core argument, which I support using both theory and evidence, is that 
corporate innovation activism increases organizational capability to use novel ideas for continuous 
adaptation to environmental changes. 
My motivation for writing this dissertation is to advance scholarly understanding of the 
complex interactions between top-down and bottom-up innovation processes coexisting in a 
multidivisional firm. To achieve my research aim, I relax the dominant assumption held in the 
foundational management literature ascribing corporate managers a largely passive role in 
innovation management. In doing so, I am able to explore in depth the motivations and 
mechanisms surrounding corporate innovation activism. 
1.2 THEORETICAL INTEREST 
Whether innovation is primarily a bottom-up or top-down process has been an important 
topic of debate in the innovation literature. Proponents of the former argue that innovation 
principally stems from individual-level creativity, which should not be hindered by top-down 





assumes that the main role of corporate managers in innovation is the establishment of an 
organizational environment that does not hamper individual-level creativity. Corporate managers 
create such an organizational environment by defining general rules for aligning innovation 
activities with corporate strategy, and limit their active interventions to resource allocation 
decision making based on inputs by trusted middle managers (Bower, 1970). When individual-
level innovation activities result in value creation at the firm level, corporate managers 
retrospectively attribute the innovation success to corporate strategy (Burgelman, 1983). 
While the bottom-up view of innovation is firmly established in the management literature, 
top-down influences on intra-organizational innovation processes have received less scholarly 
attention (Anderson, Potocnik, and Zhou, 2014). Daft (1978) considers a dual core model of 
organizational innovation, arguing that top-down influences are limited to organizational settings 
marked by low professionalization and concern mainly administrative (as opposed to technical) 
innovations. More recently, scholars studying open innovation (Boudreau and Lakhani, 2009; 
Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006) have argued that top-down involvement in innovation activities 
is necessary for sourcing high-potential novel ideas from outside of organizational boundaries. In 
the dynamic capabilities literature, Teece (2007) posits that corporate managers are directly 
responsible for the identification of high-potential innovation opportunities. Birkinshaw, Bouquet, 
and Barsoux (2011) research innovation management within several multidivisional firms and 
propose that active top-down involvement in innovation management is critical to the success of 
bottom-up innovation processes. 
1.3 RELEVANCE 
The above suggestions in the literature that corporate managers can, in fact, play a more 
active role in innovation management stem from several limitations inherent in a primarily bottom-





several examples of how these top-down interventions can address limitations in the bottom-up 
innovation process. 
First, when novel ideas are distanced from a firm’s core businesses, their vertical ascent 
through organizational layers can be hampered by a liability of illegitimacy (Criscuolo, Salter, and 
Ter Wal, 2014). Top-down interventions providing temporal sanctuary for nurturing novel ideas 
(Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007) can facilitate cognitive recognition of novel ideas’ potential 
(Argote, 1999; Levinthal and March 1981; Levitt and March 1988). 
Second, bottom-up novel idea transmission processes involve aggregation of information, 
reducing the richness of initial ideas and introducing distortions and biases (Csaszar and Eggers, 
2013; Kahneman, Lovallo, and Sibony, 2011). Without top-down interventions mitigating the 
information transmission noise and decision-making biases, corporate managers are likely to be 
presented with a distorted view of the objective innovation opportunities available to the firm 
(Vuori and Huy, 2016). 
Third, engaging in innovation activities exposes employees to risks which can be difficult 
to mitigate at the individual level, reducing individual-level novel idea expression and/or skewing 
lower-level decision making towards lower-potential/lower-risk innovation projects (Castañer and 
Kavadis, 2013); Rahrovani, Pinsonneault, and Austin, 2018). Corporate managers can introduce 
system-level mechanisms to mitigate individual-level innovation risks. 
Fourth, corporate innovation activism is likely to increase the emergence of architectural 
innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990), as corporate managers have a better overview of 
knowledge recombination opportunities (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997) than business unit managers 
(Ramachandran, Manikandan, and Pant, 2013). 
1.4 STATE-OF-THE-ART LITERATURE 
Several recent innovation research streams imply the potential for corporate innovation 





innovation processes confined within business units result in more locally and immediately 
applicable innovations, whereas innovation processes occurring at the corporate level lead to more 
generally applicable innovations relevant across business units. These findings, recently replicated 
using a larger data sample (Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014), suggest that corporate innovation 
activism can result in the pursuit of more transformational innovation projects compared to the 
organizational set-up in which the innovation decision making lies mainly with business unit 
managers. Further, corporate managers can play an important role in continuously calibrating the 
proportion between more general innovations consuming organizational resources for extended 
periods of time before generating value and more local innovations with quicker conversion of 
resources into tangible outcomes. 
Balancing exploitation with exploration is generally a complex process (March, 1991). Its 
complexity is increased further when a firm navigates challenging environmental conditions, 
increasing the managerial inclination to take actions that yield immediate results. Lim, Celly, 
Morse, and Rowe (2013) study the relationship between cost retrenchment and a firm’s post-
retrenchment performance. They find that in industries marked by high levels of exploration 
(Teece and Pisano, 1994), cost retrenchment significantly reduces a firm’s later performance. This 
effect is exacerbated when the focal firm itself follows a highly exploratory strategy marked by 
the continuous pursuit of transformative innovations. This finding highlights the role of corporate 
managers in times of crises requiring downsizing and/or downscoping (Hitt et al., 2009), as they 
possess better agency than business-level managers to reconfigure resources to mitigate the 
negative effects of cost retrenchment on their firms’ innovation ability. 
The pursuit of higher-risk exploratory activities increases a firm’s chances of finding and 
extracting value from transformative innovations to support its long-term competitive advantages. 
Austin, Devin, and Sullivan (2012) inductively study 20 cases of innovation processes in various 
settings, and find evidence of innovators deliberately incorporating accidents into their innovation 





knowledge, key challenges of an accident-seeking approach to innovation include the low yield of 
beneficial accidents and the generation of potentially destructive outcomes. Thus, the potential 
role of corporate managers is to create an organizational climate that allows accidental innovation 
to occur, while mitigating the resource waste and the contagion of system-level risks that endanger 
the organizational core (Thompson, 1967). 
Relatedly, Criscuolo, Salter, and Ter Wal (2014) study how researchers in mature 
organizations challenge research project formalization to carve out autonomy for their unofficial 
innovation research activities. They find that scientists take their research underground (i.e., 
engage in bootlegging) to escape normative organizational pressures and allow their inventions to 
develop to a stage that facilitates legitimization and the provision of further organizational 
resources. Their study shows that this bootlegging activity is positively related to organizational 
acceptance of norm-deviant behaviour, and to the proportion of researchers engaged in bootlegging 
activities (compared to the overall organizational research community). The challenge for 
corporate managers is to increase organizational tolerance towards norm-deviant behaviour 
without relaxing the organizational discipline needed for efficient and effective exploitation of 
extant knowledge (March, 1991). 
Both of the above-mentioned studies involve corporate managers potentially creating 
dysfunctional situations within their firms in the pursuit of exploration. Corporate managers can 
outsource some of this dysfunctionality to other firms by vicariously learning from external 
innovation failures (Maslach, 2016). Maslach, Branzei, Rerup, and Zbaracki (2018) explore this 
type of learning by analyzing failure data from the medical device industry. Using qualitative 
analysis, Maslach et al. (2018: 7) find that firms use public failure data to “identify aspects of 
experience that they had not seen in their own experience, to find more ways of seeing these 
adverse events, and to learn from events that would not have happened with their own products.” 





aversive counterfactuals documented in public repositories, thereby drawing on experiential 
learning from other firms without directly experiencing the negative consequences of failure. 
1.5 THE FOUR PAPERS 
1.5.1 PAPER #1 
 In my first dissertation paper, I survey extant literature on the active involvement of 
corporate managers in innovation. In particular, I aim to uncover, synthesize, and critique extant 
knowledge on innovation mechanisms operating in a multidivisional firm. First, I map this 
knowledge onto a multilevel evolutionary framework. The resultant “Variation-Selection-
Retention X Individual Inventor-Team-Business Manager-Corporate Manager” matrix organizes 
the extant knowledge on innovation mechanisms. For each mechanism, I briefly discuss the 
potential role of corporate managers. Second, I synthesize uncovered innovation mechanisms into 
structuring, nudging, and routinizing activities. Third, I identify relevant knowledge gaps and 
tensions in the literature. I conclude by proposing a comprehensive research agenda for pushing 
the boundaries of innovation scholarship by exploring the complexity of interactions between top-
down and bottom-up innovation processes operating in a multidivisional firm. 
1.5.2 PAPER #2 
 In my second dissertation paper, I develop a theory explaining why innovation is being 
increasingly elevated into the corporate domain and made into a distinct corporate function in the 
world’s largest multidivisional firms. Specifically, I argue that the active involvement of corporate 
managers in innovation is driven by the search for innovation synergies across business units and 
additional innovation value that is inaccessible to single-business organizational designs. 
 I propose that corporate managers seek to achieve the former aim of innovation synergies 





reducing selection biases that exist at the business unit manager level, and adopting a non-rigid 
approach to the innovation implementation process. I call this process “corporate innovation 
synergy.” 
I argue that corporate managers pursue the latter aim of additional innovation value by 
attracting novel ideas from external actors unwilling to deal with business unit managers due to 
trust issues; engaging in temporal and cross-business unit idea recombination; leveraging their 
higher capacity to absorb innovation losses/flops to incentivize high-risk/high-reward innovation 
projects; and supporting innovation projects which transcend short-term/individual business unit 
utility. I call this process “corporate innovation value-added.” 
1.5.3 PAPER #3 
In my third dissertation chapter, I explore top-down influences on innovation management 
in large multidivisional firms to advance scholarly understanding of the genesis of organizational 
capabilities. I respond to several recent calls in the literature for considering corporate managers 
as active, rather than passive, actors in intra-organizational innovation management in the context 
of a multidivisional firm. 
 To that effect, I have assembled a novel dataset combining narrative and archival data, 
allowing me to trace the origins of active involvement of corporate managers in innovation 
management (i.e., corporate innovation function, or CIF) in 20 large multidivisional firms. 
Through an inductive analysis of the dataset using a case-ordered predictor-outcome matrix, I find 
17 innovation processes initiated by corporate managers which operate at both corporate and 
business unit levels. 
 Based on these findings, I propose a corporate innovation function typology comprised of 
the collaborative CIF model, the parallel-capability CIF model, and the sponsorship CIF model. I 
explain how these different CIF configurations have a differential effect on the likelihood of type 





(i.e., rejection of high-value innovation projects). I synthesize my arguments by introducing the 
concept of the “innovation efficiency frontier,” which highlights the trade-offs that corporate 
managers must make when deciding whether to focus on minimizing the incidence of innovation 
failures or maximizing the likelihood of scoring innovation home runs. 
1.5.4 PAPER #4 
In the concluding chapter of my dissertation, I explore how actions of corporate managers 
in large multidivisional firms lead to the establishment of innovation routines conducive to 
continuous discovery, evaluation, and monetization of distant innovations (i.e., dynamic corporate 
innovation capability). 
 Given that knowledge about the involvement of corporate managers in innovation 
management is limited (Garud, Tuertscher, and Van de Ven, 2013), I use an inductive multi-case 
research design (Eisenhardt, 1989). Large multidivisional firms provide a suitable research context 
for studying how dynamic corporate innovation capability is developed given the inherent 
complexity of managing various innovation maturity models across multiple markets embedded 
in different environments (McGahan and Silverman, 2001; Utterback, 1971). In total, I developed 
14 in-depth case studies, providing a longitudinal and multilevel overview of the work of senior 
innovation managers. 
 The data shows how senior innovation managers foster distant innovations by establishing 
legitimacy for their role, building corporate-level innovation ambition, and designing corporate 
innovation processes, which gradually lead to the establishment of corporate innovation routines. 
Intriguingly, to establish corporate innovation routines, senior innovation managers combine well 
established mechanistic innovation processes with autocratic, resource-scaling, and experimental 
approaches to managing innovation from the top of the organization. Senior innovation managers 





structures and associated behavioural manifestations as they work on transforming corporate 
innovation routines into a dynamic corporate innovation capability. 
 I synthesize my findings across cases in a grounded theoretical process model, explaining 
how senior innovation managers develop a dynamic corporate innovation capability without 
redirecting all exploration resources away from local innovations supporting core businesses. In 
my model, I conceptualize the work of senior innovation mangers as consisting of three phases: 
(1) connecting past to present, (2) managing risk, and (3) connecting future to present. I use a 
system dynamics approach to disentangle complex interrelationships among these phases, and 
propose a holistic model linking actions by senior innovation managers with the development and 
maintenance of a dynamic corporate innovation capability. 
 The results of the study increase scholarly understanding of the interrelatedness between 
top-down and bottom-up innovation processes in two ways. First, while my findings confirm that 
the use of external knowledge (Chesbrough, 2003; Teece, 2007) is an important element of 
multidivisional firms’ strategy for generating distant innovations, I find that the use of open 
innovation is hindered by its costs and long investment-benefit conversion cycles. As a result, 
senior innovation managers initially rely on leveraging internal bottom-up sources of knowledge, 
using open innovation as a weak complement to—rather than a strong substitute for—sourcing 
novel knowledge internally. Over time, as actions of senior innovation managers increase the 
internal capability to absorb external knowledge, the use of open innovation increases as well.  
Second, I show how senior innovation managers’ regulation of innovation risk across 
individual, business unit, and organizational levels of analysis weakens formal hindrances to self-
organized grassroots innovation initiatives aimed at generating distant innovations. This result 
complements centralized research and development (R&D) innovation literature (Argyres and 
Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014), as it shows that the decoupling of innovation 
activities from the needs of core businesses can be induced at the business unit level, thereby 





1.6 PAPER INTERCONNECTEDNESS 
Taken together, the four papers in my dissertation generate a comprehensive understanding 
of corporate innovation activism through a rigorous research program comprised of an in-depth 
literature review, a deductive theory, and two inductive empirical papers. In the first paper, I map 
the extant knowledge on intra-organizational processes in a multidivisional firm onto an 
evolutionary multilevel framework. Through this structured mapping exercise, I establish what is 
already known, and identify important tensions and knowledge gaps that guide the rest of my 
dissertation. The second paper uses the elaboration of two novel concepts – corporate innovation 
synergy and corporate innovation value-added – to deductively establish the rationale for 
corporate innovation activism. The third paper leverages a hand-collected dataset to open the black 
box of corporate innovation activism. It presents the concept of corporate innovation function, 
inductively examining the genesis of corporate managers’ ability to engage in corporate innovation 
activism. While the third paper is predominantly descriptive in nature, the fourth paper considers 
the system-level aspects of corporate innovation activism through the concept of dynamic 
corporate innovation capability. Understanding how corporate managers can use their agency to 
continuously calibrate the flow of various types of innovation generates important new knowledge 
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CHAPTER 2 INNOVATION MECHANISMS IN A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM: 
MAPPING, SYNTHESIS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 A firm’s resource endowment is a major source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1986; 
Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984), especially in industries with high innovation ferment (Jacobson, 
1992; Schumpeter, 1934; Shilling, 2008). One key resource is a firm’s capability to vary its 
knowledge base to gain access to novel ideas, enabling the firm to maintain or increase its 
environmental fitness (Teece, 2007). Firms can develop novel knowledge internally (Amabile, 
1988) or acquire it externally (Chesbrough, 2006); however, the former option is slow (Gold, 1987) 
and risky (Shi, 2003), while the latter approach is expensive (Katila, Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt, 
2008) and does not guarantee novel knowledge availability, as it can take several decades of 
fundamental research before novel knowledge is commercially exploitable (Van de Ven and 
Garud, 1994). 
 Regardless of the source of the novel knowledge, once it becomes available to a firm, its 
suitability for further development needs to be evaluated (Reitzig and Sorenson, 2013), as most 
firms do not have access to unlimited resources for innovation (Weiss, Hoegl, and Gibbert, 2011). 
The evaluation of novel ideas in a multidivisional firm is a complex multi-role and multilevel 
selection process. Its objectivity can be distorted by individual self-interest (Bower, 1970; Guth 
and MacMillan, 1986), political agendas (Burgelman, 1983a, 1983b), decision-making biases 
(Kahneman, Lovallo, and Sibony, 2011), inter-business unit rivalry (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 
1996), and the divergence of innovation interests between the organization as a whole and 
individual business units (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014). 
  The retention of selected novel ideas within a multidivisional firm is another complex 
process marked by uncertainty and non-linearity (Klein and Sorra, 1996). The implementation 
phase for a specific selected innovation project is often delegated to a concrete business unit, which 





initially allocated to selected innovation projects through the formal budgeting cycle (Bower, 
1970) may prove to be insufficient (Noda and Bower, 1996). Even when the implementation of an 
innovation project is initially successful, its diffusion and adaptation throughout the organization 
is far from certain (Klein and Knight, 2005). When the implementation of an innovation project 
fails, the repercussions of the failure can endanger core businesses (Austin, Devin, and Sullivan, 
2012; Thompson, 1967). 
Despite the criticality of innovation for a firm’s long-term survival (Teece, 2007), the 
management of variation, selection, and retention of novel knowledge in a multidivisional firm 
remains poorly understood as scholars have mainly focused on studying bottom-up innovation 
processes (Anderson, Potocnik, and Zhou, 2014). Further, interactions among the variation, 
selection, and retention processes in a multidivisional firm result in a multilevel process; yet most 
extant literature studying innovation processes is single-level focused (Garud, Tuertscher, and Van 
de Ven, 2013). In consequence, our understanding of top-down interventions in innovation 
processes in a multidivisional firm remains largely undeveloped (Birkinshaw, Bouquet, and 
Barsoux, 2011). Gupta, Tesluk, and Taylor (2007: 886) comment that, “Many studies have sought 
to understand the innovation process (albeit not very often through a multilevel lens), but scholars 
have not yet been able to identify a clear prototypical process for the management of innovation.”1 
Given this lack of top-down multilevel focus in the management scholarship, three aims 
motivate this paper. The first objective is to map existing knowledge on innovation processes 
occurring within a multidivisional firm onto a multilevel evolutionary framework. The second 
objective is to conduct cross-level synthesis of uncovered innovation processes from the top-down 
                                               
1 Clemens Thornquist (2005) argues that the management of innovation is less about finding a generalized innovation 
process and more about continuously finding ways to harbour spontaneous acts of innovation as they occur within the 
organization and enable these innovation acts to find their own paths. I thank Rob Austin for bringing to my attention 





perspective. The third objective is to identify important tensions and knowledge gaps to guide 
future research on the involvement of corporate managers in innovation management. 
To achieve both depth and executability in my review, I adopted four complementary 
approaches to identify extant knowledge on innovation processes relevant to the management of 
innovation in a multidivisional firm. First, I reviewed references included in two recent reviews 
on the management of innovation (i.e., Anderson, Potocnik, and Zhou, 2014; Garud, Tuertscher, 
and Van de Ven, 2013). Second, I searched the Google Scholar interface for the following key 
words: “innovation routines,” “innovation processes,” “innovation capabilities,” “innovation 
management,” “corporate innovation,” and “corporate R&D.” Third, I created a secondary reading 
list based on references I encountered in the first and second approaches. Fourth, as a confirmatory 
check to ensure that no foundational literature has been left out of my review, I cross-checked 
reviewed literature against relevant reading lists from my doctoral studies at INSEAD, University 
of Pennsylvania, and University of Toronto. 
My search yielded knowledge on 39 innovation processes. To organize these innovation 
processes from the perspective of top-down influences on innovation in a multidivisional firm, I 
used an evolutionary multilevel framework. Following the tradition of evolutionary thought in the 
management literature (e.g., Burgelman, 1983a, 1983b; Dosi, 1982; Levinthal, 1998; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982), one organizing dimension consists of three distinct evolutionary phases: variation 
processes (i.e., novel idea pool generation), selection processes (i.e., novel idea prioritization), and 
retention processes (i.e., implementation of selected novel ideas). Considering that the 
organizational context for this review is a multidivisional firm, the other organizing dimension 
consists of four levels of analysis: individual, team, middle manager, and corporate manager. My 
organizing approach is consistent with the accepted view in the literature that the intra-firm 






The paper proceeds as follows. First, I map the uncovered 39 innovation processes onto the 
evolutionary multilevel framework. Second, I synthesize uncovered innovation processes into 
higher-order constructs operating across evolutionary phases and levels of analysis. Third, I 
conclude my review by proposing a comprehensive future research agenda. 
2.2 MAPPING INNOVATION MECHANISMS IN A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM 
2.2.1 VARIATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
 Variation of knowledge in the context of a multidivisional firm involves gaining access to 
knowledge that is novel to the firm. The process of sourcing of this knowledge generates a pool of 
novel ideas from which the firm can draw in its quest to pursue innovation. Novel knowledge 
exists both inside and outside of organizational boundaries. The intra-organizational novel 
knowledge can be sourced through the extraction of novel ideas residing in employees’ minds 
(Nonaka, 1994) and/or the recombination of extant intra-organizational knowledge (Clark and 
Henderson, 1990). External knowledge can be bought through M&A or borrowed using 
partnerships (Capron and Mitchell, 2012). In the following paragraphs, I map various variation 
mechanisms operating in a multidivisional firm onto different levels of analysis. 
2.2.1.1 Individual Level  
2.2.1.1.1 Unstructured Exploration Worktime 
 Intrinsic motivation is the key driver of individual-level innovation pursuits (Amabile, 
1988). Some firms (e.g., Google, 3M) support intrinsic motivation on a continuous basis by 
allowing employees to dedicate a portion of their worktime to unstructured, explorative activities 
based on their own interests (Steiber and Alänge, 2013). Unstructured exploration worktime results 
in conceptually richer innovations when compared to structured exploration activities (Davis, 





path dependencies that are detrimental to a firm’s innovation capability (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984; Levitt and March, 1988), and increases the causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) 
of intra-organizational innovation activities, delaying imitation by rivals (Reed and DeFillippi, 
1990). One limitation for using this mechanism is the constrained ability of employees to make 
temporal mental transitions between structured and unstructured work environments (Jonassen and 
Henning, 1996). Another limitation is the varying responsiveness to unstructured work 
environments of different employee types (Rahrovani, Pinsonneault, and Austin, 2018). Thus, the 
challenge for corporate managers is to provide unstructured innovation worktime opportunities to 
employees who are capable of this mental switching, while customizing, to a certain degree, 
unstructured exploration environments to specific employee types. 
2.2.1.1.2 Bootlegging 
Bootlegging involves covert engagement by employees in innovation activities outside of 
the realm of officially sanctioned innovation projects and without access to official R&D resources 
(Augsdorfer, 1996). It is similar to unstructured exploration worktime activities in that bootleggers 
are intrinsically motivated to pursue an interesting idea. The main difference between the two is 
the illicitness of bootlegging activities, which can expose bootleggers to potential sanctions. 
Augsdorfer, (2005: 1) argues that bootlegging’s “incremental trial-and-error learning” nature 
results in similarly valuable innovation outcomes when compared to officially sanctioned R&D 
innovation projects. In line with this reasoning, Criscuolo, Salter, and Ter Wal (2014: 1301) find 
that bootlegging “enables individuals to gain both explorative advantage over colleagues and more 
time and space to nurture and substantiate embryonic ideas before organizational assessment.” As 
Criscuolo et al. (2014) further note, the challenge for corporate managers is to maintain an 
organizational culture within which bootleggers can pursue their activities without being 
constrained by high demands on behavioural conformity. On the other hand, an abundance of 





for ad hoc exploration activities (March, 1991). Moreover, bootlegging activities result in the 
creation of social bonds among like-minded bootleggers, which can lead to an overall increase in 
organizational innovation capability (Courpasson and Younes, 2018), yet which may also 
undermine formal organizational structures established by corporate managers. 
2.2.1.1.3 Innovation Awards 
  Innovation awards aim at inducing individual-level variation of knowledge, specifically 
targeting employees for whom variation of knowledge is not a formal requirement. Innovation 
awards vary along the monetary component spectrum depending on what type of motivational 
mechanisms they are intended to activate. Non-monetary innovation awards aim at eliciting 
employees’ intrinsic motivation to pursue their innovation interests without the expectation of any 
rewards (Amabile, 1988). Monetary innovation awards act predominantly upon employees’ 
extrinsic motivation, triggered by the expectation of a material reward in exchange for their 
innovation efforts (Amabile, 1997). The design of an effective innovation awards program is a 
non-trivial task due to the potentially conflicting interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivational factors (Benabou and Tirole, 2003). 
2.2.1.1.4 Accidental Innovation 
 In their theory of organizational choice and control, Cyert and March (1963) assume that 
organizations aim at mitigating uncertainty. Similarly, Thompson (1967) argues that a firm’s core 
businesses need to be insulated from random variation. Yet, early organizational theorists also 
allow for novel knowledge to originate from “accidental encounters with opportunities” (March 
and Simon, 1958: 204). To explore the origins of this accidental variation, Austin, Devin, and 
Sullivan (2012) inductively study 20 cases of innovation processes in various settings, and find 
evidence of innovators deliberately incorporating accidents into their innovation activities. The 





the key challenges of such an approach to innovation include the low yield of beneficial accidents 
and the generation of potentially destructive outcomes. Thus, the role of corporate managers in 
accidental innovation is to create an organizational climate that allows accidental innovation to 
occur, while mitigating resource waste and the contagion of system-level risks that endanger the 
organizational core (Thompson, 1967). 
2.2.1.2 Team Level 
2.2.1.2.1 Mitigation of Ideation Inhibitors 
 Ideation researchers have studied team-level inhibitors reducing the variation of knowledge 
and searched for ways to mitigate the effect of these inhibitors. Production blocking refers to the 
air time for individual idea expression being blocked by other team members (Diehl and Stroebe, 
1991). Free riding occurs when individuals can mask their intellectual laziness by hiding within 
the collective output. Evaluation apprehension can prevent individuals from expressing their ideas 
due to the fear of negative evaluation of their idea by peers and/or superiors (Diehl and Stroebe, 
1987). Given that multiple ideation inhibitors that can supress the expression of divergent thinkers 
operate at the team level (Guilford, 1962), the role of corporate managers is to become aware of 
these inhibitors and introduce mitigating mechanisms. Production blocking can be reduced by 
using a sequential variation process, allowing ideas to germinate in individual minds first 
(Valacich, Dennis, and Connoly, 1994). Free riding can be mitigated by incentives balancing 
appreciation of individual and group performance (Toubia, 2006). Interestingly, evaluation 
apprehension has not been found to be a strong ideation inhibitor within the context of a 
multidivisional firm (Reitzig and Maciejovsky, 2015). 
2.2.1.2.2 Skunk Works Projects 
 “Skunk works” projects involve small teams with limited resources working on exploratory 





Skunk works projects are effectively moderately resourced unstructured exploration worktimes. 
Skunk works teams can be officially sanctioned by managers or they can sometimes emerge 
informally, drawing on organizational resources without formal approval, especially when they 
start as a bootlegging activity which gets exposed to the wider organization. The variation of 
knowledge occurring within skunk works project activities is more likely to result in radical, as 
opposed to incremental, innovations (Fosfuri and Rønde, 2009). The challenge for corporate 
managers is to manage an organization within their firm’s boundaries which operates in a highly 
unstructured manner, potentially creating conflict with other areas of the organization when skunk 
works activities require additional resource infusions (Rosneau, 1988). Such tension arises from 
the coexistence of highly resource-intensive innovation teams working alongside organizational 
functions focused on resource efficiency (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992). Essentially, a firm’s 
ability to concurrently harbour skunk works activities alongside more formalized R&D activities, 
as well as exploitation activities, can enable its ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004).  
2.2.1.2.3 Hackathons 
 The Oxford dictionary defines a “hackathon” as “[a]n event, typically lasting several days, 
in which a large number of people meet to engage in collaborative computer programming.”2 
Hackathons involve typically short-term collaboration among computer experts and other 
professionals who are brought together to solve a particular problem using digital technologies 
(Briscoe and Mulligan, 2018). While initially hackathons were the domain of start-ups, large 
organizations have increasingly adopted the hackathon approach to lessen built-up rigidities and 
drive innovation (Grijpink, Lau, and Vara, 2015). The three main differences between hackathons 
and skunk works projects are hackathons’ shorter temporal bracketing, focus on solving a concrete 
predefined problem, and the fluidity of the team composition. In the process of solving a concrete 
                                               





problem, the hackathons’ creative and experimental environment (Briscoe and Mulligan, 2018: 1) 
may lead to the discovery of novel ideas, which can then be further developed within the skunk 
works type of explorative environment. 
2.2.1.3 Middle Manager Level 
2.2.1.3.1 Explorative Key Performance Indicators 
The focus of middle managers is on maintaining the continuity of operations within their 
business units (Huy, 2002). The continuity of operations within a business unit requires mostly 
incremental variation of knowledge (Huy, 2001). Yet, in times of ferment, more radical variation 
of knowledge may be required to sustain a business unit’s market relevance (Burgelman, 1983b). 
Given middle managers’ role as guarantors of predictability of outcomes at the business unit level, 
their support for more radical variation of knowledge is contingent on the type of incentives they 
receive from corporate managers. When middle managers’ key performance indicators (KPIs) 
incentivize primarily exploitation-related outcomes, middle managers are less likely to support the 
diversion of resources from exploitation to exploration (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra, 2002). 
While corporate managers possess the agency to refocus middle managers’ KPIs towards variation 
of knowledge, doing so may lessen middle managers’ capability to deliver steady results. Further, 
as most middle managers are naturally inclined towards exploitation (Huy, 2001), introducing 
innovation-focused KPIs at the middle manager level may not be the most effective way for 
generating variation of knowledge. That possibility does not preclude that some middle managers 
may be highly capable individual-level innovators. 
2.2.1.4 Corporate Manager Level 





  Many multidivisional firms trace their origins to the innovation genius of their founders. 
Through the process of founders’ imprinting (Stinchcombe, 1965), the initial innovation impetus 
continues beyond the founders’ tenure. The challenge for subsequent generations of corporate 
managers is to leverage founders’ innovation imprint to continuously generate variation of 
knowledge within and across business units. Further complications arise when multiple founders’ 
innovation imprints coexist within a single multidivisional firm due to non-organic growth modes 
(Capron and Mitchell, 2012). Such plurality of founders’ innovation imprints can potentially lead 
to clashes among orthogonal innovation cultures (Van den Steen, 2010). In addition, in times of 
corporate downscoping (Hitt et al., 2009), a firm can be stripped of business units harbouring a 
strong founders’ innovation imprint.3  
2.2.1.4.2 Problemistic Search 
 Cyert and March (1963: 169) postulate that the act of searching is “problem-directed,” 
coining the term problemistic search. Problemistic search starts when managers identify an 
existing or emerging performance gap vis-à-vis an organizational goal. Problemistic search stops 
when a solution is found to increase the performance to attain the goal, or when the performance 
gap is closed by lowering the aspiration level related to the goal. Search is typically triggered by 
significant crises (e.g., a competitor’s innovation breakthrough (Cyert and March, 1963: 170)). 
Problemistic search is marked by initially confining the search effort to the immediate 
neighbourhood of the problem. If this local search fails to address the problem, managers can either 
expand it to more distant search spaces or leverage organizational slack. The challenge faced by 
corporate managers is that the widening performance gap does not guarantee the triggering of a 
more distant search (Greve, 1998), as problemistic search is subject to individual- and 
organizational-level biases. Thus, a possible task for corporate managers is the introduction of 
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Electric’s ongoing attempt to divest of its lighting businesses, founded by Thomas Edison in 1890. 





mechanisms which decrease the detection time of the widening performance gap and increase 
organizational focus on the more distant search by managing individual and organizational biases. 
2.2.1.4.3 Intra-Organizational Experiential Learning 
 A multidivisional firm typically possesses a rich repository of past experiences acquired 
during its transformation from a single business unit enterprise into a multidivisional enterprise. 
As the history of a multidivisional firm is charted, activities generating positive outcomes are given 
further impetus by senior managers, while activities resulting in negative outcomes are supressed 
(Levitt and March, 1988). Over time, this trial-and-error-based process leads to the establishment 
of intra-organizational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). As a stable set of intra-organizational 
routines can give rise to competency rigidity (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Teece, 2007), which impacts a firm’s innovation capability 
(Atuahene-Gima, 2005), the challenge for corporate managers is to recognize when intra-
organizational routines are no longer aligned with environmental shifts, and to decide on corrective 
actions. 
2.2.1.4.4 Extra-Organizational Experiential Learning 
 Experiential learning can also involve past experiences which occurred outside of a firm’s 
organizational boundaries. Firms can learn by observing, absorbing (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), 
and imitating (Greve, 2005) successful innovations introduced by rivals. Firms can also learn from 
competitors’ innovation failures (Maslach, 2016). Maslach, Branzei, Rerup, and Zbaracki (2018) 
explore this type of learning by analyzing failure data from the medical device industry. Using 
qualitative analysis, Maslach et al. (2018: 7) find that firms use public failure data to “identify 
aspects of experience that they had not seen in their own experience, to find more ways of seeing 
these adverse events, and to learn from events that would not have happened with their own 





learning. Overall, this pioneering research stream demonstrates that firms can generate variation 
of knowledge by studying aversive counterfactuals documented in public repositories, drawing on 
the experiential learning of other firms without directly experiencing the negative consequences 
of failure. 
2.2.1.4.5 Cognitive Learning 
 As stewards of their organizations, senior managers must constantly evaluate the 
opportunity landscape surrounding their organizations (Teece, 2007). Yet, senior managers’ 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1979) mitigates their capability to continuously and reliably 
identify and pursue the best opportunities. Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) use a computer simulation 
to explore cognition-based learning and its relationship with experiential-based learning. Their 
main finding is that cognition allows managers to identify new high-potential areas within the 
opportunity landscape, enlarging the pool of possible applications of experiential learning. Further, 
they find that while flexibility in managerial cognition increases organizational adaptation, new 
cognitive mental models can cause experiential wisdom obsolescence. Thus, a key challenge for 
corporate managers is to manage this trade-off between the introduction into the organization of 
vastly better opportunity sets and their negative impact on the exploitability of accumulated 
knowledge. 
2.2.1.4.6  R&D Centralization 
 R&D centralization shifts the locus of some R&D activities from business units into the 
corporate realm. Scholars studying the effects of R&D centralization (Argyres and Silverman, 
2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014) find that centralized R&D activities result in more general 
innovation outcomes, while business unit-level R&D activities generate innovations with narrower 
and more immediate applications. In this way, R&D centralization can be a useful tool for 
corporate managers to create conditions allowing for the concurrent pursuit of heterogeneous 





so, corporate managers create parallel innovation structures, potentially leading to tensions among 
various groups of researchers. Another issue is the difficulty of the intra-firm knowledge transfer 
(Szulanski, 1996), as the variation of knowledge achieved at the corporate level needs to be 
codified and transmitted (Zollo, 1998) to areas of the organization earmarked for further 
development of the new knowledge. 
2.2.1.4.7 Corporate Entrepreneurship 
 Corporate entrepreneurship is another mechanism available to corporate managers for the 
discovery of new opportunity sets through “activities that enhance a company’s ability to innovate, 
take risk, and seize opportunities in the markets” (Zahra, 1991: 259). Using data from the chemical 
industry, Ahuja and Lampert (2001: 540) find that “the pursuit of novel, emerging, and pioneering 
technologies leads to breakthrough inventions.” They further suggest the existence of a “virtuous 
circle of corporate entrepreneurship,” whereby breakthrough innovations create slack resources 
(Penrose, 1959), supporting the next cycle of intra-organizational innovation experimentation with 
the aim to generate additional breakthrough innovations. Once the corporate entrepreneurship 
capability is developed, scaling it down can significantly reduce firm-level performance (Lim, 
Celly, Morse, and Rowe, 2013). Thus, corporate managers must continuously support corporate 
entrepreneurship, even during periods of challenging economic conditions—though this may 
prove difficult as funding for exploration can be vulnerable to budget cuts in times of crisis 
(Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011). 
2.2.1.4.8 Innovation Jams 
 “Innovation Jams” are large-scale ideation events conducted using online networking 
platforms with the aim of generating many novel ideas over a short time period (Bjelland and 
Wood, 2008). The “IBM’s 2006 InnovationJam®” (IBM, 2018) provided a major impetus for other 
firms to employ Innovation Jams. Innovation Jams can involve multiple internal and external 





is that these large-scale innovation events mass produce innovation ideas which vary greatly in 
quality and potential. This mass production of heterogeneous innovation ideas requires substantial 
deployment of resources to conduct the post-Innovation Jam selection process. This selection 
process, which aims to separate innovation idea “unicorns” from low-potential ideas, is a non-
trivial undertaking (Reitzig, 2011). 
2.2.1.4.9 Open Innovation 
 Corporate entrepreneurship often takes the form of open innovation when a firm sources 
knowledge located outside of its boundaries (Chesbrough, 2006). Sources of external knowledge 
include consumers, individual inventors, other firms, or public institutions. A case of corporate 
entrepreneurship employing the open innovation approach is corporate venturing, whereby a firm 
acquires a start-up to gain access to its technological knowledge (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). A 
firm can also buy non-controlling equity stakes in multiple start-ups to spread its bets on numerous 
emerging technologies (Puranam and Vanneste, 2016). There are several issues corporate 
managers face when they seek knowledge through open innovation. The knowledge sought by a 
firm may not yet exist externally. When it is available, external knowledge may be fully priced in 
the resource markets, lowering a firm’s capability to use it to gain a competitive advantage over 
its rivals. In cases when the external knowledge is available and can be sourced at an attractive 
valuation, the receiving firm may not have a suitable internal environment for developing the 
knowledge further. For instance, Puranam,  Singh, and Zollo (2006) find that novel knowledge 
sourced through a start-up acquisition can be destroyed by an acquirer’s lack of capability to 
nurture an emerging technology prior to its commercialization. 
2.2.2 SELECTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
A key managerial task is to continuously optimize the ratio between exploration for novel 





implementation) to ensure the most effective use of organizational resources from the perspective 
of a firm’s long-term survival. Variation of knowledge activities generate novel knowledge, 
which needs to be prioritized for several reasons. First, firms are resource-constrained systems 
(Kornai, 1979), requiring resource allocation prioritization (Bower, 1970). Second, some novel 
knowledge is not exploitable in the short term due to lack of immediate consumer interest. Third, 
some variation of knowledge with the potential for disrupting the organizational status quo may 
not be politically acceptable. Fourth, some novel knowledge may lead to innovation outcomes 
that are not socially acceptable.4 Finally, some novel knowledge can simply be too costly to 
implement. Overall, “we have tended to treat the problem of evaluation as trivial or self-evident” 
(Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007: 51). In the following paragraphs, I review extant knowledge on 
the selection of novel knowledge at different levels of analysis. 
2.2.2.1 Individual Level 
2.2.2.1.1 Temporal Sheltering of Novel Ideas 
 The organizational form of a multidivisional firm tends to be characterized by high levels 
of hierarchy and the limited ability of employees possessing formal power to evaluate objectively 
novel ideas. Using a simulation, Knudsen and Levinthal (2007) find that such selection 
environments tend to be cautious, which increases the likelihood of the elimination of superior 
novel ideas (i.e., Type I selection error). Thus, corporate managers can support a temporal 
sheltering of novel ideas, delaying their exposure to the hierarchical/imprecise selection process. 
During this sheltering period, individual innovators can work on developing their novel ideas into 
more defensible projects, which are then harder to reject based purely on caution. 
                                               
4 A recent example of such constraint is Facebook’s decision to patent software allowing it to use a phone’s 
microphone to record users’ reactions to advertisements, but not commercialize it. 
https://www.engadget.com/2018/06/28/facebook-patent-turns-phone-mics-on-to-record-reactions-to-ads/ accessed 





2.2.2.1.2 Legitimization of Bootlegging Outputs 
Building on insights by Knudsen and Levinthal (2007), Criscuolo, Salter, and Ter Wal 
(2014) study how researchers in mature organizations carve out autonomy for their non-
mainstream innovation research activities. They find that scientists routinely take their research 
underground (i.e., bootlegging) to escape normative organizational pressures and allow their novel 
ideas to develop to a stage that facilitates legitimization and the provision of further organizational 
resources. The challenge for corporate managers is to ensure that these bootlegging activities are 
eventually exposed to the formal selection process, as opposed to just fizzling out either due to a 
lack of resources or due to being spun outside of organizational boundaries. 
2.2.2.2 Team Level 
2.2.2.2.1 Openness to External Ideas 
 Intra-organizational teams are biased towards the promotion of ideas generated within the 
team at the expense of ideas from external sources (Katz and Allen, 1982). Internal sources of 
extra-team knowledge include teams operating in different functional, geographical, or cultural 
contexts. External sources of extra-team knowledge include suppliers, other firms, independent 
inventors, and public entities. The rejection of external knowledge stems from psychological 
biases resulting in the erroneous assessment of the utility of external knowledge (Antons and 
Piller, 2015). Even when biases causing the “not invented here” (NIH) syndrome (Katz and 
Allen, 1982) are overcome and a team actively seeks external knowledge, the tacit nature of 
novel knowledge makes its transmission, comprehension, and utilization by the recipient 
difficult (Szulanski, 1996). 
2.2.2.2.2 Hybrid Ideation Process 
 Brainstorming refers to the generation and selection of novel ideas in a group setting 





ideation has been subjected to several experiments in the psychology literature that suggest the 
contrary (Diehl and Stroebe, 1987). In innovation management scholarship, Girotra, Terwiesch, 
and Ulrich (2010) test the effects of temporal bifurcation of ideation into individual and collective 
components. They find that when the individual-level ideation precedes the team ideation, more 
novel ideas are generated which are, on average, of better quality compared to the brainstorming 
scenario. They further find that sequencing individual and group ideation processes results in 
higher idea-selection ability at the team level. Corporate managers face the challenge of creating 
organizational environments conducive to this hybrid (Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010: 1) 
ideation process in order to allow for temporal separation between individual and collective 
ideation processes without separating them completely. 
2.2.2.2.3 Rapid Prototyping 
 The idea that a mature organization should incorporate start-up like environments into its 
organizational design has recently gained increasing popularity (Ries, 2011). One mechanism that 
can approximate a start-up like environment is rapid prototyping rooted in the trial-and-error type 
of experimentation (Thomke, 2001). The rapid prototyping capability allows innovators to quickly 
transition from the initial ideation stage into the proof of concept phase, while minimizing the use 
of resources. Rapid prototyping has become cheaper to execute due to the increased accessibility 
of simulation methods testing the “what-if” scenarios approximating laboratory settings (Thomke, 
2003). When the proof of concept phase is unsuccessful, rapid prototyping allows an innovation 
project to fail fast, thereby mitigating the resource waste and failure risk contagion. One challenge 
with using rapid prototyping is the assumption that the ideal outcome is already known, and the 
novel idea is merely evaluated against a known desired state.5 Yet, Austin and Devin (2003) find 
that creative thinkers search for emerging ideas which are truly original, as opposed to simply 
evaluating a possibly original idea against extant knowledge. 
                                               





2.2.2.2.4  Customer Feedback 
 Ultimately, an innovation should create value for the end user, either internally or 
externally. A prototype solution can be subjected to feedback by end users to test its potential to 
generate value (Slater and Mohr, 2006). Products can be also tested in limited geographical 
markets (Fortune, 2015) and/or limited areas of a firm’s operations; this way, should the novel 
idea prove to be a flop, the potential damage to a firm’s core businesses is contained (Thompson, 
1967). 
2.2.2.3 Middle Manager Level 
2.2.2.3.1 Strategic Context 
 Strategic context refers to “the political mechanisms through which middle managers 
question the current concept of strategy, and provide the top management with the opportunity to 
rationalize, retroactively, successful autonomous strategic behaviour” (Burgelman, 1983b: 1352). 
Through the process of strategic context, middle managers risk their reputations by pitching 
bottom-up novel ideas to corporate managers (Burgelman, 1983a; Noda and Bower, 1996). Thus, 
middle managers act as selection agents, evaluating the merit of ideas originating at lower 
organizational levels. Corporate managers can manage the strategic context selection environment 
by influencing decision-making biases operating at the middle manager level. Middle managers’ 
decision-making biases include risk aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), self-interest 
(Bower, 1970), evaluation apprehension, and perceived lack of control (Reitzig and Maciejovsky, 
2015: 1979). From the corporate managers’ perspective, the challenge is to become aware of 
possible biases operating at the middle manager level and design effective mitigating mechanisms. 
2.2.2.3.2 Hierarchical Layering 
 Sah and Stigliz (1986) argue that middle managers’ willingness to submit an innovation 





layers installed above them. However, Reitzig and Maciejovsky (2015) test this prediction using 
simulation and experimental data and find the opposite result; the steeper the hierarchy above 
them, the less likely middle managers are to pass up novel ideas. Interestingly, they note that 
middle managers do not appear to be overly concerned about the quality of their selection skills 
(i.e., the risk of committing an error of commission damaging their reputation). Instead, Reitzig 
and Maciejovsky (2015) find that middle managers’ behaviour can be explained by their fear of 
superiors giving them additional evaluation work. Based on this result, corporate managers face 
the challenge of designing incentive programs for middle managers to lessen their concern about 
unnecessarily generating additional work for themselves. Alternatively, corporate managers could 
reroute bottom-up idea flows so that they largely bypass middle managers. 
2.2.2.3.3 Emotions 
 In his study of the role of emotions in a large multidivisional firm, Huy (2011) shows that 
by regulating middle managers’ group-focused emotions, elicited by middle managers’ perceived 
belonging to an identifiable group within the firm, corporate managers can steer middle managers’ 
selection decision making. On the other hand, middle managers’ emotions can distort the bottom-
up information flow. By qualitatively studying the factors which led to the demise of Nokia, Vuori, 
and Huy (2016) find that middle managers’ fear of peers and corporate managers reduced the 
amount of unfavourable information that they were transmitting to corporate managers. 
Consequently, corporate managers formed an overly positive view of the firm’s performance, 
which reduced their focus on the need to sustain innovation activities. 
2.2.2.4 Corporate Manager Level 
2.2.2.4.1 Structural Context 
 Structural context is set by corporate managers and encapsulates administrative rules as 





behaviour of lower-level employees without the need for continuous corporate-level managerial 
involvement (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983a). The aim of corporate managers in determining 
the structural context is to align employees’ activities towards the fulfilment of corporate strategy. 
As Burgelman remarks (1983c: 66), the contingency of structural context on corporate strategy 
supports Chandler’s (1962) observation that structure follows strategy. Over time, corporate 
managers can adjust specific elements of the structural context (e.g., appointment of middle 
managers, changes to KPIs) to influence the selection of novel ideas (Bower, 1970). This gradual 
adjustment of the corporate context increases the likelihood that novel ideas deviating from the 
corporate strategy will be selected by middle managers and brought to the attention of corporate 
managers (Burgelman, 1983c). 
2.2.2.4.2 Direct Exposure to Innovation Activities 
 Given that corporate managers are primarily focused on high-level decision making, they 
are unlikely to become involved in the origination of novel ideas on a continuous basis. Yet, their 
senior role does not preclude them from coming into proximity with innovation activities, and 
providing their endorsement or skepticism of novel ideas at early stages of their development. For 
instance, 3M’s top executives regularly visit the company’s research labs and engage in 
discussions with lab researchers (Berger et al., 2008). Another mechanism for reducing the 
distance between corporate managers and innovation activities is hierarchical flattening, whereby 
the number of layers of middle managers is reduced (Lerner and Wulf, 2007; Teece, 1996). 
Further, Teece (2007: 1335) argues that organizational decentralization “brings top management 
closer to new technologies, the customer, and the market.” In line with Teece’s (2007) argument, 
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004: 223) note that in business units in which exploitation and 
exploration activities coexist, “senior executives [play] a more interventionist role, focused on 






2.2.3 RETENTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
 Retention of novel knowledge involves implementation of selected innovation projects. 
Retention of novel ideas necessitates the allocation of different types of knowledge retention 
resources over varying time periods. Knowledge retention resources include managerial attention, 
employee time, physical materials, tools and machinery, physical space, and software. These 
resources ultimately consume a firm’s financial resources, which puts a time limit on how long a 
specific knowledge retention activity can be pursued without generating any value. In the 
following paragraphs, I review the existing scholarship related to retention of novel knowledge at 
different levels of analysis. 
2.2.3.1 Individual Level 
2.2.3.1.1 Individual-Level Failure Management 
 Most innovation projects fail (Carr, Hard, and Trahant, 1996; Cozijnsen, Vrakking, and 
van Ijzerloo, 2000). Failed innovation projects can be potentially detrimental for firm-level 
performance (Austin, Devin, and Sullivan, 2012). Yet, corporate managers themselves are mostly 
shielded from the negative impact of innovation failures on their careers, unlike employees who 
engage directly in innovation activities (Birkinshaw, Hamel, and Mol, 2008). Thus, corporate 
managers face the challenge of creating an organizational climate which encourages individual-
level explorative behaviour and concurrently mitigates innovation risks at the individual level. The 
creation of such an organizational climate is a non-trivial undertaking as most employees avoid 
situations which could associate them with a failed project (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). 
2.2.3.1.2 Explorative Human Resource Management  
 Human resource management systems can be configured to support explorative behaviour 
past the generation of a novel idea on the individual level. Drawing on human resource 





planning, performance appraisal, reward systems, and career management as key pillars which 
could be used by managers to encourage individual employees to continuously engage in 
explorative behaviour. The tension arises when the top-down encouragement of exploration at the 
individual level conflicts with an employee’s formal role focused on exploitation. Such tension is 
likely to be exacerbated when an employee’s immediate superior perceives this employee’s pursuit 
of explorative activities as a diversion of resources under his/her control. Corporate managers can 
protect emerging innovators from exploitative pressures by establishing a network of innovation 
mentors to nurture emerging innovation talent (Cohn, Katzenbach, and Vlak, 2008). 
2.2.3.2 Team Level 
2.2.3.2.1 Iterated Resource Allocation 
 Resources that are released in large discrete amounts within the annual budgeting cycle 
exercise are typically earmarked for induced innovation projects which were given impetus by 
corporate managers (Bower, 1970). Yet, the implementation of innovation projects rarely 
follows a linear path as new obstacles are discovered, projected paths reach impasses, and 
internal frictions derail the implementation progress (Klein and Sorra, 1996). Further, 
autonomous innovation activities give rise to innovation projects for which no resource 
allocation was made in the backward-looking annual budgeting exercise. These factors combine 
to generate unplanned resource demands. In a qualitative study examining strategy making in 
the telecommunication industry, Noda and Bower (1996) find that corporate managers are more 
likely to respond to these unplanned resource demands—which the authors call “iterated 
resource allocation”—when they are informed of a specific innovation project’s intermediary 
milestone attainments. Corporate managers face the challenge of receiving distorted milestone 
signals when these signals must pass through multiple hierarchical layers, as well as the 






2.2.3.2.2 Innovation Team Composition 
 The development of each innovation project is likely to require a unique set of human 
resources (Tushman and Nadler, 1986). Thus, it is unlikely that a firm can optimize its innovation 
implementation process solely by relying upon a dedicated innovation implementation team 
without recourse to human resources scattered across the organization. A more realistic scenario 
is a tailored assembly of a team best suited for the development of a specific innovation project. 
Such a team can include dedicated innovation implementers, novel idea originators, subject matter 
experts, engineers, software developers, testers, project managers, and those in other roles. The 
challenge with this approach is that the assembly of such project-specific teams is likely to require 
pulling employees from their formal roles and temporally assigning them to these ad hoc 
innovation projects. Such an approach can generate tensions with employees’ superiors, who may 
not be willing to relinquish (even on a temporary basis) control over these human resources. 
Further, managers run the risk of losing these employees permanently if the innovation project 
creates conditions for employees’ permanent reassignment. 
2.2.3.3 Middle Manager Level 
2.2.3.3.1 Sponsorship of Innovation 
The need for corporate managers to find sponsors for an innovation project hinges on the 
type of project. Incremental innovation projects are likely to already have a home within an 
existing business unit, whereas more radical innovation projects may need to be pitched to business 
units, or a new organizational structure may need to be set up for their development (McDermott 
and O’Connor, 2002). Yet, as the development of an innovation project often requires the 
dedication of resources initially earmarked for exploitation, middle managers may be reluctant to 
sponsor innovation projects. The NIH syndrome can be another factor biasing middle managers 





2.2.3.3.2 Managerial Style 
 The primary role of middle managers is to ensure the efficient utilization of organizational 
resources to meet short-term performance targets (Huy, 2001). Aside from their role in 
exploitation, middle managers can also play a crucial role in ensuring that their organization adapts 
to environmental changes (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra, 2002). To increase the support at the 
middle manager level for explorative projects, corporate managers can purposefully appoint 
middle managers inclined to support innovations. Kanter (1982: 96) studies 165 middle managers 
across five firms and finds that managers who are open to change, adopt a long-term orientation, 
can navigate internal politics, and are agreeable yet persistent are more likely to be open to novel 
ideas and proactively transmit information about bottom-up innovation activities to corporate 
managers. 
2.2.3.3.3 Promotion of Innovators 
 Another mechanism operating at the middle manager level that can be enacted by corporate 
managers is the promotion of successful innovators into the middle management rank. Cohn, 
Katzenbach, and Vlak (2008) study innovation processes in 25 firms across industries and find 
that the promotion of internal or external innovators into the middle management rank gives rise 
to innovation networks. These innovation networks counterbalance the tendency of middle 
managers to support exploitation over exploration (March, 1991). The challenge for corporate 
managers in this regard is related to the difficulty of identifying employees who can successfully 
assume both innovation and managerial roles.  
2.2.3.4 Corporate Manager Level 
2.2.3.4.1 Resource Allocation  
 The implementation of selected innovation projects requires the allocation of resources. 





resources that are expected to be available to the programs and organizational units that will require 
them” as part of a top-down budgeting process (Ackoff, 1970: 66). Based on several detailed field 
studies, Bower (1970) finds that resource allocation is a convoluted, multi-hierarchical, and 
longitudinal process infused by organizational politics. According to Bower (1970), corporate 
managers identify resource allocation needs, develop policies for governing the resource allocation 
process, and establish monitoring and reward systems to align the resource allocation process with 
the overall corporate strategy. The difficulty for corporate managers arises from the non-linear 
nature of innovation implementation (Klein and Sorra, 1996), which generates ad hoc resourcing 
needs outside of the formal resource allocation process studied by Bower (1970).  
2.2.3.4.2 Variation Control Technologies6 
 Several approaches aimed at controlling the variation of process outcomes have influenced 
intra-organizational innovation processes. For instance, the Six Sigma approach “measures the 
degree to which any business process deviates from its goal” (Harry, 1998: 60). Many firms well 
known for their innovative products (e.g., 3M, Boeing, GE, and Motorola7) have adopted the Six 
Sigma approach when implementing innovation projects (Benner and Tushman, 2003). Six Sigma 
innovation implementation requires a certain degree of efficiency. Yet, that efficiency can also 
limit innovation activities. Therefore, the main challenge for corporate managers is not to stifle 
innovation by overemphasizing the Six Sigma approach, given that riskier projects are especially 
unlikely to follow a predictable path. George Buckley, CEO of 3M, commented, “There has to be 
a sprinkle of ‘magic dust’ to produce great products, or whatever it is you wish to call the 
inspiration that is the mother of invention. Serendipity, accidents, blind luck, and other things all 
play a part. You can’t put that into a can or a Six Sigma process.” (Berger et al., 2009: 66). 
                                               
6 I thank Rob Austin for suggesting this more general label for approaches used to reduce variation of outcomes in 
innovation activities. 





2.2.3.4.3 Stage‐Gate® System 
A Stage‐Gate® approach to innovation management aims to structure the new product 
development process into distinctive phases (Cooper, 1990). In this approach, managers determine 
a prototypical development trajectory consisting of various stages. As a novel idea passes through 
these stages, its fitness for being commercialized into a viable new product is being systematically 
evaluated. Thus, the Stage‐Gate® approach concerns both the selection and retention of novel 
ideas. The key challenge for corporate managers is to prevent the transformation of the Stage‐
Gate® system into a rigid project management tool that reduces the selection of, and/or retention 
support for, novel ideas which do not follow the expected developmental path (Benner and 
Tushman, 2003; Cooper, 2008). Another challenge is that the Stage‐Gate® system focuses on the 
process of idea flow within an organization and neglects the complex emergence and development 
of an idea itself, which may not always follow prescribed trajectories nor conform to 
predetermined developmental expectations (Thornquist, 2005).8 
2.2.3.4.4 Innovation Pipeline 
 Many multidivisional firms aim at achieving a predetermined percentage of revenues and 
profitability by selling products and services introduced over a set period of time (Schilling, 2008). 
Accordingly, a vital issue for corporate managers is the management of the innovation 
implementation flow (i.e., the innovation pipeline) in terms of its distribution across different 
innovation types, degree of innovation novelty, and market and time diffusion. For instance, 3M’s 
innovation pipeline is comprised of five innovation classes, which are monitored and resourced by 
corporate managers based on market demand and technological advancements available to 3M 
(Berger et al., 2009). 
2.2.3.4.5 Codification of Knowledge 
                                               





 A key concern for corporate managers is the diffusion of innovation into other parts of their 
firms beyond the immediate area in which the initial implementation took place. The intra-firm 
diffusion of innovation knowledge is a non-trivial process (Klein and Knight, 2005), marked by 
knowledge tacitness (Polanyi, 1967) and stickiness (Szulanski, 1996). An important enabler of 
intra-organizational innovation diffusion is codification of knowledge pertaining to the 
implemented innovation (Zollo, 1998). Codification of knowledge is “the process of conversion 
of knowledge into messages which can be then processed as information” (Cowan and Foray, 
1997: 596). Codification of knowledge enables both contemporaneous and temporal innovation 
diffusion, especially when members of the implementation team possessing the tacit knowledge 
can no longer be consulted (Kim, 1993). Corporate managers face the dilemma of codification of 
knowledge being both an enabler of its diffusion and a source of potential knowledge rigidity due 
to the path-dependent nature of the knowledge codification process (Cowan and Foray, 1997; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
2.3 SYNTHESIS ACROSS LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
 From the perspective of corporate managers, what are the main managerial approaches they 
can deploy to manage innovation activities within their firms? The above overview is somewhat 
limited by its discreteness because in a real-world multidivisional firm, most of the uncovered 
mechanisms operate across evolutionary phases and levels of analysis. Further, the uncovered 
mechanisms are unlikely to be deployed in isolation without managers considering inter-
mechanism interactions. To reflect this complexity of the organizational reality, I synthesize the 
uncovered mechanisms into three higher-order classes of corporate interventions in innovation 
activities: the first class is comprised of structured approaches; the second class consists of 






2.3.1 STRUCTURING INNOVATION ACTIVITIES 
2.3.1.1 Letting Innovation Follow Organizational Design 
 A specific organizational design choice by corporate managers can increase the probability 
of the generation of a certain type of innovation. For example, organizational design of a skunk 
works project aims specifically at generating radical, as opposed to incremental, innovations 
(Fosfuri and Rønde, 2009). Similarly, centralization of innovation activities is likely to result in 
more general innovations, while the delegation of innovation decision making to business unit 
heads often leads to incremental innovations centred around the core businesses (Argyres and 
Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014). Corporate managers can also vary the use of 
temporal organizational designs. When corporate managers aim at producing a large pool of novel 
ideas, they can organize an innovation jam (Bjelland and Wood, 2008). When they need creative 
solutions to a specific problem, they can sponsor a hackathon (Briscoe and Mulligan, 2018). Thus, 
while a specific organizational design choice does not guarantee a desired innovation outcome, 
organizational design choice can increase the probability of a desired innovation outcome. 
2.3.1.2 Adopting Organizational Design to Innovation 
In some cases, structure follows innovation. For instance, when an external innovation is 
introduced into a multidivisional firm from an acquired start-up, the multidivisional firm’s rigid 
formal organizational structures can suffocate the acquired innovation before it develops into a 
viable innovation project (Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006). Accordingly, when a novel idea 
emerges and/or is introduced into the organization, corporate managers often need to create a 
specific organizational design that is best suited for the development of the novel idea. More 
generally, after deciding on preferred types of innovations, corporate managers can adjust the 
structuring of the selection process along the hierarchy-polyarchy spectrum to manage the trade-





2.3.1.3 Pursuing Organizational Design Plurality 
Given the multitude of available ideation modes and the constantly evolving external 
environment, it is unlikely that corporate managers can decide on a specific structuring approach 
without constantly adjusting it. One solution lies in the coexistence of a variety of organizational 
designs within the boundaries of a single firm to enable the simultaneous pursuit of various 
innovation types. Corporate managers pursuing such organizational design plurality are in fact 
aiming to achieve innovation type ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004).  
One hurdle to achieving innovation type ambidexterity is the cost of maintaining 
organizational design plurality due to duplicity of resourcing (McAdam and Galloway, 2005), 
rivalry among various innovation units, or the cost of intra-organizational transmission of 
innovation knowledge related to complex coordination requirements. Another issue is the fact that 
variation presents itself sequentially and often unexpectedly. This sequential and ad hoc nature of 
the variation process can be addressed through organizational design sequential ambidexterity 
(Venkatraman, Lee, and Iyer, 2007). Further, creative employees are prone to identity crises when 
they are required to switch between creative and execution-focused roles (Gotsi, Andriopoulos, 
Lewis, and Ingram, 2010), which again highlights the value of organizational design plurality as a 
way to manage innovation identity transitions. 
2.3.2 NUDGING INNOVATION ACTIVITIES 
 Corporate managers can influence the behaviour of employees by acting on employees’ 
psychology across evolutionary phases and levels of analysis. “Nudging” innovation activities 
refers to subtle, purposeful psychological interventions by corporate managers to induce a specific 
innovation behaviour from employees. Some forms of nudging are open and known to employees, 
while others take the form of covert manipulations without employees’ direct awareness of such 





2.3.2.1 Stimulating Intrinsic Motivation 
Intrinsic motivation has been found to be a powerful individual-level driving force that 
induces employees to pursue innovation activities (Zhang and Bartol, 2010). Corporate managers 
can induce intrinsic motivation in several ways. While intrinsic motivation stems from an 
employee’s personal interest in an activity (Amabile, 1988), it can be increased by setting general 
achievement targets in the form of milestones which employees pursuing innovation activities 
through their personal interest are expected to achieve through individual-level effort. These 
general achievement targets further stimulate the self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982) of ideating 
employees who are capable of reaching them (Cameron, Banko, and Pierce, 2001).  
Such general achievement targets can involve various degrees of complexity depending on 
the general level of employees’ sophistication and capability, based on the organization type. For 
instance, employees working in a repetitive task environment may be asked for a one page 
summary of the innovation project, whereas in organizations comprised mainly of employees with 
advanced STEM degrees, employees may be required to produce a working prototype. Intrinsic 
motivation is associated with individual employees and the variation stage of the innovation 
process. 
2.3.2.2 Managing Fear of Innovation 
Innovation activities produce uncertain outcomes (Levine, 1980). Uncertainty of outcomes 
generates fear (Lee and Kelley, 2008). As Lee and Kelley (2008: 163) note in their study of 
innovation project leaders, this fear effect, in and of itself, is not necessarily undesirable as “fear 
of failure [tends] to weed out those lacking the drive to engage in high-risk activity.” Further, the 
authors find that expertise acts as an insulator from the inhibiting effect of fear on innovation 
activities, which naturally draws employees with sufficient levels of self-efficacy to specific 
innovation projects (Bandura, 1982), which in turn increases their intrinsic motivation (as 





a certain level of fear of innovation within the organization may help this self-selection for 
innovation projects occur naturally. 
Yet, fear can also reduce intra-organizational information flows, which can bias corporate 
managers’ innovation-related decision making. In their study of the factors leading to the demise 
of Finnish mobile handset maker Nokia, Vuori and Huy (2016) identify middle managers’ fear as 
a strong inhibitor of the information flow that is critical for allowing corporate managers to form 
an accurate picture of organizational needs. In this way, corporate managers face the challenge of 
designing an open information exchange climate within the organization to reduce their 
subordinates’ evaluation apprehension (Cottrell, 1972) in cases where the transmitted information 
contains negative signals about the firm’s performance. 
2.3.2.3 Influencing Innovation Behaviour 
Corporate managers can influence employees’ innovation behaviour by acting on 
employees’ psychology through direct motivators and indirect environmental factors. One of the 
key issues in a multidivisional firm is knowledge stickiness (Szulanski, 1996). Knowledge 
stickiness prevents the intra-organizational diffusion of knowledge that already exists within the 
organization, often within minds of individual employees as opposed to being codified in easy-to-
transfer blueprints (Zolo, 1998). To examine factors which increase employees’ willingness to 
share their knowledge, Bock et al. (2005) surveyed managers at South Korean firms. The authors 
find that several aspects of organizational climate within corporate managers’ realm are conducive 
to employees’ willingness to share knowledge. These organizational climate aspects (Bock et al., 
2005: 107) involve the establishment of fair and stable intra-organizational practices, the 
encouragement of individual-level exploration of frontier knowledge areas, and the generation of 






Just as corporate managers can influence innovation behaviour through the manipulation 
of the organizational climate, they can also influence innovation behaviour by manipulating inter-
employee social interactions. Huy (2011) studies how corporate managers influence middle 
managers’ support for innovation projects through social identity manipulation. He finds that 
corporate managers can induce group-focused emotions to generate support for an innovation 
activity, even in cases when the supporting middle managers did not have a vested interest in 
supporting such innovation activity. Based on this finding, it can be inferred that corporate 
managers can purposefully create social groups of employees to support innovation activities. Such 
group social engineering by corporate managers can involve the creation of innovation-friendly 
networks. 
2.3.3 ROUTINIZING INNOVATION ACTIVITIES 
Corporate managers’ ability to actively manage innovation is bounded by their cognitive 
limitations (Simon, 1955, 1979), attention spans (Ocasio, 1997), and hierarchical distance from 
market-facing employees (Lerner and Wulf, 2007). This finding implies that some actions by 
corporate managers aim at routinizing some of the intra-organizational innovation processes 
occurring at lower hierarchical levels. Thus, routinization of innovation activities refers to the 
transformation of ad hoc approaches to innovation into reliable and replicable innovation 
behaviour across the organization and across time, without the need for continuous involvement 
by corporate managers. 
2.3.3.1 Increasing the Reliability of Innovation-Driven Value Generation 
As a resource constraint system, a multidivisional firm cannot sustain long periods of 
resource allocation to innovation projects which do not create value above and beyond resources 





corporate managers have at their disposal several mechanisms for improving the reliability of 
selection and retention processes. 
In terms of the selection process, corporate managers can focus on mitigating various kinds 
of biases to ultimately shift the nature of the selection process towards a rules-based process to 
increase the objectivity of evaluation of novel ideas. One such rule could aim at decreasing the 
power of formal hierarchy to shut down innovation voices (Diehl and Stroebe, 1991). Corporate 
managers can create virtual and physical spaces supporting individual ideation so that novel 
ideas can develop at the level of individual minds before facing the initial selection environment 
(Girotra et al., 2010; Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007). Such innovation behaviour can be 
institutionalized through top-down creation and promotion of these innovation spaces 
earmarked for individual ideation. Another rule related to the selection can concern the bias self-
awareness routine (Kahneman, Lovallo, and Sibony, 2011) mandatory for employees involved 
in the selection of novel ideas. Similar to a take-off check list used by airplane pilots, corporate 
managers can create a “bias beware” checklist for evaluators across hierarchical levels.  
In terms of the retention process, corporate managers can introduce innovation-related 
components into KPIs across hierarchical levels and business units. While individual-level 
innovation-related performance goals can vary significantly as a function of the main formal 
role an employee occupies, KPIs at the managerial level can more uniformly include innovation-
related performance targets. Such managerial innovation-related components of KPIs are likely 
to incentivize managers to search for opportunities to convert the implementation of innovation 
projects within their realm of influence into tangible results. Another routine corporate managers 
can use is to set the minimum threshold criteria that an innovation project must meet or exceed 
before being granted further funding (Noda and Bower, 1996). This type of progress threshold 
criteria can incorporate financial metrics, availability of a functional prototype (Von Hippel, 





innovation projects running into implementation hurdles, bringing them to the attention of 
corporate managers (Ocasio, 1997). 
Ultimately, this routinization of selection and variation processes allows corporate 
managers to channel their attention to innovation activities requiring more of a hands-on 
approach (i.e., structuring innovation activities, nudging innovation activities). Further, 
managers can manage the innovation pipeline (Schilling, 2008) by periodically recalibrating the 
rules’ parameters. 
2.3.3.2 Creating and Evolving Corporate Innovation Capability 
Over time, corporate managers can transform the portfolio of routinized top-down 
innovation activities into a corporate innovation capability (Atuahene-Gima, 2005). Corporate 
managers’ role then shifts from the micromanagement of specific innovation activities to the 
orchestration of a portfolio of routinized innovation activities. Corporate managers can focus on 
adjusting innovation activities already present in the portfolio, deleting innovation activities that 
prove to be unnecessary and/or detrimental to the achievement of organizational innovation 
objectives, and adding new innovation activities which can be successfully routinized after 
corporate managers become more experienced with them through an initial, hands-on approach. 
Gradually, such a corporate innovation capability can become increasingly independent of specific 
sets of corporate managers as routinized innovation activities become embedded in the 
organizational culture (Barney, 1986). 
2.4 AN AGENDA FOR EXTENDING RESEARCH ON CORPORATE INNOVATION MECHANISMS 






Why would corporate managers actively participate in innovation management? While my 
survey uncovered multiple ways in which corporate managers can get actively involved in 
innovation management across hierarchical levels and evolutionary phases, it is unclear why 
corporate managers would not simply delegate innovation management to individual business 
units and concentrate on the more traditional corporate-level focal areas, such as management of 
the business portfolio (Hitt et al., 2009), organizational legitimacy vis-à-vis the external 
environment (Collis, Young, and Goold, 2007), and/or resource allocation (Bower, 1970). 
Several possible motives emerge in my survey. Findings by Argyres and Silverman (2004) 
and Arora, Belenzon, and Rios (2014) suggest that delegation of innovation responsibility to 
business units skews the composition of the innovation pipeline (Shilling, 2008) towards less 
radical and more incremental innovation projects. Thus, corporate managers may need to become 
involved in innovation management to gain greater agency over the types of innovation projects 
pursued in their firms. Another issue with the delegation of innovation management to business 
units is the existence of multiple innovation-related decision-making biases at the business unit 
level, such as the NIH syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982), middle managers’ personal agendas 
(Bower, 1970), and/or middle managers political agendas (Burgelman, 1983a, 1983b). Therefore, 
corporate managers may want to get involved in innovation management in order to mitigate 
these decision-making biases. Other motives can be discerned in my survey. However, future 
research can consider more holistically why it makes sense for corporate managers to get actively 
involved in innovation management, as opposed to just delegating innovation management to 
business units. 
2.4.2 TRACING THE ORIGIN OF CORPORATE MANAGERS’ AGENCY TO MANAGE INNOVATION 
Considering it can be established that it makes sense for corporate managers to become 
involved in innovation management, how do corporate managers gain the agency to actively 





multidivisional firm, it seems unlikely that such agency can be established by simply declaring 
the existence of a new role at the corporate level and attaching some resources to that role. 
Assuming resource constraint at the firm level, a corporate innovation function is likely to be 
diverting resources from other corporate-level and business unit-level activities earmarked for 
non-innovation-related activities. Thus, the establishment of a corporate innovation function is 
likely to be a highly political process. Once the political pressures get resolved and some 
resources are allocated to the corporate innovation function, how are top-down innovation actions 
prioritized? Is the focus largely on fixing broken bottom-up innovation processes, designing new 
innovation processes, or a combination of both? At which levels of analysis, in which 
evolutionary phases, and in which sequence should these top-down actions be deployed? 
Answering these and related questions will likely require a detailed study examining the process 
of establishing agency of corporate managers to meaningfully influence how innovation occurs 
across hierarchical levels and evolutionary phases. 
2.4.3 MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM 
Many of the reviewed mechanisms aim to increase certainty of outcomes in what is an 
inherently uncertain process. The pursuit of innovation activities is uncertain at the individual 
level, as personal careers can be derailed by an innovation project’s failure. Dedication of teams 
to innovation projects ties up significant resources with no guarantees of future returns. At the 
middle manager level, promoting innovation projects that ultimately fail can cast doubt on middle 
managers’ judgment and ability to effectively and efficiently govern resources under their 
control. Corporate managers can endanger the future of the whole organization when they over-
allocate resources to innovation activities that consume resources at a rate above that of the 
organizational resource replenishment. 
Given these innovation-related risks in multidivisional firms, which cross several levels of 





risks? At one extreme, corporate managers can channel most of their agency, attention, and 
resources to minimize innovation-related risks across hierarchical levels. Individual employees 
can be told to limit their innovation activities to those projects that build substantially on existing 
knowledge. Innovation teams can dedicate their effort to innovation projects that are likely to 
succeed. Middle managers’ risks are then reduced as well, given the certainty of outcomes at the 
team level. Finally, at the corporate level, resource allocation can prioritize those innovation 
projects that have already shown significant promise.  
The likely outcome in such a limit scenario is an organization which is successful at 
avoiding costly innovation mistakes (Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007), even as its innovation output 
remains highly incremental in nature (Henderson and Clark, 1990). The opposite extreme 
scenario, in which corporate managers maximize uncertainty in the pursuit of breakthrough 
innovations, can deplete organizational resources prior to the discovery and commercialization 
of such breakthrough innovations. Hence, corporate managers must balance the need to mitigate 
risk taking with the need for controlled uncertainty, allowing their firm to maintain environmental 
fitness (Teece, 2007). While some of the surveyed mechanisms can be helpful in terms of 
managing innovation-related risk at discrete levels of analysis and specific evolutionary phases, 
further research should consider developing models of innovation uncertainty management at the 
system level. 
2.4.4 ENABLING THE COEXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO INNOVATION 
How does an organization create innovation ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004), 
allowing for the simultaneous pursuit of different approaches to innovation? The coexistence of 
legal and illegal innovation activities within the same organizational boundaries is likely to create 
tensions. Employees working on legal, officially approved innovation projects are likely to view 
illegal bootlegging activities (Augsdorfer, 1996, 2005) with suspicion. Further, middle managers 





bootlegging are likely to envy their official counterparts their resource access and official status. 
Similarly, innovators actively incorporating accidents (Austin, Devin, and Sullivan, 2012) into 
their approaches to innovation may be viewed as potential disruptors of the organizational status 
quo and/or as outright dangerous to the organization and their fellow employees. Yet, as Austin, 
Devin, and Sullivan (2012) show, a highly experimental approach to innovation can be a source 
of major innovation breakthroughs. How corporate managers address these tensions appears to be 
an interesting research avenue. In addition, future research can build on work on micro-level 
innovation ambidexterity (Austin, Hjorth, and Hessel 2017) to explore how corporate managers 
manage innovation-related conflicts at the innovation front line. 
2.4.1 BALANCING CREATIVITY/EXPLORATION VERSUS EFFICIENCY/EXPLOITATION 
Within the key managerial task of managing the trade-off between exploitation and 
exploration (March, 1991), my survey shows that a similar tension exists even within exploration 
activities. Some of the surveyed mechanisms aim at increasing the efficiency of the innovation 
process (e.g., rapid prototyping, Stage‐Gate® process, Six Sigma). The problem with introducing 
efficiency into innovation processes is that the efficiency can become the goal in itself, reducing 
the chance for a firm to discover and develop innovations that generate significant value. On the 
other hand, exploration activities need to transition at some point from the phase of pure 
exploration for novel knowledge into the phase of exploiting this new knowledge. Issues 
surrounding the management of this tension within exploration activities warrant further research. 
2.4.2 UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL IDEATION AND OPEN 
INNOVATION 
The pursuit of open innovation (Boudreau and Lakhani, 2009; Chesbrough and Crowther, 
2006) has become a mantra among scholars and practitioners alike. The argument regarding the 





open innovation be managed in the case of a multidivisional firm, and what should be the role of 
corporate managers in this process? Should open innovation be delegated to the team, business 
unit, and/or corporate level? What is the process of finding and negotiating the acquisition of 
external knowledge? Given that a specific external knowledge is likely to be available to several 
potential bidders, and is therefore likely to command a full market price, how does a company 
create a competitive advantage through open innovation? Once an open innovation is acquired, 
what is the process of absorbing it? Further, what is the relationship between internal knowledge 
generation and open innovation? Does one complement the other, are they substitutes, or should 
they be managed in parallel? Another issue is the management of intellectual property issues. All 
of these questions can be partially addressed through research efforts delving into previous 
research opportunities, but the holistic understanding of the complex relationship between external 
and internal knowledge sourcing in the context of a multidivisional firm is likely to require a 
comprehensive research program. 
2.4.3 THE ROLE OF A FIRM’S HISTORY IN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 
What role does founders’ imprinting play in the involvement of corporate managers in 
innovation management? Is there such a mechanism as innovation founders’ imprinting operating 
similarly to organizational imprinting (Stinchcombe, 1965)? More generally, what role does 
organizational innovation history play in the degree of corporate managers’ involvement in 
innovation management? These questions relate to the organizational capability to retain 
knowledge about past innovation activities and utilize this knowledge for present innovation 
endeavours. On another related note, how does a history of divestment of once highly innovative 
business units affect the parent company’s present and future innovation capability? Given the 
dispersion of knowledge across business units forming a multidivisional firm and intra-





an important role in linking past, present, and future innovation exploits, projects, and 
opportunities; this concept offers another promising research stream. 
2.4.4 ETHICAL BOUNDARIES OF TOP-DOWN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 
Under which conditions can corporate managers drive their innovation agenda by 
manipulating the behaviour of individual employees with or without their consent? My survey 
uncovered several mechanisms which can be used by corporate managers to induce an employee’s 
desire to pursue innovation activities. It may be beneficial for the firm to have a particular 
employee concentrate more on explorative activities as opposed to pursuing an exploitative role. 
Yet, given the inherent riskiness of an explorative career, this may not be in the best interest of the 
specific employee. From the organizational perspective, an employee whose explorative career 
ended in failure is not a significant loss, as a new employee can be hired to fulfil the original 
exploitative role. In a sense, the organization can consider each employee as a cheap option (as the 
employee is already working for the firm) to gain access to novel knowledge. From the employee 
perspective, the switch from an exploitive to explorative career within the firm can significantly 
increase the risk of a career failure—a risk that can be difficult to hedge against on an individual 
level. This ethical conflict between an organization’s interest in innovation and the interests of 
individual employees can be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Relatedly, under which conditions can corporate managers support innovation activities by 
manipulating the behaviour of end users without their consent? For instance, social media 
companies have used knowledge about human psychology and factors increasing addiction to 
make their products highly addictive. More recently, Facebook patented software for tracking end 
users’ reactions to advertisements.9 Such innovations are likely to be driven from the top down, 
with full consent and awareness of corporate managers. Given that some large multidivisional 
                                               
9 https://www.engadget.com/2018/06/28/facebook-patent-turns-phone-mics-on-to-record-reactions-to-ads/ accessed 





firms are capable of innovating well ahead of governmental attempts to regulate the outcomes of 
their innovations, the ethical considerations surrounding the involvement of corporate managers 
in driving innovations that impact and/or exploit human behaviour comprise another interesting 
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CHAPTER 3 A MID-RANGE THEORY OF CORPORATE INNOVATION 
ACTIVISM 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Does it make sense for corporate managers to actively influence how innovation occurs in 
their firms? In a multidivisional firm, corporate managers exert control over several business units 
operating in distinct markets under the stewardship of middle managers (Chandler, 1962). Through 
this agency, corporate managers have a significant impact on a firm’s performance (McGahan and 
Porter, 1997, 2002).  
Scholars suggest several roles of corporate managers to provide partial explanations for the 
existence of this link between the actions of corporate managers and firm-level performance. 
Several scholars have proposed that corporate managers substitute for market mechanisms of 
capital allocation through intra-organizational coordination and resource allocation decision 
making (Bower, 1970; Chandler, 1962; Williamson, 1975). Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that 
corporate managers reduce agency costs by better aligning the interests of shareholders and middle 
managers in charge of running individual business units. Collis, Young, and Goold (2007) argue 
that corporate managers provide legitimacy function to satisfy regulatory demands and drive 
efficiencies by providing centralized back-office services to business units. 
 None of these roles of corporate managers assume “corporate innovation activism” (CIA), 
defined as purposeful actions by corporate managers to actively manage intra-organizational 
innovation processes. Proposed top-down mechanisms influence intra-organizational innovation 
processes indirectly through organizational structure (Chandler, 1962), organizational purpose 
(Selznick, 1957), organizational slack (Penrose, 1959), rules and procedures (Allison, 1971; 
Bower, 1970; Cyert and March, 1963), or organizational identity (Kogut and Zander, 1996). 





innovation activities lends support to this assumption about corporate managers’ passivity in 
innovation management (Ciabuschi, Forsgren, and Martin, 2012). 
 Yet, the assumption of corporate managers’ passivity in innovation management is 
incongruent with the importance given to innovation in foundational strategy literatures such as 
organizational learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991), resource-based view (Barney, 
1991; Rumelt, 1984; Teece, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984), and dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007). Further, there is mounting evidence 
from strategy consulting firms as well as scholars publishing in practitioner journals (e.g., 
Birkinshaw, Bouquet, and Barsoux, 2011) that suggests that corporate managers do actively 
influence intra-organizational innovation processes through direct top-down mechanisms. 
 This dissonance in the literature is reflected in the recent call to rethink the role that 
corporate managers play in innovation management. Gupta, Tesluk, and Taylor (2007: 886) 
observe, “Many studies have sought to understand the innovation process (albeit not very often 
through a multilevel lens), but scholars have not yet been able to identify a clear prototypical 
process for the management of innovation.” Similarly, recent innovation literature surveys note 
that mechanisms through which corporate managers influence how innovation occurs in their firms 
are largely unknown (Anderson, Potocnik, and Zhou, 2014; Garud, Tuertscher, and Van de Ven, 
2013). Given this tension in extant scholarship, the main purpose of this paper is to develop a mid-
range theory explaining why it makes sense for corporate managers to engage in CIA. 
 The rest of the article proceeds as follows. First, I review foundational management 
literatures to uncover different perspectives on the roles that corporate managers can have in 
innovation management. Second, I combine insights from these foundational building blocks with 
the innovation, decision making, psychology, and finance literatures to theoretically elaborate two 
novel concepts: corporate innovation synergy and corporate innovation value-added. I frame my 
theorizing within the evolutionary model of innovation, decomposing intra-organizational 





1982; Levinthal, 1998; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Third, I discuss the generalizability of the 
developed theory together with its boundary conditions. I conclude with implications for theory 
and practice, as well as several suggestions for testing and extending the CIA theory. 
3.2  FOUNDATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROLE OF CORPORATE MANAGERS IN 
INNOVATION 
 In the following paragraphs, I review foundational perspectives in the management 
literature on the role of corporate managers in innovation. Foundational management scholarship 
which does not specifically address the role of corporate managers in innovation is not within the 
scope of this literature review (e.g., the positioning school). As most of these management 
literatures are contextualized within the realm of complex organizations, I consider the terms 
“senior managers” and “corporate managers” as synonymous. In addition, by “the role of corporate 
managers in innovation,” I mean actions taken by corporate managers to influence intra-
organizational innovation processes. 
3.2.1 INCREASING MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY 
 Barnard (1938) draws insights about the role of senior managers from an empirical study 
conducted at Western Electric on worker motivation. He defines organizations as systems of inter-
employee cooperation which allow employees to overcome their individual limitations. These 
limitations make it necessary for employees to cooperate to reach goals unattainable by individual 
action. Pondering the ephemeral nature of organizations, Barnard (1938) argues that the main 
conditions for organizational survival include cooperation readiness, communication capacity, and 
the existence of purpose. These survival conditions define the functions of a senior manager as the 
creation and conservation of the sense of organizational purpose encapsulated within an 
organizational moral code, the establishment of formal and informal communication channels, and 





efficient way, Barnard (1938) proposes that senior managers must continuously leverage 
innovations.  
3.2.2 RECOGNIZING AND MITIGATING MANAGERIAL COGNITIVE CONSTRAINTS 
 Building on work by Barnard (1938), Simon (1945/1997) posits that senior managers’ 
bounded rationality limits their ability to solve complex problems. Simon (1945/1997) suggests 
that the consequence of bounded rationality is that senior managers’ decision making leads to 
satisficing as opposed to maximizing outcomes. Once senior managers decide on the course of 
action, their decisions need to be communicated downwards so that the process of administration 
can take place. For that purpose, senior managers employ organizational influences such as 
authority, organizational loyalties, and advice. The combination of senior managers’ bounded 
rationality and the process of administration can hinder the intra-organizational transfer of ideas, 
without which, “nothing will happen” (Simon, 1945/1997: 235) in terms of the development of 
new products. Thus, from the bounded rationality perspective, the role of senior managers is to 
design mechanisms to recognize and mitigate their cognitive limitations hindering intra-
organizational knowledge flows. 
3.2.3 CREATING AND UTILIZING ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK 
 Penrose (1959) moves the theory of the firm discussion away from prices and quantities to 
consider a firm as a portfolio of resources functioning within an administrative framework 
delineating firm boundaries. According to Penrose (1959), a firm’s growth is related to managers’ 
desire to transform human and other resources controlled by the firm into productive uses. 
Consequently, a firm’s rate of growth is a function of a firm’s growth of knowledge and of the 
ability to manage the associated change process with current (i.e., efficient, but fully allocated) 
and new (i.e., initially underutilized resources creating organizational slack) human resources. 





administrative framework that allows for the emergence of organizational slack and its 
transformation into productive use. 
3.2.4 MAINTAINING INNOVATION IN PERIODS OF OVERPERFORMANCE10 
In resonance with Simon’s (1945/1997) and Penrose’s (1959) arguments, Cyert and March 
(1963) reject the classic economic theory of the firm and examine the actual behaviour of business 
organizations, drawing on ideas of bounded rationality, imperfect environmental matching, and 
unresolved conflict. Cyert and March (1963) argue that a firm can be viewed as a coalition having 
a series of independent goals which exhibit a certain degree of inconsistency. Goals represent 
constraints imposed in the short term by bargaining among potential coalition members. Goals 
evolve in the long term due to changes in coalition structures. The decentralization of decision 
making, the consecutive attention to goals, and the modification of organizational slack permit a 
firm to tolerate perpetual conflict and respond to environmental variations despite the 
inconsistency of goals. Organizational choice is embedded in standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) that reflect organizational learning and determine short-term decisions employing 
concrete but inaccurate estimates. Thus, implicitly, corporate managers influence intra-
organizational innovation processes indirectly by setting organizational goals. When a 
performance discrepancy materializes between organizational goals and organizational 
performance, innovation occurs through problemistic search. The role of corporate managers in 
innovation is then to design mechanisms which can alert them to the need for conducting search 
even in periods absent of triggers inducing the problemistic search. 
3.2.5 DETERMINING THE IMPORTANCE OF INNOVATION WITHIN THE ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSE 
                                               
10 This paragraph is based on the seminar discussion within Dr. Harbir Singh’s Corporate Strategy class held at the 





 Selznick (1957) analyzes organizations through the theoretical lens of institutional 
leadership. He examines the process of organizational transformation from a rational into a social 
system defined by distinct competencies and character, arguing that the overemphasis on 
efficiency obscures the process by which available resources lead to organizational goals. Whereas 
the concept of efficiency applies to individual business units having well defined purpose and 
position within the organization, it does not fully account for the role of organizational leadership. 
Selznick identifies leadership as a key concept that allows goal setting and resource mobilization 
and alignment for reaching these goals. Leadership creates an organizational structure capable of 
linking organizational purpose to daily activities by providing a long-term sense of purpose 
through organizational myths. According to Selznick, senior managers’ main function as leaders 
is to exemplify the organizational purpose, guard institutional integrity, and manage internal 
differences. Hence, from Selznick’s perspective, senior managers influence innovation activities 
indirectly by regulating the importance of innovation within the process of determining the 
organizational purpose. 
3.2.6 DESIGNING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES CONDUCIVE TO INNOVATION 
 Chandler (1962) studies the interconnections in modern corporations between structure and 
strategy. In the 1930s, the multidivisional form of organization (M-form) started to be employed 
by U.S. corporations as a response to top management’s overload caused by increased complexity 
of decision making. This increased complexity was due not simply to the increase in a firm’s size, 
but to the broadening of the scope of a firm’s activities requiring diverse managerial knowledge. 
Thus, business unit managers became responsible for the market share related profits, whereas 
corporate managers focused on monitoring, planning, and resource allocation processes. In general 
terms, adjustments to organizational structure were made to support a strategy of growth into new 
product and geographical markets, making structure follow strategy. In terms of innovation, 





departments.” Therefore, from Chandler’s (1962) perspective, corporate managers are responsible 
for the creation of appropriate organizational structures within which innovation can take place in 
support of strategic goals. 
3.2.7 SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTING AND NOURISHING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CORE 
 Thompson (1967) considers how organizations handle uncertainty stemming from 
technologies and environments. Rational firms aim at protecting their technology core from 
environmental influences by enveloping it with input and output components. The residual 
variation which firms cannot control is handled by smoothing of input and output transactions and 
by preparation for anticipated changes, thereby achieving a degree of self-control and reducing 
dependency on the environment. The result is an organizational design that seeks to place 
boundaries around activities which may become crucial contingencies if exposed to environmental 
influences and that reflects interdependencies of the organization with the environment and its 
technology. From the perspective of Thompson (1967), the role of senior managers is to manage 
the degree of organizational openness so that the technological core is protected from being 
maligned by environmental influences, yet nourished sufficiently to withstand environmental 
shocks from which a firm cannot be completely insulated. 
3.2.8  GUIDING ENVIRONMENTAL ADAPTATION 
 Andrews (1971) builds on arguments put forward by Barnard (1938) in his discussion on 
the role of senior managers. He argues that a senior manager’s main function is to lead the 
perpetual process that defines the nature of an organization and ensures that the organizational 
purpose is meaningful and fulfilled. Senior managers are therefore responsible not only for the 
formulation of the overall business strategy, but also for its successful implementation by creating 
appropriate organizational structures and providing leadership. Andrews (1971) distinguishes 





in the context of the competitive environment enclosing the business unit. Corporate strategy 
determines organizational purpose. Through organizational purpose, senior managers define 
organizational identity and character, formulate actions to be undertaken, mobilize resources, and 
guide adaptation to environmental variations. Implicitly, Andrews (1971) assumes that senior 
managers have a good understanding of future innovation opportunities relevant to maintaining 
their firm’s environmental fitness. 
3.2.9 UPDATING PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING NEW INFORMATION 
 Allison (1971) describes decision making during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, drawing 
on the rational actor model (i.e., national interest is defended by government), organizational 
behaviour model (i.e., security apparatus follows routines), and governmental politics model (i.e., 
an agreement is possible through bargaining and compromise among actors) to fully explain 
decision making during the crisis. The deadlock was reached as adversary organizations stuck to 
their codified routines prescribed for dealing with crisis situations. On a general level, the Cuban 
crisis provides an example of organizations ending up in deadlock due to slow adaptation to an 
environmental variation. This adaptation rigidity stems from the processing of new information by 
unchanged procedures and routines. Based on Allison’s (1971) findings, the role of corporate 
managers in innovation is to constantly update SOPs (Cyert and March, 1963) to keep them current 
with information processing demands stemming from environmental evolution. In doing so, 
corporate managers need to make decisions regarding the degree of local versus global 
optimization of SOPs, as well as the degree of divisionality versus centralization of intra-
organizational authority flows. 
3.2.10 COUNTERING DECISION-MAKING BIASES INHIBITING INNOVATION 
 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose the prospect theory, which is concerned with 





benefit maximization. The key difference between these theories concerns carriers of value being 
changes in wealth (i.e., gains and losses) as opposed to being final asset states. Further, decision 
weights are replaced by probabilities. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) note that empirical evidence 
is inconsistent with axioms of utility theory; specifically, people exhibit a tendency to underweight 
uncertain outcomes when having the option of a certain outcome, resulting in the “certainty effect.” 
Moreover, people tend to not consider elements shared by all prospects under assessment, resulting 
in the “isolation effect.” These two effects influence decision making in real-life situations. The 
resulting value function is habitually concave for gains and usually convex and steeper for losses 
(i.e., people perceive less utility in gain than in loss avoidance). Failure to update the positioning 
of the reference point can induce incremental risk seeking. Given the inherent riskiness of 
innovation pursuits, prospect theory implies that the main role of corporate managers in innovation 
is to identify biases negatively impacting decision making related to innovation and design 
mechanisms to lessen the impact of these biases (Kahneman, Lovallo, and Sibony, 2011). 
3.2.11 KEEPING ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY CONDUCIVE TO INNOVATION 
 Kogut and Zander (1996) argue that the integration of activities through a firm drives 
coordination and learning from which a firm’s shared identity— constituted by shared norms and 
language—emerges. A firm is demarcated from the market as learning, communication, and 
coordination are not only physically integrated, but also get imprinted in the shared identity. Over 
time, a firm’s shared identity creates distinct boundaries between its businesses and markets. The 
key function of a firm’s shared identity is the decrease in the costs of coordination and 
communication. Yet, this shared identity may also instil rules limiting organizational search as it 
may be reinforcing established SOPs (Cyert and March, 1963) and legitimizing employees’ 
tendency to reject outside influences (Katz and Allen, 1982). Thus, from Kogut and Zander’s 
(1996) perspective, the role of corporate managers in innovation is to continuously identify and 





3.2.12 MAINTAINING ENVIRONMENTAL FITNESS THROUGH INNOVATION 
Building on foundations laid out by scholars investigating value creation through 
organizational-level efficiency (e.g., Rumelt, 1984; Teece, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984) and those 
examining organizational responses to changing environments (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1976), scholars in favour of the dynamic capabilities framework argue that 
a firm’s competitive advantage stems from unique processes, specific asset positions, and 
inherited path dependency (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 
1997). A firm’s capacity to maintain its competitive positioning hinges on the permanence of the 
market demand, the easiness of expansion through internal replication, and the difficulty of 
imitation of its activities by rivals. As such, the dynamic capabilities framework suggests that the 
maintenance of competitive positioning is contingent mainly on a firm’s ability to identify and 
exploit new profitable ventures, allowing it to maintain environmental fitness. In resonance with 
Andrews (1971), Teece (2007) proposes that senior managers are directly responsible for the 
identification of innovation opportunities that sustain their firm’s environmental fitness.  
3.3 CORPORATE INNOVATION SYNERGY 
 As shown, a review of the foundational literature uncovers several arguments supporting 
the notion that the active involvement of corporate managers in innovation can render intra-
organizational innovation processes more efficient. In the following paragraphs, I build upon the 
foundational corporate strategy scholarship, the scholarship on managerial decision making, and 
the innovation scholarship to propose several sources of efficiency gains within intra-
organizational innovation processes achieved by CIA. 
3.3.1 VARIATION 





Diversity in the pool of novel ideas increases a firm’s chances of gaining access to 
impactful novel ideas (Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010). The key obstacle to obtaining 
diversity from intra-organizational ideation sources is the domination of the idea generation 
process by a few opinion leaders, causing the groupthink effect (Coser, 1956). Superiors can use 
their power rooted in hierarchy to silence innovation voices which steer too far from extant core 
businesses and/or commonly held beliefs about what would work and what would fail (Van de 
Ven, 1986).  
To reduce instances of voice suppression by formal power, corporate managers can deploy 
pan-organizational technological platforms enabling idea sharing and networking among 
spatially and hierarchically distributed employees. The introduction of such idea-sharing 
platforms is likely to be more efficient when it is spearheaded from the corporate level as 
opposed to consisting of discrete initiatives occurring at the business unit level. For instance, 
IBM used its intranet infrastructure to facilitate novel idea exchange on a continuous basis even 
before conducting its inaugural “IBM’s 2006 InnovationJam®” (IBM, 2018). 
 
Proposition 1: The pan-organizational deployment of idea-sharing platforms reduces voice 
suppression by formal power. 
 
3.3.1.2 Increase in the Expression of Grassroots Novel Ideas 
 Another hurdle to obtaining diversity from intra-organizational ideation sources is 
employees’ perception that their voices do not count, resulting in the mind-level suppression of 
novel ideas (Reitzig and Maciejovsky, 2015). From the ideating employees’ perspective, the higher 
the likelihood that their ideas will be given attention by their superiors, the more likely they are to 





The active involvement by corporate managers in the facilitation of grassroots ideation can 
increase employees’ perception that their idea has a chance of getting noticed and appreciated, as 
opposed to being dismissed by their immediate supervisors. For instance, IBM CEO Samuel J. 
Palmisano actively participated in IBM’s 2006 InnovationJam® involving more than 150,000 
internal and external contributors (IBM, 2018). Bjelland and Wood (2008: 39), who researched 
IBM’s 2006 InnovationJam®, described the event: “Cartoon-like avatars of IBMers from all over 
the world, meeting in Second Life, created the IBM Virtual Universe Community, and even 
Palmisano joined the conversations. (You could recognize his avatar right away: While most 
avatars are funky or outrageous, Palmisano’s was a cartoon man wearing a conservative blue suit, 
the kind for which IBM salesmen were once famous.)” 
 
Proposition 2: The perception by employees of corporate managers’ direct engagement in the 
variation process increases employees’ grassroots novel ideas expression. 
 
3.3.1.3 Increase in the Generation of High-Potential Grassroots Novel Ideas 
An increase in grassroots novel ideas is not of great value to a firm unless the grassroots 
novel idea pool contains a few high-potential innovative ideas over many mediocre ones (Girotra, 
Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010). This organizational preference is well demonstrated across different 
industries. In the area of pharmaceutical research, novel drugs need to have significant potential 
in the marketplace to offset the mostly invariable costs related to the drug discovery and 
commercialization processes. In academic research, emphasis is given to producing a few articles 
with high citation runs over many poorly cited papers. Similarly, private equity firms strive to 
uncover a few exceptionally high-return investments as merely average returns would not justify 





The likelihood that the grassroots ideation process generates a few high-potential ideas can 
be increased when corporate managers provide employees with high-level clues about challenges 
and opportunities relevant to their firm. This assertion is based on the seminal study by Ward 
(1994) on the role of cognitive structures in the individual ideation process. Using a series of 
experiments, Ward (1994) found that without any direction, experimental subjects resorted to 
known knowledge frameworks when imagining novel ideas. Yet, instructions and task constraints 
increased subjects’ willingness to depart from current cognitive schemas and employ expansive 
knowledge frameworks, leading to more original novel ideas in Ward’s (1994) case animal species. 
Corporate managers can achieve such ideation nudging by suggesting high-level topics for ideation 
centred on the maintenance of existing core technologies (Thompson, 1967) or the exploration of 
emerging technologies (Teece, 2007). 
 
Proposition 3: The transmission from corporate managers to employees of information about 
key challenges and opportunities facing the organization increases the likelihood of the 
grassroots novel idea generation process periodically producing a high-potential novel idea. 
 
3.3.2 SELECTION 
3.3.2.1 Reduction of Middle Managers’ Selection Biases 
Middle managers have considerable agency in deciding which grassroots ideas get 
endorsement and attention from corporate managers (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983). As middle 
managers engage in the selection of grassroots ideas, their selection process has been found to be 
distorted by several selection biases. One such bias is the tendency to eliminate ideas which may 
be harmful to their personal interests (Bower, 1970; Guth and MacMillan, 1986). At a more 





business unit without taking into consideration a novel idea’s potential benefit for the whole 
organization (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996; Guth and MacMillan, 
1986; Rietzig and Soreson, 2013). Such biases are particularly harmful to the innovation output in 
a diverse multidivisional firm in which corporate managers lack the attention span to continuously 
monitor innovation activities occurring at lower hierarchical levels (Ocasio, 1997). To counter 
these biases, corporate managers can deploy several mechanisms.  
First, corporate managers can increase the novel idea dismissal threshold by establishing a 
curatorial approach to managing grassroots innovativeness (Litchfield and Gilson, 2013). Similar 
to a museum managing a collection of artworks, generated grassroots ideas can be catalogued 
through an online interface, tagged with key attributes, and retained within a central registry. 
Registration access can be made available to all employees without the involvement of middle 
managers. Registered ideas are initially sponsored by their originators, who pitch them to their 
superiors. When superiors dismiss a novel idea, they would be required to comment on their 
decision within the registry. This paper trail linking a middle manager’s selection decision to a 
specific novel idea not only increases the likelihood that a middle manager’s selection decision 
can be scrutinized, but also creates a firm-level knowledge database. Corporate managers can 
appoint a curator of grassroots novel ideas whose role would be to periodically review the content 
of the knowledge database as well as the selection decisions made by middle managers.  
Second, corporate managers may introduce a set of objective selection criteria (Cooper, 
Edgett, and Kleinschmidt, 1999) to be used by middle managers in their selection process to 
decrease the likelihood that a novel idea is dismissed due to personal preferences, inter-employee 
relationships, or business unit-specific agendas detrimental to the whole organization. Such criteria 
can include financial analyses of the novel idea’s potential (e.g., net present value, payback time, 
investment intensity) or qualitative assessments (e.g., fit with existing capabilities, relevance to 






Third, corporate managers can introduce an appeals process allowing employees who had 
their ideas dismissed to have their rejected ideas evaluated by an independent referee panel (March, 
1994). 
 
Proposition 4: The creation of a grassroots novel idea registry, the introduction of a set of 
objective selection criteria, and the establishment of an appeals process for dismissed ideas 
all reduce the chances that middle managers’ selection biases will prevent a high-potential 
grassroots novel idea from reaching corporate managers. 
3.3.3  RETENTION 
3.3.3.1 Reduction of Implementation Derailments Due to Incremental Resource Scarcity 
Once a novel idea is selected, the duration and path of its implementation are hard to 
estimate (Klein and Sorra, 1996). When additional innovation funds are required, managers at 
business units tasked with the implementation of selected innovation projects may be reluctant 
to accommodate an implementation extension and provide additional resource funds due to 
resource constraints and rigidities embedded in the budgeting process (Bower, 1970). Thus, 
when decision making regarding the resourcing of the implementation phase is confined to the 
business unit level only, promising innovation projects may be at risk of being cancelled due to 
the lack of incremental resourcing required by unexpected implementation hurdles (Mattes, 
2014). 
The bifurcation of implementation resourcing between the business unit and corporate 
levels can reduce this risk. Once the implementation of an innovative project is allocated to a 
specific business unit, managers from that business unit make an implementation budget 
estimate and the initial implementation resource funds are allocated. If this initial resource 





allocation of incremental implementation resources subject to a formal review of a project’s 
progress (Noda and Bower, 1996). If the need to allocate incremental resources gets approved, 
corporate managers are in a better position than business unit managers to procure these 
additional resources from general purpose funds located at the corporate level, raise additional 
capital, or reshuffle resources among business units (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993). 
 
Proposition 5: The bifurcation of the implementation resourcing decision-making processes 
into business unit-level initial resourcing request and corporate-level incremental resourcing 
evaluation and provision reduces the chances that a high-potential innovation project will be 
cancelled due to incremental resource scarcity. 
 
3.3.3.2 Reduction of Innovation Failure Contagion to Core Businesses 
Most innovations fail (Levine, 1980). When the failure of an innovation is confined to an 
economic loss in the form of wasted resources earmarked in advance for the failed project, the 
organization is likely to withstand the failure as the organizational resource allocation process 
accounts for the high innovation failure rate (Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014). Yet, an innovation 
failure can have repercussions beyond the failed innovation project itself, and even beyond 
organizational boundaries, when it negatively impacts the organization’s core businesses 
(Thompson, 1967). For instance, several in-flight failures of Rolls-Royce’s innovative Trent 
1000 engine (used by Boeing to power its Dreamliner 787 aircraft) caused Rolls-Royce to 
reallocate significant organizational resources to fix the faulty design (BBC, 2018). Similarly, 
information about an innovation failure involving a major financial institution can rapidly erode 
clients’ trust in the organization’s long-term stability. For this reason, traditional banks have 
been reluctant supporters of the fintech revolution in the finance industry (Forbes, 2017). In the 





new uses of an extant software code, such explorative activity generates reconfiguration costs 
as well as exploration costs in the form of potentially undesirable outcomes (Austin and Devin, 
2009). 
Corporate managers can deploy several mechanisms to reduce the risk of innovation failure 
contagion beyond the innovation project itself. First, they can temporally structurally ring-fence 
the innovation failure contagion risk by establishing specialized organizational units dedicated 
exclusively to the pursuit of innovations (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003). An innovation is then 
diffused into the rest of the organization only after it passes a certain threshold of reliability. 
Any innovation flops can be fully contained within these separate organizational structures, with 
legal barriers preventing innovation failure spillovers from affecting core businesses. Second, 
corporate managers can constrain the initial implementation of risky innovation projects to 
markets of lesser importance (Klompmaker, Hughes, and Haley, 1976), even when this is 
initially a suboptimal solution from the perspective of a single business unit. For example, global 
firms often test their new products in Australia before introducing them in other markets 
(Fortune, 2015). Third, when an innovation failure occurs, corporate managers have a better 
overview than middle managers of how the innovation failure contagion can impact core 
businesses across the organization, and are therefore in a better position to enact a pan-
organizational containment plan (Tufano, 1996). 
 
Proposition 6: Corporate managers are in a better position than middle managers to reduce 
the risk of innovation failure contagion to core businesses. 
 
3.3.3.3 Reduction of the Number of Late-Stage Innovation Flops 
The outright failure of an innovation project is easier to recognize and deal with early in 





promise, but on the balance of probabilities, their value creation within a reasonable timeframe 
becomes unclear. The decision to push on with a failed project by managers and employees who 
have championed it is due to several decision-making biases. The confirmation bias (Nickerson, 
1998) reduces the innovation implementation team’s search for information which would 
undermine its project’s continued viability. The availability bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) 
reduces the innovation implementation team’s effort to update fundamental premises upon 
which the project was selected. The anchoring bias (Northcraft and Neale, 1987) reduces the 
innovation implementation team’s willingness to consider the feasibility of its innovation from 
new angles. 
Corporate managers are not immune to letting these biases cloud their own decision 
making, even when they are aware of the existence of these biases (Kahneman, Lovallo, and 
Sibony, 2011). Yet, several factors stemming from their position within the organizational 
hierarchy reduces their susceptibility to these biases relative to middle managers. First, corporate 
managers oversee a large number of innovation implementations across the organization, 
making it easier for them to let go of any one of these projects. Second, corporate managers are 
less personally invested in the innovation implementation projects, reducing the likelihood that 
they will favour one over another due to their own personal agendas (Bower, 1970). Third, given 
their position at the top of the organizational hierarchy, corporate managers possess the ultimate 
authority to stop a particular project (Cyert and March, 1963; Finkelstein, 1992; Thompson, 
1967). Further, the decision to abandon an innovation implementation may be harder to make at 
the business unit level due to the sunken cost effect increasing the implementation team’s 
reluctance to terminate the project (Garland, 1990). 
 
Proposition 7: Corporate managers are in a better position than middle managers to 






3.3.3.4 Reduction of Innovation Duplicity 
Innovation duplicity refers to the simultaneous pursuit of similar innovation projects within 
the same organization (McAdam and Galloway, 2005). Innovation duplicity can occur 
geographically, among spatially distributed business units; structurally, among distinct 
functional areas; or temporally, when an innovation project which recently failed is attempted 
again without an increased probability of success. Innovation duplicity not only wastes 
organizational resources, but can also give rise to destructive rivalry among innovation teams 
(De Clercq, Thongpapanl, and Dimov, 2009). 
Corporate managers are in a better position than business unit managers to reduce 
innovation duplicity. First, corporate managers can use their helicopter overview of innovation 
projects to detect innovation duplicity occurring across business units, geographies, and/or 
functional areas. Second, corporate managers are likely to have better insight into whether a 
specific innovation duplicity is desirable or wasteful. In some situations, innovation duplicity 
can be desirable when several innovation teams work concurrently, yet independently, on an 
innovation project crucial for the organization’s long-term survival. 
 
Proposition 8: Corporate managers are in a better position than middle managers to 
reduce innovation duplicity when it is wasteful. 
3.4 CORPORATE INNOVATION VALUE-ADDED 
 When the innovation function is elevated to the corporate level in a multidivisional firm, 
is the organization better able to add unique elements to the variation, selection, and retention 
innovation processes than when the innovation function is delegated to individual business units 
only? The difference between the corporate innovation synergy concept and the corporate 
innovation value-added concept is that without the active involvement of corporate managers in 





unique position occupied by corporate managers within a multidivisional firm. In contrast, some 
elements constituting corporate innovation synergy are likely to occur to a certain degree even 
when corporate managers are not actively involved in intra-organizational innovation processes. 
3.4.1 VARIATION 
3.4.1.1 Generation of Architectural Innovation  
 The concepts of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1979), experiential learning (Levitt and 
March, 1988), and cognitive learning (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) are closely related to the 
managerial capability needed to recombine knowledge already existing within organizations. 
Henderson and Clark (1990: 10) term such recombination of existing knowledge “architectural 
innovation.” According to Henderson and Clark (1990), architectural knowledge differs from the 
component knowledge about a product’s various parts required for its functioning. Specifically, 
architectural knowledge refers to knowledge about how these different components work together 
as a system. 
  The identification of architectural innovation opportunities requires a holistic overview of 
different component knowledge bases that may be scattered structurally, geographically, and 
temporally across the entire organization. Corporate managers have, on average, longer tenure than 
middle managers and can connect past, present, and emerging knowledge available to the 
organization. For instance, innovations that failed in the past can be a source of inspiration for 
future innovations (Drucker, 2008). Corporate managers are also continuously concerned about 
emerging technologies that may disrupt their core businesses (Teece, 2007). Further, corporate 
managers have the formal power to change the way things are done and overcome the path-
dependent nature of experiential learning (Levitt and March, 1988) that increases the rigidity of 
organizational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In addition, corporate managers can facilitate 





opportunities. Such intra-organizational information flows are less likely to occur at the business 
unit level due to the stickiness of knowledge (Szulanski, 1996). 
 
Proposition 9: Corporate managers can generate architectural innovations by leveraging 
their holistic overview of organizational knowledge, using their formal power to lessen 
organizational rigidities, and facilitating intra-organizational information flows. 
 
3.4.1.2 Sourcing of External Novel Ideas 
External knowledge sourcing is an important source of variation (Chesbrough, 2006). Yet, 
external knowledge holders may be reluctant to share their knowledge because they worry about 
a disproportionate economic value appropriation by the knowledge seeker (Chatain and Zemsky, 
2011). Another issue arises when the external knowledge holder is reluctant to share the 
knowledge out of fear of disrupting established business relationships (Birkinshaw, Bouquet, 
and Barsoux, 2011). For example, suppliers may be concerned that their asset-specific 
investments may be devalued by revealing that novel ways of cooperation in the buyer-supplier 
relationship exist. Even when external knowledge holders are willing to share their knowledge, 
the “not invented here” (NIH) syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982)—whereby the value of external 
knowledge is discounted in favour of internally generated ideas (Katz and Allen, 1982)—may 
prevent external knowledge from gaining acceptance at the business unit level. 
Corporate-level managers can mitigate external knowledge holders’ concerns by 
establishing trust between their organization and the external knowledge holders at the corporate 
level (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995), as opposed to letting business units negotiate with 
external knowledge holders directly. Establishing trust at the corporate level can mitigate 
external knowledge holders’ fear that middle managers may disseminate the acquired external 





turnover (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). Similarly, corporate managers can extend the 
corporate-level trust to address the concerns of existing external partners about the protection of 
their asset-specific investments to encourage them to express their innovative ideas. The 
establishment of trusting relationships with external knowledge holders is likely to motivate 
corporate managers to push the utilization of the acquired external knowledge, countering the 
NIH bias (Katz and Allen, 1982). 
 
Proposition 10: The establishment of trusting relationships with external knowledge 
holders at the corporate level generates external novel idea sourcing and increases the 
acceptance of external knowledge at lower hierarchical levels. 
3.4.2 SELECTION 
3.4.2.1 Selection of Riskier Innovation Projects 
An innovation project’s failure can negatively impact the careers of the involved 
employees at the business unit level as they have limited project diversification options (Hitt et 
al., 1996). Consequently, middle managers involved in the selection of innovation projects tend 
to select less risky projects over projects with higher value creation potential, but also higher 
likelihood of failure (Castañer and Kavadis, 2013). 
 Corporate managers benefit from several mechanisms that decrease their risk aversion 
towards high-potential/high-risk innovation projects. First, corporate managers can spread their 
bets over multiple innovation projects, thereby diversifying away their individual-level risk. 
Second, the nature of corporate managers’ employment contracts often provides them with a 
safety net should a failure of a particular innovation project negatively impact their own personal 
career. Third, given their position within the organizational hierarchy, corporate managers are 





their ability to infuse analytical decision making based on available data with intuitive decision 
making rooted in their experiences (Barnard, 1938) and gut feeling (Dane and Pratt, 2007). 
 
Proposition 11: The involvement of corporate managers in the selection of innovation 
projects will increase the proportion of riskier innovation projects in a firm’s selected 
innovation pool. 
3.4.3 RETENTION 
3.4.3.1 Creation of Organizational Innovation Memory 
As successful innovation projects are implemented and diffused across the organization, 
innovations become increasingly routinized (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Once innovations 
become implemented and routinized, the tacit knowledge about their origins erodes through 
employee turnover (Massingham, 2008) and downsizing (Schmitt, Borzillo, and Probst, 2012). 
Gradually, organizations forget knowledge they once generated internally or acquired externally 
(Argote, Beckman, and Epple, 1990; Darr, Argote, and Epple, 1995). Even when the tacit 
knowledge still exists within the organization, the process of accessing it, understanding it, and 
reusing it is non-trivial (Alavi and Leidner, 2001). 
As corporate managers become actively involved in intra-organizational innovation 
processes, the innovation knowledge involved across the innovation pipeline gets centralized at 
the corporate level. The centralization of various innovation knowledge bases at the corporate 
level is likely to trigger the need for innovation knowledge codification (Zollo and Winter, 
2002). Continuous innovation knowledge codification at a centralized corporate location 
triggers the need for a more systematic way to archive codified knowledge to make it useful for 
existing innovation projects as well as future innovation endeavours. Over time, in conjunction 





2013), a knowledge management system gets established, within which codified and catalogued 
innovation knowledge resides. This knowledge management system sets the foundation for the 
creation of organizational innovation memory, making innovation knowledge across the full 
spectrum of outcomes accessible across the organization in the present and future (Hargadon 
and Sutton, 1997).  
While useful for present and future innovation endeavours, such organizational memory is, 
by definition, comprised of knowledge that has been generated in the past about undertaken 
innovation activities. For instance, this kind of codifiable information can relate to tested and/or 
deployed processes, tools, materials, shapes, and innovation organizational set-ups.11 
 
Proposition 12: The active involvement of corporate managers in innovation creates 
organizational innovation memory. 
 
3.4.3.2 Generation of Architectural Innovation Implementation 
 Architectural innovation implementation builds upon the concept of architectural 
innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990) and refers to the active optimization of ongoing 
innovation implementation processes across the organization. Ideally, managers continuously 
evaluate and periodically reconfigure distributed innovation modules constituting various 
innovation implementation projects to gain efficiencies and generate value. These are non-trivial 
tasks as different elements of innovation knowledge are often distributed temporally, 
geographically, and structurally (i.e., among separate business units and/or among functions). 
Benefiting from their centralized overview of all innovation projects across the 
organization, corporate managers can often connect the dots and generate architectural innovation 
                                               
11 I thank Rob Austin for pointing out the backward-looking nature of the organizational innovation memory and 





implementation. Ramachandran, Manikandan, and Pant (2013: 114) provide the following 
example from Tata Group: “Although household water purifiers were widely available in India for 
many years, they were unaffordable to the poor, who didn’t have access to clean drinking water. 
Then in 2009, Tata Swach, a low-cost water purifier, was launched. (…) The company developed 
an early prototype but declared it unviable and not a fit with its software business, and shelved the 
project. In 2006, R. Gopalakrishnan, a senior member of Tata’s group executive office, stumbled 
across the prototype (…). He revived the project, suggesting that Tata Chemicals, with its expertise 
in chemical-processing technologies, take the lead.” This example demonstrates how 
organizational innovation memory—in this case, enacted by an individual corporate manager—
can generate instances of architectural innovation implementation. 
 
Proposition 13: Organizational innovation memory enables architectural innovation 
implementation. 
3.5 DISCUSSION AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 I have developed two novel concepts: corporate innovation synergy and corporate 
innovation value-added. Corporate innovation synergy refers to mechanisms that can be deployed 
by corporate managers to make existing intra-organizational innovation processes more efficient. 
Corporate innovation value-added concerns mechanisms that can be deployed by corporate 
managers to improve intra-organizational processes in ways which are hard to achieve at the 
business unit level. I have synthesized my propositions into a theoretical model which depicts the 
interdependencies among these mechanisms as their deployment increases a firm’s innovation 
output. I conclude by discussing important boundary conditions of the CIA theoretical model and 
suggesting several areas for future investigation. 





The CIA theory is mid-range in nature. Several important boundary conditions apply, and 
are discussed below. 
3.5.1.1 Degree of Diversification 
The need for CIA is likely to be contingent on a firm’s degree of diversification. Less 
diversified firms tend to have flatter organizational designs (Rajan and Wulf, 2006), reducing 
innovation decision-making distortions caused by hierarchical layering (Reitzig and Maciejovsky, 
2015), and in turn reducing the need for CIA. Further, in a less diversified firm there is less need 
for specialized corporate-level roles as the administrative complexity decreases and the roles of 
corporate and business managers overlap. 
On the other hand, in an excessively diversified firm, several factors are likely to lessen 
the effectiveness of CIA. First, due to the increased organizational complexity of an excessively 
diversified firm, less managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997) at the corporate level will be available 
for innovation related matters. Second, the cognitive limitations (Simon, 1955, 1979) of corporate 
managers limit their ability to comprehend innovation issues, needs, and opportunities across many 
diverse industries. Third, the cause of excessive diversification is often an aggressive M&A 
program stemming from managerial motivation to reduce employment risk (Amihud and Lev, 
1981), as opposed to internal growth through deployment of organizational slack (Penrose, 1959). 
The resulting portfolio of businesses each having their unique innovation cultures makes the 
deployment of CIA difficult due to strong path dependencies of innovation trajectories at the 
business unit level. 
In sum, CIA is likely to be most effective in firms in which the degree of diversification is 
congruent with owners’ interests (as opposed to with the interests of managers exercising their 
managerial discretion) (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990). 





One of the premises on which the theory of CIA rests is the turnover differential between 
corporate and business unit managers. I assume that corporate managers have significantly lower 
turnover rates than business unit managers. I argue that the lower turnover of corporate managers 
versus business unit managers enables corporate managers to create organizational innovation 
memory and build trusting relationships with external idea holders, among other effects. In 
companies in which the turnover of corporate managers is high, some of the CIA model’s 
propositions are likely to be weakened. 
3.5.1.3 CIA in Crisis Periods 
When organizations encounter a period of financial turmoil, placing them under the purview 
of stakeholders providing financial backing, corporate managers are likely to refocus their 
attention away from CIA to manage more pressing tasks required for their firm’s short-term 
survival. Paradoxically, corporate managers’ abandonment of CIA in times of crisis may provide 
short-term relief, but may also set the stage for a gradual erosion of a firm’s capability to remain 
competitive in the long term (Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011; Lim, Celly, Morse, and Rowe, 2013). 
3.5.2 POSITIONING OF CIA MECHANISMS WITHIN THE EVOLUTIONARY FRAMEWORK 
 Most of the propositions concern the variation and retention phases of intra-organizational 
innovation processes. This CIA focus suggests that corporate managers have multiple avenues for 
shaping novel idea generation and supporting implementation of selected ideas, while being more 
limited in intervening in the selection process. 
This imbalance in the CIA model is consistent with recent observations in the literature 
(Reitzig and Maceijovsky, 2015; Reitzig and Sorensen, 2013) regarding the lack of knowledge 
about the sub-processes that shape the selection decision making in a multidivisional firm. I argue 
that corporate managers can play an important role in reducing middle managers’ selection biases 





Future research can test these propositions using randomized control trials in companies 
which have not yet experienced CIA. Further, future studies might employ recent advances in the 
understanding of a neurobiological basis for decision-making biases (e.g., De Martino et al., 2006) 
and apply these insights from neuroscience to theoretically and empirically push the boundaries of 
knowledge on influences shaping the selection of novel ideas. 
3.5.3 TYPE OF INNOVATIONS SUPPORTED BY CIA 
 Corporate managers are likely to be effective in enhancing organizational capability for 
architectural innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990), as they possess a holistic overview of all 
innovation projects. Given corporate managers’ lesser risk aversion compared to middle managers 
(Castañer and Kavadis, 2013), CIA is also likely to contribute to the generation of radical 
innovations. On the other hand, corporate managers are less likely to contribute to innovations at 
the component level, given their lack of detailed expertise-level knowledge. Similarly, employees 
closest to core businesses (Thompson, 1967) are better equipped at ideating on incremental 
improvements than are corporate managers, who are often separated by several hierarchical levels 
from the underlying business processes run by lower-level managers and/or market-facing 
employees. Thus, an interesting empirical research question relates to the effect that CIA has on 
changing the representation of different innovation types post CIA’s deployment. 
3.5.4 CIA INTENSITY 
Is it always beneficial for organizations to pursue increased innovation output? Wouldn’t 
corporate managers’ energy and attention be better spent on other activities? When too many 
resources are diverted to exploration/innovation that does not yield economic rents in the short 
term, the organization’s long-term survival prospects can decline due to insufficient generation of 
funds to support ongoing operations. This point brings us back to the issue of 





the firm level, exploration diverts resources from exploitation, which can undermine 
organizational ability to survive as the pursuit of innovation depletes resources at a higher rate than 
the rate at which innovations generate new resources (i.e., negative resource replenishment rate 
due to investments in exploration/innovation pursuits). 
During periods with a negative replenishment rate, resource providers can turn away from 
a firm. A case in point is the satiation of IBM, which has been struggling to transition into cloud 
computing while its traditional business has been declining. Investors responded by selling IBM’s 
stock, which limited IBM’s access to public markets. The case of GE is even more striking. The 
company was deselected from the Dow Index, its last original constituent, and had to fire-sell 
assets to pay off debt and shrink itself. Yet, its debt load remains high while its ability to generate 
profits to service/pay off its debt greatly diminished. This example leads to an important research 
question: how do firms sustain CIA during negative resource replenishment periods due to major 
restructuring efforts involving heavy resource allocation to exploration? 
3.5.5 THE DARK SIDE OF CIA 
Limited periods of increased CIA intensity causing a temporal negative replenishment rate, 
especially during organizational restructuring, are unlikely to cause a firm to become structurally 
biased towards exploration at the expense of exploitation. Yet, CIA continuously applied across 
various hierarchical levels could potentially give rise to a structural negative replenishment rate. 
Over time, a structural negative replenishment rate can deplete organizational ability to support 
exploration through exploitation of core businesses (March, 1991; Thompson, 1967). Another 
potentially negative aspect of sustained high levels of CIA is the generation of intra-organizational 
conflicts among different organizational charters (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). In the following 
paragraphs, I discuss this possible dark side of CIA across hierarchical levels. 





At the individual employee level, CIA is likely to increase the provision of unstructured 
exploration worktime (Steiber and Alänge, 2013) by supporting the allocation of a portion of 
employees’ time towards intrinsically motivated exploration pursuits (Amabile, 1988). An 
overemphasis on the importance of unstructured exploration worktime could dilute employees’ 
focus on their formal responsibilities, negatively affecting a firm’s capacity for exploitation of its 
core businesses. Further, overprovision of unstructured exploration worktime could disrupt 
employees’ cognitive focus on generating incremental innovations related to core businesses, 
leading to an accelerated depreciation of core businesses’ value-generating potential (Thompson, 
1967). 
Another potential issue with sustained high levels of CIA intensity at the employee level 
is the erosion of negative perceptions of failure. Destigmatization of innovation-related failure 
could lower employees’ focus on ultimately generating valuable and replicable outcomes of their 
innovation efforts and decrease the overall productivity of employee-level innovation efforts. At 
the extreme, CIA could encourage employees to engage in exploration activities that endanger 
core businesses (Austin, Devin, and Sullivan, 2012). 
The over-application of CIA at the employee level could also generate conflict between 
employees for whom it is natural to engage in exploration and employees who require more 
structured working environments in order to be productive. CIA could furnish exploration-oriented 
employees with a licence to decrease their collaboration on projects related to exploitation under 
the pretense of needing to focus their efforts on innovation projects harboured within their minds. 
Such uncollaborative behaviour legitimized by CIA could prove to be difficult for the exploration-
minded employees’ immediate superiors to rectify. 
3.5.5.2 Teams 
The over-application of CIA could lead to the emergence of a multitude of semi- to fully 





CIA could facilitate the emergence of such teams by providing them with ad hoc resources and a 
degree of legitimacy for their independent pursuits. Given the lack of formal approval of actions 
undertaken by these semi-autonomous innovation teams, these teams could tie up valuable 
organizational resources without accountability for meaningful outcomes. At the extreme, such 
teams could disrupt formal command and control structures.  
Sustained high levels of CIA intensity could also lead to the emergence of competing 
innovation teams. Such team-level competition could be conducive to finding valuable innovation 
outcomes faster, yet it could also become counterproductive if the inter-team rivalry were to 
diminish the ability and willingness of teams to collaborate and leverage knowledge and outcomes. 
Instead, the over-application of CIA could generate more innovation-related behaviour that is 
rewarded from the CIA perspective reducing the motivation at the team level to collaborate and 
build upon the efforts of other teams. Still another potential CIA-related conflict could arise if a 
rivalry emerged between CIA-sponsored innovation teams operating at the corporate level and 
innovation teams embedded within business units. 
3.5.5.3 Middle Managers 
The main issue with the over-application of CIA at the middle manager level relates to 
incentives. Middle managers’ role has been traditionally understood in the literature as being 
closely related to exploitation (Huy, 2002). CIA could skew middle managers’ incentives towards 
innovation, which could hamper efficient and effective exploitation of core businesses. Further, as 
middle managers play an important role in evaluating the merit of innovation projects originating 
within their business units (Bower, 1970; Reitzig and Sorenson, 2013), tilting middle managers’ 
incentives more towards exploration could increase the riskiness of innovation projects earmarked 
for implementation. 





CIA has the potential to create a conflict within the C-suite as corporate managers start to 
fight over control of the innovation voice and direction. Multiple corporate-level managers (e.g., 
the chief marketing officer, chief innovation officer, chief strategy officer, and even the CEO) 
could consider top-down innovation decision making as belonging to their sphere of influence and 
decision making. 
Another issue related to sustained, high-level intensity of CIA is corporate long-term 
support for projects which may never have commercial application, and/or their commercialization 
is only possible in the distant future. Given that these innovation projects would enjoy endorsement 
and resourcing from the very top of the organization, they could become a significant drag on 
organizational resources. 
 
Limited periods of increased CIA intensity causing temporal negative replenishment rate, 
especially during organizational restructuring, are unlikely to cause a firm to become structurally 
biased towards exploration at the expense of exploitation. Yet, CIA continuously applied across 
various hierarchical levels could potentially give rise to structural negative replenishment rate. 
Structural negative replenishment rate can over time deplete organizational ability to support 
exploration through exploitation of core businesses (March, 1991; Thompson, 1967). Another 
potentially negative aspect of sustained high levels of CIA is the generation of intra-organizational 
conflicts among various organizational charters (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). In the following 
paragraphs, I discuss this potentially dark side of CIA across hierarchical levels. 
3.5.5.5 Individual employees 
At the individual employee level, CIA is likely to increase the provision of unstructured 
exploration worktime (Steiber and Alänge, 2013) by supporting allocation of a portion of 
employee’s time towards intrinsically motivated exploration pursuits (Amabile, 1988). An 





focus on their formal responsibilities negatively affecting a firm’s capacity for exploitation of its 
core businesses. Further, overprovision of unstructured exploration worktime could disrupt 
employees’ cognitive focus on generating incremental innovations related to core businesses, 
leading to an accelerated depreciation of core businesses’ value generating potential (Thompson, 
1967). 
Another potential issue with sustained high levels of CIA intensity at the employee level 
is the erosion of negative perception related to failure. De-stigmatization of innovation related 
failure could lower employees’ focus on ultimately generating valuable and replicable outcomes 
of their innovation efforts and decrease the overall productivity of employee level innovation 
efforts. At the extreme, CIA could encourage employees to engage in exploration activities 
endangering core businesses (Austin, Devin, and Sullivan, 2012). 
The overapplication of CIA at the employee level could also generate conflict between 
employees for whom it is natural to engage in exploration and employees who require more 
structured working environment in order to be productive. CIA could furnish exploration-oriented 
employees with a licence to decrease their collaboration on projects related to exploitation under 
the pretense of needing to focus their efforts on innovation projects harboured within their minds. 
Such uncollaborative behavior legitimized by CIA could prove to be difficult to rectify by 
exploration minded employees’ immediate superiors. 
3.5.5.6 Teams 
The overapplication of CIA could lead to the emergence of a multitude of semi- to fully 
autonomous teams operating outside of the realm of formal organizational authority structures. 
CIA could facilitate the emergence of such teams by providing them with ad-hoc resources and a 
degree of legitimacy for their independent pursuits. Given the lack of formal approval of actions 





organizational resources without accountability for meaningful outcomes. At the extreme, such 
teams could disrupt formal command and control structures.  
The sustained high levels of CIA intensity could also lead to the emergence of competing 
innovation teams. Such team-level competition could be conducive to finding valuable innovation 
outcomes faster, yet it could also become counterproductive when the inter-team rivalry would 
diminish the ability and wiliness of teams to collaborate and leverage knowledge and outcomes of 
aim becomes to generate more innovative related behavior rewarded from the CIA perspective 
without collaborating and building upon efforts of other teams. Another potential CIA related 
conflict could arise when a rivalry would emerge between CIA sponsored innovation teams and 
innovation teams embedded within business units. 
3.5.5.7 Middle managers 
The main issue related to the overapplication of CIA at the middle manager level is related 
to incentives. Middle managers’ role has been traditionally understood in the literature as being 
closely related to exploitation (Huy, 2002). CIA could skew middle managers’ incentives towards 
innovation which could hamper efficient and effective exploitation of core businesses. Further, as 
middle managers play an important role in evaluating the merit of innovation projects originating 
within their business units (Bower, 1970; Reitzig and Sorenson, 2013), tilting middle managers’ 
incentives more towards exploration could increase the riskiness of innovation projects earmarked 
for implementation. 
3.5.5.8 Corporate managers 
CIA has the potential to create a conflict within the C-suite as corporate managers start to 
fight over the control of the innovation voice and direction. Multiple corporate level managers, 
such as Chief Marketing Officer, Chief Innovation Officer, Chief Strategy Officer, and even the 
CEO herself, could consider top-down innovation decision making as belonging to their sphere of 





Another issue arises related to a sustained high-level intensity of CIA is corporate long-
term support for projects which may never have commercial application and/or their 
commercialization is only possible in the distant future. Given that these innovation projects would 
enjoy endorsement and resourcing from the very top of the organization, they could become a 
significant drag on organizational resources. 
3.5.6 CIA GOVERNANCE 
A key factor when considering the role of CIA during negative resource replenishment 
periods is the conversion rate of innovation effort into economic rents. The determination of the 
optimal conversion rate of innovation effort into economic rents is ultimately a managerial task as 
managers make resource allocation decisions (Bower, 1970) among lower-risk/lower-
potential/faster-conversion-rate innovation projects and innovation projects that take longer to 
generate economic rents. Rowe (2001) argues that visionary leaders (who are much more likely 
than managerial leaders to fund innovations) are more likely to cause a firm to go bankrupt if they 
will not allow themselves to be supported by a managerial leader. Rowe’s (2001) insight leads to 
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CHAPTER 4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE INNOVATION 
FUNCTION IN MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRMS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 A firm’s innovation capability consists of sourcing of novel ideas (Hamel, 2006), selection 
from among the novel ideas of the best ones (Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010), and the 
implementation of the selected ideas (Klein & Sorra, 1996). The concept of innovation capability 
is particularly relevant to strategy scholars since innovation is often associated with competitive 
advantage (McGrath, Tsai, Venkataraman, and MacMillan, 1996; Van de Ven, 1986). Hitt, 
Hoskisson, and Kim (1997) argued that, due to increasingly globalized markets, failure to innovate 
can lead to a sudden reversal of fortunes of well-established firms. 
 Little is known about the role that corporate managers, who exert control over separate 
business units in a multidivisional firm (Miller, Fern, and Cardinal, 2007; Rumelt, 1974), have in 
influencing intra-organizational innovation processes (Anderson, Potočnik, and Zhou, 2014; 
Garud, Tuertscher, and Van de Ven, 2013). In his seminal research on the resource allocation 
process, Bower (1970) portrayed corporate managers as passive influencers of innovation 
processes occurring at the business unit level through the establishment of corporate context. 
Bower (1970) defined corporate context as a static system of reporting structures, performance 
metrics, and monitoring procedures aligning bottom-up innovation initiatives with corporate 
strategy. Corporate managers approve bottom-up innovation initiatives based not on their detailed 
knowledge of each initiative, but on their trust in the judgment of middle managers responsible for 
the performance of individual business units (Bower, 1970). Corporate managers are thus 
dependent on middle managers’ sensemaking of innovation initiatives and selection choices, 
which constitute the strategic context (Burgelman (1983a). 





errors occur when an approved innovation initiative turns out to be a failure, whereas type II 
innovation errors occur when an innovation initiative is rejected, yet turns out to be a success 
elsewhere (Garud, Nayyar, and Shapira, 1997). Middle managers’ bias toward innovation 
initiatives presenting low risk for their own careers (Bower, 1970) increases the incidence of type 
I innovation errors when a low-value innovation initiative is selected, even though it does not earn 
sufficient return on the deployed resources necessary for its implementation. More recently, 
Reitzig and Maciejovsky (2015) found that middle managers are prone to eliminating promising 
yet high-risk innovation initiatives when they sense that their selection capability could be 
questioned by their superiors. Middle managers’ cognitive constraints (Simon, 1955, 1979), 
limiting their ability to comprehend innovations that transcend their areas of expertise (Bower, 
1970), contribute to the incidence of type II innovation errors. A further source of type II 
innovation errors occur when middle managers resist the introduction of external ideas seeking to 
protect their sphere of influence, authority, and relevance (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; 
Chesbrough, 2006). 
 Type I and II innovation errors can occur even before innovation initiatives reach the 
selection process. Burgelman (1983b) distinguished between autonomous and induced innovation 
initiatives. Induced innovation initiatives follow corporate strategy formulated by corporate 
managers. When corporate managers lack foresight about future high-impact innovation 
opportunities, induced innovation initiatives are likely to have low success potential (Noda & 
Bower, 1996). Even when high-value innovation opportunities are identified by corporate 
managers, lack of codification of the corporate strategy in a comprehensive manner can hinder its 
diffusion among employees with the potential to contribute to innovation (i.e., individual 
innovators) located several hierarchical levels below corporate managers (Zollo, 1998). Both of 





the incidence of type I innovation errors at the individual innovator level. Autonomous innovation 
initiatives are driven by individual innovators’ intrinsic motivation, as opposed to being induced 
by corporate strategy. This increases the hurdle rate that autonomous innovators face to get 
resources to further develop their novel ideas into defensible projects (Knudsen & Levinthal, 
2007), which increases the incidence of type II innovation errors, again at the individual inventor 
level. 
 Some researchers have started to recognize that corporate managers can influence the 
incidence of type I and II innovation errors. For example, Noda and Bower (1996) extended the 
original Bower-Burgelman model by suggesting a more active role for corporate managers through 
repeated resource allocation process. More recently, Birkinshaw, Bouquet, and Barsoux (2011) 
suggested that proactive corporate intervention in innovation is complimentary to bottom-up 
innovation processes, as corporate managers are well-positioned for managing the penetrability of 
the strategic context for bottom-up innovation initiatives. For instance, innovators in one business 
unit could attempt to transfer and use knowledge resources that already exist in a different business 
unit to achieve a certain innovative outcome (Birkinshaw & Lingblad, 2005; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 
1996). While middle managers responsible for the financial performance of the business unit may 
consider such activity as a misallocation of resources under their control, corporate managers could 
view it as desirable (Gruber, Harhoff, and Hoisl, 2013) for increasing their firm’s ambidexterity 
capability (Zimmermann, Raisch, and Birkinshaw, 2015). 
 Despite this gradual relaxation of the corporate manager passivity assumption in the 
literature, there has been a lack of multi-level innovation studies exploring how corporate 
managers (i.e., at the organizational level) impact innovation processes occurring at lower 
hierarchical levels (Anderson, Potočnik, and Zhou, 2014; Gupta, Tesluk, and Taylor, 2007). Thus, 





actively influence how innovation occurs within their firms (i.e., the CIF). Further, we associate 
corporate processes with resources needed for their enactment. These corporate innovation 
resources are both tangible (e.g., innovation funding, innovation spaces, corporate innovation 
teams) and intangible (e.g., corporate innovation strategy, corporate involvement in ideation, 
corporate endorsement of individual innovators) in nature. 
 The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Given the inductive nature of our study, we 
entered the field with openness to discovering innovation processes and relationships among these 
processes so far underexplored in the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). For presentation purposes, we 
adopted the post-positivistic research convention (Suddaby, 2006) to present literature up front, 
followed by a description of the methods, findings, and the discussion. Similar to Schotter and 
Beamish (2011), this choice was made to provide clarity to the reader, rather than to reflect the 
chronological uncovering of new insights and theory development. We thus first provide a 
synthesis of the conceptual background on the variation, selection, and retention processes 
operating within a multidivisional firm. Second, we outline our methodological approach, 
including a description of the data. Third, we describe our findings with an emphasis on results 
obtained through the inductive theory-building process. Fourth, we develop a typology of CIFs 
and theorize about how their attributes affect a firm’s innovation output. We conclude by 
discussing future research opportunities and the managerial relevance of this study. 
4.2 BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
4.2.1 VARIATION OF NOVEL IDEAS 
 Novel ideas emerge from the creativity of individual employees (Amabile, 1996; 
Campbell, 1960), especially when their personal traits are conducive to innovation, when work is 





generation of novel ideas (i.e., variation) involves a team effort, the likelihood of generating high-
quality novel ideas increases in cases where team variation is preceded by individual ideation effort 
(Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010). External idea sourcing further enhances the firm’s chances 
of having access to high-quality novel ideas (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009; Chesbrough, 2006; von 
Hippel, 1988; von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). 
 The existence of multiple business units under one corporate umbrella increases the 
complexity of innovation variation due to the compartmentalization of novel ideas within business 
units (Tsai, 2001) and across geographies (Gerybadze & Reger, 1999). Innovation cross-
fertilization among business units (Carlile, 2004; Dougherty, 1992) is difficult to achieve, as novel 
ideas are often largely tacit in nature, and their transfer requires prior articulation and codification 
(Szulanski, 1996; Zollo & Winter, 2002). The potential of novel ideas for disrupting existing 
organizational structures can generate intra-organizational opposition toward novel ideas (Garud, 
Tuertscher, and Van de Ven, 2013). As a result, novel ideas can be denied initial organizational 
support (Abernathy & Clark, 1985), decreasing the chances of their transformation into innovation 
initiatives (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). 
4.2.2 SELECTION OF THE BEST IDEAS 
 A key feature of a multidivisional firm is a layer of middle managers (Kanter, 1981), which 
acts as an interface between corporate managers and bottom-up innovation processes (Burgelman, 
1983a, 1983b). This interface is prone to personal (Bower, 1970) and behavioral (Reitzig & 
Maciejovsky, 2015) biases, which may hinder the organizational ability to recognize and select the 
best novel ideas (Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010). Middle managers can also disrupt 
diffusion of awareness about available novel ideas among business units (Reitzig & Sorenson, 
2013), further decreasing chances that the best novel ideas will be selected. Formalization of the 





prevent the selection of the best novel ideas (Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007). 
4.2.3 RETENTION OF SELECTED IDEAS 
 The transformation of selected ideas through the proof of concept and prototype stages 
(Quinn, 1985; Thomke, 2003) into valuable innovation outcomes requires the commitment of 
scarce organizational resources (Bower, 1970; Repenning, 2002). Even when resources are made 
available, retention of selected ideas is a complex process marked by several challenges (Klein & 
Knight, 2005), including (1) unreliability of technological solutions underpinning the innovation, 
(2) need for cognitive effort by users of the innovation, (3) resistance by users of the innovation to 
top-down directives, (4) reluctance by more senior users to collaborate with more junior innovation 
users, (5) short-term negative effect on firm performance, and (6) stickiness of existing routines. 
Intervention by corporate managers has the potential to mitigate some of these retention inhibitors 
(Klein & Sorra, 1996). 
4.3 METHODS  
 We deployed an inductive iterative research approach, similar to Basu, Phelps, and Kotha 
(2016), in order to generate new theory from multiple cases and the extant literature (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Yin, 2013). An inductive research 
design is well-suited for exploring how and through which mechanisms corporate managers get 
involved in innovation processes at the business unit level, given the complexity of the interaction 
between corporate and business unit levels (Burgelman, 2011). We draw on conceptual arguments 
from the evolutionary view of intra-organizational processes (Burgelman, 1983a) in order to 
develop new theory from empirical insights (Eisenhardt, 1989). 






 While the starting point of our inquiry is activity at the corporate level, in order to generate 
deeper theoretical insights, we adopted a multi-level design incorporating corporate and business 
unit levels in our analysis. The multi-case/multi-level design was employed in other recent 
inductive studies concerning related topics such as integrated innovation management (Bernstein 
& Singh, 2006) and external innovation sourcing by mature organizations (Basu at al., 2016). We 
treated each case individually first, but then went back iteratively to individual cases with the 
purpose of identifying common processes across all cases (Yin, 2013), as well as processes linked 
to differing rationales for establishing the CIF. Further, we also isolated case-specific processes 
throughout the theory development work and drew from them when they offered a new insight. 
4.3.1.2 Sampling Approach 
 We purposely selected cases in which we could observe the process of corporate 
involvement in innovation at both corporate and business unit levels of analysis (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). We sought established multidivisional firms with at least three decades of 
operational history and three divisions to ensure that our sample firms have distinguishable 
corporate and business unit levels, yet retained a high enough degree of across-case comparability. 
The sampled companies showed variance in terms of industry, size, age, ownership structure, and 
organizational complexity12 (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The heterogeneity of our sample along 
these dimensions enabled us to observe the creation and deployment of the CIF in various settings. 
This allowed us to draw meaningful comparisons across cases (Yin, 2013). 
4.3.2 DATA SOURCES AND TRIANGULATION 
 Our main primary recorded data source are oral presentations and supporting PowerPoint 
materials from ten summits of chief innovation officers organized by the Innovation Enterprise, a 
                                               





private UK firm organizing summits on topics of concern to senior executives. These summits 
took place between December 2013 and February 2016 in major global cities. Narrators were 
senior innovation executives and consultants discussing corporate involvement in innovation. The 
average presentation was 30 minutes in length. The supporting PowerPoint slides offered 
additional levels of detail, and were also available for the majority of the presentations. Each 
summit comprised on average 30 distinct presentations. The heterogeneity in hierarchical levels 
among presenters enabled us to obtain diverse perspectives on corporate involvement in innovation 
processes across different levels of analysis, as well as contrast internal versus external 
perspectives. From the initial sample comprising over 200 distinct firms, we selected 20 firms that 
fit our sampling criteria. Our sample did not suffer from impression management issues (Graebner 
& Eisenhardt, 2007), as the presenters were not made aware of our specific research project at the 
time of delivering their presentations.13 Table 1 provides an overview of our sample firms, with 
information on key variables. 
                                               
13 From an ethical standpoint, all presenters were made aware by the Innovation Enterprise that the content of their 













revenues	(USD	m) Age	(Years) #	of	employees Narrator
Asteria Airlines 7 33,832 100 95,000 Vice	President,	Innovation
Atlas Asset	Management 9 15,692 230 50,000 Managing	Director,	Strategic	Growth	Initiatives
Crius Asset	Management 11 1,300 80 5,000 Senior	Vice	President,	Innovation
Cronus Insurance 7 13,900 130 10,000 Vice	President,	Global	Innovation
Dione Housewares	&	Accessories 4 5,700 100 8,000 SVice	President,	Chief	Innovation	Officer
Eos Textile	Apparel,	Footwear	&	Accessories 5 1,560 40 3,000 Vice	President,	Innovation
Eurybia Auto	Manufacturers 15 126,839 90 22,600 Head	of	Innovation
Hyperion Drug	manufacturers 3 36,568 300 97,000 Senior	Director	of	Consumer	Health	R&D
Lelantos Food	manufacturing 5 18,218 90 23,000 Vice	President,	Breakthrough	Innovation
Metis Department	stores 3 15,744 130 83,000 Head	of	Innovation	&	Quality
Oceanus Food	manufacturing 5 5,719 60 19,000 Vice	President,	Global	Innovation
Ophion Investment	brokerage 5 37,950 80 56,000 Lead,	Global	Innovation	Program
Pallas Biotechnology 4 51,914 120 89,000 Head	of	Central	R&D	Services,	Innovation&IP
Perses Drug	manufacturers 5 44,576 40 112,000 Director,	Innovation
Phoebe Diversified	machinery 9 83,949 170 348,000 Head	of	Innovation
Prometheus Retail 6 7,942 60 4,300 Head	of	Innovation
Rhea Fashion,	Glass 6 4,026 120 31,000 Director,	Open	Innovation	Networks
Tethys Confectioners 3 7,421 120 15,000 Director	of	Innovation	Center	of	Excellence	
Thea Wireless	communications 4 64,535 40 101,000 Head	of	Innovation
Themis Appliances 13 20,900 100 97,000 Director,	Strategic	Innovation
Max 15 126,839 300 348,000
Min 3 1,300 40 3,000
Mean 6 29,914 110 63,445






 To triangulate our primary data (Yin, 2013), we collected additional data through the 
review of firms’ web sites and annual reports published between 2006 and 2015. The focus of this 
triangulation was to create longitudinal stories of the evolution of corporate involvement in 
innovation in each firm, which significantly augmented our ability to interpret the narrative data. 
4.3.3 DATA CODING AND ANALYSIS 
 To facilitate theory-building based on our research questions, we developed a protocol for 
systematically capturing data relevant for our inquiry along 10 dimensions, including the rationale 
for establishing the CIF, CIF attributes, CIF charters/mandates, CIF objectives, CIF relationships 
with other corporate functions, the process of establishing the CIF, the process of deploying the 
CIF, the nature and degree of CIF involvement in business unit-level innovation processes, CIF 
results, and long-term evolution of the CIF. We followed a three-step analytical procedure for 
coding and analyzing our data (Miles & Huberman, 1994), which we elaborate on below. In terms 
of coding, we initially deployed atlas.ti software to aid the qualitative data analysis. Atlas.ti’s 
benefits are its visual and spatial features and its flexibility in developing interlinkages. Further, 
we did manual coding in Excel in a matrix form to remain close to the underlying data sources. 
The combination of the aggregation power of atlas.ti and the granularity of manual coding in Excel 
allowed a more comprehensive development of coherent theoretical ideas (Barry, 1998). 
4.3.3.1 Step 1: Within-case Analysis of Processes Related to Corporate Involvement in 
Innovation 
 We first recorded information about the innovation activities as they were described in our 
data. Out of these activities, we formed our second-order processes (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). We 
distinguished between processes occurring at corporate and business unit levels. We grouped these 





we aggregated first-order processes into three main processes observed in our data related to the 
generation of novel ideas, selection among these ideas, and retention of selected ideas. We ended 
the single-case review process when we had reached theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). 
4.3.3.2 Step 2: Assessment of the Rationale for Corporate Involvement in Innovation for 
Each Case 
 When conducting the within-case analysis, we uncovered important differences in 
corporate managers’ motives for influencing innovation processes in their respective firms. In 
some cases, robust innovation processes were already in place, and the objective of corporate 
managers was to evolve organizational capability to innovate to a substantially higher level in 
terms of the impact of innovation activities on the firm’s overall performance. The main issues 
evoked by managers in these companies included lack of attention to innovation by the most senior 
executives, insufficient exploitation of emerging technologies, and innovation activities being 
conducted too close to the core activities of the firm. In other cases, the motive was a turnaround, 
as the overall innovation process was broken and needed to be fixed. Common problems included 
lack of high-quality ideas coming from the ideation programs, strong resistance to innovation 
embedded in the formal organizational structure, organizational culture a priori hostile to 
innovation activities, and lack of replicability of innovation processes within the firm. In some 
intermediate cases, partial fixes were needed to an otherwise solid innovation capability 
foundation. Accordingly, we classified organizations into turnaround, evolution, and improvement 
cases. We identified seven eight evolution cases, seven turnaround cases, and five improvement 





Table 2: Corporate Innovation Function Evolution Cases 
 
 
Code name Motivation Trigger for top-down involvement in innovation processes Issues with existing innovation processes Dimensions of new innovation processes
Dione Evolution - The 2009 crisis hit us hard and created the need for 
reinvention. We needed to innovate beyond our core 
products which began to shrink.
- We had solid innovation foundations (i.e., 
disciplined portfolio management, disciplined stage-
gate development, multi-disciplined teams, 
technology brokerage), which we needed to evolve to 
the next level.
- The next level of innovation management incorporates more aggressive innovation goals, wider and deeper 
innovation processes, a deeper innovation mindset, integrated structures supporting innovation.
Eurybia Evolution - We aimed at increasing innovation value generation 
potential and speed at which innovation occurs in an 
organization having a lot of divisions and operating globally.
- We recognized the need to move from a Research 
Center to a Global Research & Innovation network 
management.
- We decided to create a large network which includes: our divisions, suppliers, universities, public and private 
center of competency as partners for innovation.
Oceanus Evolution - The growth of our organization has been based on 
innovation. Yet continuous growth based on global 
possibilities required changes to the current innovation 
management system.
- Regional based innovation was marked by several 
limitations: it required top skills in every region, it 
resulted in making a lot of the same cakes, it traded-
off complexity for growth, it did not necessarily 
generate ideas big enough for investment in 
breakthroughs.
- We established a global R&D function to tackle new  opportunities that include big, different and breakthrough 
ideas that wouldn't be achieved locally. The main goal was to introduce global innovation processes to remove 
duplicity of projects in markets with similar key consumer attitudes and opportunities. The new challenge was to 
link and sync throughout the organization the role of innovation, type of innovation and organizational design to 
deliver this innovation.
Phoebe Evolution - We decided to develop a technologies division focusing 
innovation on customer needs, while keeping innovation 
consistent with our aim to be a pioneer in all our businesses 
to secure the most competitive edge.
- Our innovation management system was focused on 
exploiting present opportunities and we strived to 
develop a Corporate Innovation Process capable of 
identifying and preparing  our organizations for 
opportunities which will convert into financial 
results a decade or further ahead.
- We set several goals for Corporate Innovation Process (CIP): to ensure a timely identification of disruptive 
commercialization challenges, to realize their strong potential business impact, to have astringent and holistic 
capital allocation decision, to set-unclear operational ownership and a continuous process, to ensuretop 
management attention. In general, CIP will push organic growth in support of organizational growth targets.
Rhea Evolution - Innovation has been embedded in CEO's vision since the 
start of the company: "Every new era offers new possibilities 
for action and development. Development never stands 
still. Innovations in one field inevitably lead to innovations 
in others. One must remain alert at all times, always ready 
to make the very best use of what emerges."
- Our organization has a long history of innovations. A 
continuous challenge has been how to leverage new 
technologies on both our B2C and B2B businesses.
- We incorporated more  of open innovation mindset into our innovation management systems to identify 
disruptive technology innovations. We work closely with Global Foresight to identify and understand current and 
future customer needs.
Tethys Evolution - Not available - The previous innovation system relied on innovation 
teams embedded within business units. A different 
approach was needed beyond core and beyond 
product.
- We decided to embed innovation in the corporate strategy and create a global innovation center of excellence to 
consider technology Innovation, generate  innovation foresight, consider innovation options beyond Product 
portfolio and drive innovation excellence/ capabilities.
Thea Evolution - Not available - Key challenge for our innovation system is the ability 
to drive transformation globally to respond to 
shifting customer expectations.
- We designed an innovation management system based on co-creation with continuous executive input and 
support: discovery (innovation workshop, innovation forum, executive support), selection (co-creation workshops, 
high level feasibility and impact, selection proposal to executive level), executive commitment (co-creation 
agreement, steering committee, joint resources & funding, executive sponsorship), design & validation (business 
impact validation, joint location & resources, user experience validation, design team, scalability plan, rapid 
prototype creation), decision go-big/stop (transition/stop plan, steerco review, executive decision), result (transfer, 
redesign, stop). 
Themis Evolution - [We asked ourselves] how do we move from “us” making 
all innovation decisions to an organization that is managing 
and delivering innovation goals in a sustainable basis?
- We lacked a global innovation governance and 
management structure enabling continuous 
innovation.
- We made innovation part of the enterprise business process starting with planning and goal setting and resulting 























Code name Motivation Trigger for top-down involvement in innovation processes Issues with existing innovation processes Dimensions of new innovation processes
Asteria Improvement - We recognized that innovation landscape in our industry 
changed through disruptive new business models, rapid 
product/service innovations, innovations moving from 
corporates to start-ups, open innovation.
- We had difficulty persuading the Board of Directors 
about innovations that will not bear immediate fruit. 
Further, after a recent merger two distinct innovation 
cultures co-existed. Organizational silos hindered 
innovation.
- We focused on the following drivers of innovation success: innovation strategy and ownnership, innovation 
friendly culture, balanced portfolio, internal and external collaboration, innovation execution: process and tools, 
innovation competencies, central steering and support.
Crius Improvement - Not available. - We needed to create a structured approach to 
innovation in a conservative organizational 
environment.
- We established two long-term goals: generate meaningful revenue from new businesses and build a stronger 
culture of innovation.
Metis Improvement - We  realized that most employees became designers and 
merchandisers working  with very short of timeframes 
making the concept of innovation difficult for them to 
embrace. We needed an updated innovation management 
system to allow innovation to co-exist with mindsets not 
focused on innovation.
- We were a little like civil service: an old and rigid 
organization. Our organization was defined by 
ideation silos without opportunities to cross-fertilize 
ideas. Yet during our 100+ year old history we had 
been aiming at achieving balance between 
operational vs. innovation worlds. All the past 
innovation ideas got recorded in company's archive.
- Our updated innovation management system consisted of agreement on  what type of innovation is required, 
acquisition of capabilities required to achieve desired innovation type, training of employees in innovation 
thinking by surely changing the organizational culture, embracement of experimentation and failure increasing 
wiliness for risk taking, assembly of diverse innovation teams allowing involved employees to assume distinct 
innovation roles, creation of physical environment conducive to innovation.
Pallas Improvement - We needed an innovation management system supporting 
our strategic pillars: delivering value for end users and 
testing efficiency for business customers.
- We did not  have a uniform understanding of what 
innovation represented for the organization. We also 
lacked an integrated approach to innovation.
- We invested in developing  a holistic innovation and intellectual management system incorporating innovation 
into strategy, organizational structure and culture. The innovation management processes included ideas, IP and 
Portfolio management, product and process development, market preparation and launch. System is supported by 
program and project management, awards and incentive systems, IT and knowledge management systems and 
improvement processes. In the next phase we aim to develop a corporate venturing program.
Perses Improvement - Intrapreneurship is hard and we wanted to get better at it 
recognizing that current innovation management system is 
not enough to deliver  our 10 year vision to be the most 
innovative provider of our clients' health needs in our 
geography.
- We had a standard stage-gate innovation process in 
place supported by the following capabilities: project 
delivery, innovative thinking, medical/scientific 
expertise, strong cross-functional understanding of 
our organization and opportunity identification. 
- We  needed to incorporate in our innovation management system new capabilities: lean start-up experience, 
innovation process, broader understanding of the healthcare and industry (including start-ups), expertise  in 
building a health service and monetize it, data driven insights generation focused on customers and consumers, 





Table 4: Corporate Innovation Function Turnaround Cases 
Code name Motivation Trigger for top-down involvement in innovation processes Issues with existing innovation processes Dimensions of new innovation processes
Eos Turnaround - CEO wanted an innovation governance system mitigating 
risks of personal negative outcomes for employees who 
engage in innovation.
 -Most people were empowered to say NO to 
innovation across the organization. Further these 
people were never held accountable for saying NO as 
nobody got ever fired for saying NO to a great idea.
- Our main objective was to install an innovation governance system headed by a senior executive reporting to the 
CEO and empowered to push through the organization good ideas, with an independent budget, freedom to fail and 
mandate to source ideas externally.
Hyperion Turnaround - Senior executives decided that “Consumer is at the heart 
of everything we do”.
- Previous innovation system was characterized by 
Limited to no consumer focus within R&D, Product 
design and aesthetics not core to product 
development, Link of R&D to commercial not 
embedded and established, Technology pipeline not 
necessarily linked to commercial ambition, No clear 
pathway/process for product development, No 
sensory/consumer science for product evaluation and 
claims support
- We aimed at adding a function to Consumer Health R&D that ensures consumer focused R&D efforts delivering 
superior products that not only are science based but consumers also love to use them. A more concrete goal was to 
develop a consumer focused innovation pipeline (5-10 years) by setting a stretching goal and a working hypothesis 
that will provide a
distinctive, life-improving experience; identifying the target consumer’s ideal experience; defining the ideal 
product, package or device benefits
Lelantos Turnaround - After going public we realized that we needed to conduct 
an innovation turnaround to drive innovation in our large 
established multidivisional company. 
- Our large organization got in the way of innovation 
resulting in inconsistent innovation processes, which 
were difficult  to replicate and which did not lead to 
sustained success. 
- We first used workarounds using new venture team, breakthrough team, SWAT team, CEO-sponsored team and 
front end teams. Main issue with these approaches was difficulty to establish a repeatable innovation capability. We 
approached this issue by establishing a common "What" is innovation for our organization and "How" are we going 
to achieve it. Our ultimate goal was to develop innovation capability that was repeatable across the organization, 
led to consistency in introducing new  products and resulted in high level financial performance.
Ophion Turnaround - Innovation was scattered throughout the organization, 
made through passion without a coherent framework.
- We needed a global framework as nobody knew 
what other people were doing. There was 
disconnection among innovation activities and 
duplication of ideas.
- The new innovation management system mostly provided structure around the innovation activities: it got senior 
managers involved in innovation, recognized that individuals contribute to the innovation process differently and 
took that into account when assigning innovation roles, created a safe environment for experimentation by 
changing the organizational culture, broke down organizational silos by providing a common innovation platform
Prometheus Turnaround - Our innovation model generated a lot of bad ideas lacking 
strategic alignment.  
- We implemented management idea system which 
again generated a lot of bad ideas, with the 
responsibility to select among them a few good ones 
delegated to business units, which again did not 
work. It was discontinued after 1.5 years.
- We introduced Corporate innovation Function responsible for supporting and accelerating the innovation process 
at the business unit level by providing the right methods, tools and conditions so that everybody can innovate. This 
new approach to innovation management is focused on creative problem solving  with a more top-down approach.
Atlas Turnaround - Not available. - Our conservative, process driven and siloed 
organizational environment hindered innovation.
- We needed to break internal barriers to innovation to start generating meaningful innovation revenue without 
disrupting organizational DNA.
Cronus Turnaround - We analyzed the database of 3000 ideas from 1000 
employees on two dimensions: contributions per person 
and quality of submitted ideas. We found that  few people 
submitted a lot of low quality ideas while a lot of people 
submitted few but high quality ideas.
- Our top-down dictated innovation hyperactivity is 
best described as "innovation carnival". We found 
that innovation carnival leads to the generation of 
very few good ideas whose implementation is further 
hindered by rigid innovation processes resulting in 
episodic innovation outcomes.
- We strived to change from centralized innovation management to the creation of decentralized business-unit level 
innovation ecosystem which is always on and allows for exploration of ideas which would never get attention under 





 To increase the confidence level in our case classification, we also coded data on triggers 
for corporate involvement in innovation processes and included them in Table 2. We expected 
triggers for the evolution cases to be more abstract and forward-looking compared to the 
turnaround cases. For the eight evolution cases, six had triggers that concerned either the need to 
extract more value from innovation or to incorporate into the innovation processes a capability to 
identify and prepare ground for exploiting new opportunities. For two evolution cases, data on 
triggers were not available. In contrast, seven out of eight turnaround cases had concrete triggers 
concerning the need to refocus innovation activities on existing customer needs or to fix 
fundamental issues with existing innovation processes. 
4.3.3.3 Step 3: Cross-case Analysis Employing a Case-ordered Predictor-outcome Matrix 
 The final stage of our analysis was the creation of a case-ordered matrix (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Table 5) to uncover processes specific to either the turnaround or evolution 
rationale for establishing the CIF. We termed these as turnaround-specific processes or evolution-
specific processes.14 Further, the cross-case analysis allowed us to identify common processes 
deployed in almost all firms, as well as contingent processes, manifested in some firms without a 
clear distributional pattern across the sample, based on the rationale for establishing the CIF.
                                               
14 In Table 3 we also include improvement cases. We focused our analysis on evolution and turnaround cases given 





Table 5: Case-ordered Matrix of Variation, Selection, and Retention of Corporate and Business Unit Level Processes TABLE	3Case-ordered	Matrix	of	Variation,	Selection	and	Retention	of	Corporate	and	Business	Unit	Level	Processes
I.	Variation	processes II.	Selection	processes III.	Retention	processes















































































































































































































































































































Dione * * * * *
Eurybia * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Oceanus * * * * * * * * * * *
Phoebe * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Rhea * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Tethys * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Thea * * * * * * * * * * * *
Themis * * * * * * * * * * * *
Improvement
Asteria * * * * * * * * * * *
Crius * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Metis * * * * * * * * * * *
Pallas * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Perses * * * * * * * * * *
Turnaround
Atlas * * * * * * * * * *
Cronus * * * * * * * * * *
Eos * * * * * * * *
Hyperion * * * *
Lelantos * * * * * * * * *
Ophion * * * * * * * * * * *





 The main goal of our analysis was to uncover processes employed by corporate managers 
to influence how innovation is done within multidivisional firms. Building on the evolutionary 
view of intra-organizational innovation processes (Burgelman 1983a), we first mapped processes 
we found on to the variation, selection, and retention (VSR) framework (see Figure 1). We paid 
particular attention to distributing processes across the three levels of analysis (i.e., corporate 
managers, middle managers, inventors) and process types (i.e., turnaround-specific, evolution-
specific, common, contingent processes). Subsequently, we discussed interdependencies within 
and across the main processes of variation, selection, and retention. 







































































































































4.4.1 VARIATION PROCESSES 
4.4.1.1 Corporate-level Variation Processes 
 At the corporate level, we observed one common, one contingent, and two evolution-
specific processes related to variation. The common variation process is the increase in variation 
diversity (3). Firms across the sample used open innovation (Chesbrough, 2006), consisting of 
sourcing ideas directly from external providers, such as universities, other firms, or individual 
inventors. Further firms invested into or partnered with start-ups with the objective to get access 
to latest technologies (Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006). Firms also actively scouted for ideas in 
unrelated industries. Several firms established offices in Silicon Valley with the mandate to 
discover and assess the exploitability of the latest technological innovations. Firms routinely 
established a web interface through which outsiders could submit their innovation ideas. Firms 
also frequently organized ideation campaigns among outside stakeholders (e.g., customers). The 
senior director of consumer franchise innovation at Hyperion commented: 
Open innovation is critical to fuel the short and long-term [innovation] pipeline. We use a 
defined system within Hyperion asking for submissions to fuel our innovation pipeline. We 
also actively work with other companies for product development, ingredient selection etc. 
 
 The contingent variation process is the uniformization of innovation definition (1). The 
decision by corporate managers to play a more active role in the management of innovation 
processes triggered a search for a firm-specific meaning of innovation. In several firms, this 
process took the form of a company-wide consultation across hierarchical levels. The head of 
central R&D services, innovation, and intellectual property at Pallas stated: 
We asked lifecycle / worldwide committee in all the regions what is innovation for you. Name 
the products launched in the last 10 years you consider as innovative. [Based on this 
consultation] we derived innovation attributes: inspirational, game changing and money 
making. This definition of innovation has been communicated over and over throughout the 
company to make clear what innovation means. If employees have ideas fitting these criteria, 




 The uniformization of innovation definition also involves the promotion of aspects of the 
existing organizational culture compatible with the clarified meaning of innovation. Making 
significant changes to the organizational culture was considered counterproductive. In that sense, 
the uniformization of innovation definition follows the extant organizational culture and not vice-
versa. The vice president of innovation at Asteria remarked: 
Do not work against the company culture unless [your] company needs radical restructuring. 
Work with the culture and [its] good elements. 
 
 The first evolution-specific process is the elevation of innovation into corporate strategy 
(2). Across all evolution cases, innovation became a key element of corporate strategy. Corporate 
managers formulated mid- to long-term goals linked specifically to innovation activities, outlined 
strategy for achieving these goals, and defined metrics allowing them to track progress toward 
achieving innovation goals. The innovation goals were clearly separated from goals associated 
with existing businesses. The director of the Innovation Center of Excellence at Tethys 
commented: 
We made innovation part of corporate strategy to drive industry-leading growth, along growth 
coming from expansion of our geographical footprint in focus areas and creation and expansion 
of a consumer-centric portfolio across key geographies to drive best-in-class shareholder 
return. 
 In contrast, executives in turnaround cases were mostly focused on getting extant 
innovation processes corrected and updated, as opposed to considering innovation as a significant 
growth engine at the same level of importance as growth from existing businesses. This dichotomy 
points to a differential in the level of innovation ambition between evolution and turnaround firms. 
Corporate managers in former firms established aggressive top-down innovation goals and were 
subsequently changing their innovation processes to achieve these goals. Corporate managers in 




in their organizations, which focused corporate managers’ attention to eliminating structural 
obstacles to innovation. 
 The second evolution-specific process we observed is the increase in variation horizon (4). 
It involves corporate support for the exploration of consumer trends and technologies whose 
potential financial contributions will not materialize in the near future. This process enables firms 
to reduce managerial myopism limiting opportunity searches to cognitively close landscapes 
(Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000) and to develop beyond-the-horizon (i.e., future-oriented) absorptive 
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The head of innovation at Phoebe commented: 
We focus on trendsetting technology portfolios per business to achieve leading position. We 
aim to increase patents in trendsetting technologies through effective R&D spending. We do 
so by fully leveraging our capabilities and assets to tap further potential. 
4.4.1.2 Business unit-level Variation Processes 
 One common business unit-level variation process is the decentralization of risk-taking 
(10), aimed at pushing risk-taking behavior into areas outside of traditional loci of innovation 
activities, such as specialized R&D centers. Corporate managers encouraged autonomous bottom-
up innovation, provided physical experimentation spaces, and made it possible for individual 
innovators to alternate between exploitative and explorative careers. In Eurybia’s innovation 
documents, this process was described succinctly: 
[The objective of the CIF is to] spread the culture of Innovation throughout all Eurybia Group 
disciplines. 
 The second common business unit-level process is the increase in variation productivity 
(12), focused on increasing the odds that variation activities result in higher-quality ideas. Second-
order processes included training programs improving individual innovators’ variation skills, rapid 
experimentation allowing efficient testing of early-stage ideas, facilitation of horizontal 
collaboration, and destigmatization of failure. Not all of these second-order processes were easy 




Failure is an issue for everybody. If you fail, you may feel that you will get penalized. 
[Organizational] culture must change to turn failure into an opportunity to learn. It is tough to 
do in a regulated environment. 
The contingent business unit-level variation process is related to the channeling of risk-taking (11). 
It consists of the identification of individual innovators deemed as possessing the ability to 
generate high quality ideas and of the solicitation of variation contributions from these individuals. 
The contingency nature of this process hinged on the ability of the organization to recognize high 
quality variation contributors. The vice president of global innovation at Cronus commented: 
We ran innovation generation events and analyzed the database of 3000 ideas from 1000 
employees on two dimensions including: contributions per person and quality of submitted 
ideas. We noticed that few people submitted a lot of low quality idea and a lot of people 
submitted few, but high quality ideas. We used social tools to get more ideas from these low 
frequency contributors. 
4.4.2 SELECTION PROCESSES 
4.4.2.1 Corporate-level Selection Processes  
 The only common corporate-level selection process is the verticalization of corporate 
context (5). This refers to corporate managers proactively influencing selection processes at lower 
hierarchical levels. The involvement of corporate managers started in the early stages of the 
development of novel ideas by individual inventors, as corporate managers directly participated in 
ideation events. Further, corporate managers got involved in the selection of bottom-up ideas. 
Corporate managers also simplified and added transparency to idea selection criteria and rules. For 
instance, Thea’s innovation document describes a co-creation innovation methodology in which 
the idea discovery phase directly involved corporate managers, who also actively participated in 
the idea selection phase. 
 The evolution-specific corporate-level selection process is the dynamization of corporate 
context (6). It involves continuous updating of assumptions underpinning the corporate context, 




corporate context is that corporate managers actively pitch novel ideas that they considered as 
promising to business units. The prominence of dynamization of the corporate context among 
evolution cases is a key distinction vis-à-vis the original Bower-Burgelman model (Bower, 1970; 
Burgelman 1983a, 1983b), in which the corporate context was assumed to be static in nature (Noda 
& Bower, 1996). The following quote by the vice president of global innovation at Oceanus 
illustrates the dynamic nature of corporate context among the evolution cases: 
Tackling of new opportunities that include Big, Different and Breakthrough [projects], that 
wouldn’t be achieved locally, requires knowing when it is time to change models again. 
4.4.2.2 Business unit-level Selection Processes 
 We identified one common and one turnaround-specific process at the business unit level. 
Both of these processes are aimed at lowering or eliminating the influence of the negative biases 
of middle managers towards novel ideas. The common process is the creation of alternatives to 
strategic context (14), which consisted of bypassing middle managers and connecting promising 
ideas directly with resources located at the corporate level. To create these channel alternatives to 
the strategic context, firms established social platforms for idea sharing and diffusion, and created 
informal innovation networks. The vice president of innovation at Asteria stated: 
There used to be just one person selecting ideas and a lot of good ideas got lost. Now we use 
Ishare platform to connect idea generators with experts / other innovators. We also built 
internal “innovators network”, as well as innovation networks for specific initiatives. 
 The turnaround-specific process, the mitigation of strategic context influence (13), aims at 
lowering middle managers’ agency to dismiss novel ideas for reasons other than their potential to 
create value. Corporate managers empowered innovation teams in evaluating novel ideas and de-
emphasized the role of formal hierarchy in the innovation activities. In doing so, corporate 
managers increased the selection influence of actual inventors and their collaborators with close 
knowledge of the novel idea, and decreased bureaucratic selection power arising from the 




processes at the inventor level, which lowered the hierarchical level at which the first selection of 
ideas took place. It also increased the resilience of pre-screened novel ideas when they faced 
scrutiny from middle managers (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). The vice president of global 
innovation at Cronus described their approach as follows: 
We decentralized the innovation activity, [started to] use a light-touch management approach, 
integrated innovation activity into business units and leveraged pair-wise scoring consisting of 
comparing two randomly selected ideas. 
 The locus of this turnaround-specific selection process at the business unit level underlines 
the embedded difficulty in making business unit-level organizational structures penetrable for 
novel ideas. Resistance to innovation that turnaround firms had to overcome to ensure vertical 
flows of novel ideas stemmed from both employees directly opposed to innovation activities and 
employees suffering from innovation self-denial. The head of global innovation at Ophion noted: 
[In the case of] aggressive resistors [to innovation], the challenge is how to manage them. 
People may [also] resist when they think they have been innovating for years. 
4.4.3 RETENTION PROCESSES 
4.4.3.1 Corporate-level Retention Processes 
 The common process at the corporate level, the focus on innovation sustainability (8), 
consists of sustaining the retention of selected ideas when their implementation runs into 
unexpected challenges. This top-down involvement was especially impactful when the utility of 
ideas transcended across multiple business units. The retention of such ideas might not have been 
optimal from the perspective of middle managers running the individual business units, as it drew 
on business unit-specific resources without offering short-term return potential at the business unit 
level. Yet, corporate managers might still pursue the implementation of hard-to-implement 
selected ideas, seeking long-term returns. To that effect, corporate managers established corporate 




managers as opposed to middle managers. Further, corporate managers co-committed resources 
alongside business units’ resources. Corporate managers also actively managed the innovation 
pipeline mix to continuously include easy-to-execute projects, as well as more complex innovation 
projects. Corporate managers’ ultimate goal was to routinize the retention of selected bottom-up 
innovation activities originating at the business unit level so that implementation challenges would 
not stop the selected novel ideas from being retained. The focus on innovation sustainability (8) 
required an ongoing effort and attention from corporate managers. The director of strategic 
innovation at Themis commented: 
We have a [innovation] strategy, how do we move from “us” making all innovation decisions 
to an organization that is managing and delivering innovation goals in a sustainable basis? 
 The first contingent corporate level retention process is the centralization of innovation 
responsibility (7), manifested by the designation of a senior-level executive with the responsibility 
for the retention of the innovation strategy. While the main responsibility of the innovation 
executive was to transform innovation goals into measurable results, concrete agendas varied 
depending on specific innovation objectives. A common denominator in the narratives was the 
initially undefined nature of this position. Instead, innovation executives were defining their exact 
roles and priorities through an iterative sense-making process that involved the perceptions of the 
different internal stakeholders. The managing director of strategic growth initiatives at Atlas 
described the evolving nature of his role as follows: 
I was given the task to manage innovation top down, with no direction how to do it… I talked 
to business unit managers and asked “what do you think, are we innovative?” [It made 
managers’] head spinning, all heard of Google’s 20% of time working on whatever they like… 
[But that would not work] not at Atlas. [I knew I] will not get it right the first time; it will be 
an iterative process; [moreover] the [corporate] innovation program will have to survive the 
strong culture. 
 The other contingent corporate retention process is the inter-temporalization of innovation 




ideas that needed to be developed further. Given that corporate managers can spread their bets on 
more innovation projects than business unit managers can, corporate managers are less constrained 
in how long they can support a high-potential idea whose retention progress is being slowed down 
by innovation process-related obstacles (e.g., Klein & Knight, 2005). Further, corporate managers 
can set up and maintain long-term organizational innovation memory by preserving blueprints for 
ideas that prove to be unsuitable for implementation in the current temporal period. The inter-
temporalization of innovation implementation is contingent on corporate managers’ objectives 
being focused on long-term results, as opposed to seeking maximization of short-term profits. 
Another contingency is the provision of a discretionary innovation budget at the corporate level. 
4.4.3.2 Business unit-level Retention Processes 
 All retention processes at the business unit level were classified as contingent. The process 
of evaluation of innovation performance (15) results in the ability of the organization to measure 
both innovation activity and outcomes. It involves the establishment of key innovation 
performance indicators used to measure individual level innovation activity and the setting up of 
an innovation dashboard to follow innovation progress on a more aggregated level. The 
contingency nature of this process is linked to the difficulty in modifying existing metrics used to 
assess performance of both middle managers and individual innovators. The managing director of 
strategic growth initiatives at Atlas remarked: 
[We] established financial target for each business unit linked to innovation, [managers] hated 
that, but it focused the business units on generating innovation, and measured progress against 
the innovation targets. 
 Recognition of innovation performance (16) institutes mechanisms for celebrating 
innovation achievements, such as public commendations, opportunity to work on projects of 
intrinsic interest to employees, or personal recognition and advice from senior executives. 




successes and failures is required. Rewarding failure was non-trivial, particularly in firms 
operating in highly regulated environments (e.g., finance, aviation). In these type of environments, 
which require high levels of operating reliability, failure was viewed as undesirable. One 
contingency in this process was the willingness by senior managers to back their non-tangible 
recognition of individual-level innovation efforts with tangible rewards. Previous literature 
uncovered that non-tangible rewards and intrinsic motivation were the main motivating factors for 
employees’ decision to engage in creative variation (Zhang & Bartol, 2010). Yet, we found that 
maintaining employee motivation beyond the initial variation phase required increasing use of 
extrinsic motivators. The managing director of strategic growth initiatives at Atlas stated: 
[We] increased cash awards to implement innovation, [in addition] to rewarding innovation at 
town hall [meetings]. [When an employee got commended for a novel idea], all the other 
employees [claimed to have] had the same idea. [Only] once money gets involved, people 
execute. 
 The process of flexibilization of innovation implementation resources (17) consists of 
making retention resources available on a discretionary basis (Noda & Bower, 1996). This is 
important since the implementation of innovation initiatives often runs into unexpected obstacles 
(Klein & Sorra, 1996). Flexibilization of innovation implementation resources was contingent on 
the amount of resource slack within the organization (Penrose, 1959), lowering the negative effect 
on short-term performance of allocating resources to bottom-up innovation. Flexibilized resources 
took both tangible and intangible form, as reflected by a comment from the senior vice president 
at Crius: 
What we [the CIF] offer: time, funding, feedback and idea refinement, a firm wide hub for 
innovative ideas, people and projects. 
4.4.4 INTERDEPENDENCIES WITHIN VARIATION, SELECTION, AND RETENTION PROCESSES 
 Above, we outlined the strongest links between first-order processes and variation, 




comprising both vertical and horizontal interdependencies within and across the main processes. 
4.4.4.1 Vertical and Horizontal Interdependencies in Variation.  
 We observed several vertical and horizontal interdependencies in the corporate 
involvement in the variation process. One salient vertical interdependency involved the search for 
the meaning of innovation. Corporate managers involved in the uniformization of innovation 
definition (1) sought opinions across the hierarchical levels. In the case of Lelantos, consultations 
about the meaning of innovation took place at regional, divisional, and team levels. Increases in 
variation diversity (3) required regular interactions between corporate managers and middle 
managers. For instance, at Atlas, investment professionals responsible for making venture capital 
investments held consultations with business unit heads to get their inputs. Yet, it was an indirect 
bottom-up influence since specific resource allocations remained firmly a corporate-run process. 
In contrast, in the case of Perses, corporate managers formed direct intra-organizational 
partnerships to drive variation diversity. In addition, we observed that the explicit inclusion of 
innovation into corporate strategy triggered the need for business managers to incorporate in their 
market strategies plans to generate growth from innovation, as the overall growth targets were 
unachievable from exploiting existing activities only. 
 Horizontally, on the corporate level, the uniformization of innovation definition (1) 
facilitated the inclusion of innovation into corporate strategy, as the organizational meaning of 
innovation was clarified which facilitated its codification (Zollo, 1998). In addition, the increase 
in ideation diversity (3) supported the increase in variation horizon (4), as corporate managers 
gained awareness and knowledge about more distant trends and technologies. On the inventor 
level, we observed that channeling of risk-taking reinforced the positive effect of the 
decentralization of risk-taking on the increase in variation productivity. Without directing the 




produce low-value ideas only. 
4.4.4.2 Vertical and Horizontal Interdependencies in Selection 
 The main vertical interaction we observed within the selection process was between 
corporate managers and individual innovators, more so than between corporate and middle 
managers. Corporate managers assumed that increasing middle managers’ openness to 
autonomous innovation is possible, but it will be a lengthy and complex process, as it involves 
modification of elements of organizational culture. Instead, corporate managers focused their 
efforts on directly empowering individual innovators. For instance, in the case of Eos, corporate 
managers reduced the chances of negative consequences for individual innovators. Further, they 
increased the cost in terms of performance evaluation for middle managers to block autonomous 
innovation initiatives. 
 Horizontally, on the corporate selection level, the verticalization of the corporate context 
(5) and resulting greater direct knowledge of bottom-up innovation initiatives allowed corporate 
managers to enhance their capabilities to modify assumptions guiding their interventions into 
innovation processes. At the business unit selection level, the mitigation of strategic context 
agency (13) made it easier for individual inventors to bypass middle managers in their search for 
resources and corporate-level endorsement of their innovation activities. 
4.4.4.3 Vertical and Horizontal Interdependencies in Retention.  
 The first vertical interdependency in retention is between the centralization of innovation 
responsibility (7) and the evaluation of innovation performance (15). Corporate managers, often 
with the help of outside consultants, inserted measurable metrics used to evaluate the innovation 
performance of middle managers. Innovation performance metrics were often contested by middle 




exploitative results. The second vertical interdependency is between the focus on innovation 
sustainability (8) and the flexibilization of innovation implementation resources (17). The 
discretionary innovation budget controlled by corporate managers was not only used to support 
corporate-level innovation processes, but was also deployed to provide ad hoc resources for 
retention of selected innovation initiatives at the business unit level. 
 Horizontally, on the corporate retention level, centralization of the innovation 
responsibility supported several of the second-order processes aimed at making innovation 
sustainable. This was particularly the case for the establishment and resourcing of corporate 
innovation teams and the acquisition of discretionary innovation budgets. On the business unit 
level, the ability to evaluate innovation performance allowed for its recognition. The evaluation of 
innovation performance also facilitated more efficient flexibilization of innovation 
implementation resources. 
4.4.5 INTERDEPENDENCIES ACROSS MAIN PROCESSES 
 Interdependencies across main processes were associated with the informational outputs 
generated by first- and second-order sub-processes. In the case of variation (I) and retention (III) 
processes, focus on innovation sustainability (8) influenced corporate efforts toward increasing 
variation diversity (3), as corporate managers monitored the numbers and types of projects in the 
innovation pipeline (i.e., innovation pipeline’s characteristics). Corporate managers proactively 
addressed discrepancies between innovation pipeline characteristics and the corporate innovation 
strategy (2) by influencing the variation diversity (3). Further, we observed that the ability of 
corporate managers to evaluate (15) and recognize (16) innovation performance hinged on the 
level of concreteness of the innovation definition (1). The innovation definitional fuzziness 
decreased the ability of corporate managers to drive innovation retention. 




temporalization of innovation implementation (9), together with flexibilization of innovation 
implementation resources (17), allowed for the iterative selection of ideas. The benefit of this was 
that, instead of terminating ideas whose implementation ran into issues in the retention phase, ideas 
were submitted for re-selection to assess their potential for further resource commitment. 
4.5 TYPOLOGY OF CORPORATE INVOLVEMENT IN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 
 Prior to discussing theoretical implications of our findings, we synthesize the level and 
nature of involvement of corporate managers in innovation management (i.e., the CIF 
configuration) by defining the collaborative, parallel-capability, and sponsorship CIF models. 
These three CIF models were the dominant types emerging from observations across our cases. 
For each CIF model, we explain the respective variation, selection, and retention mechanisms. We 
conclude our typology discussion by positioning each CIF model on the innovation efficiency 
frontier, defined as the efficient trade-off between type I and II innovation errors. 
4.5.1 THE COLLABORATIVE CIF MODEL 
 In the collaborative CIF model, corporate managers proactively influence existing 
innovation processes across the organization without developing a standalone corporate-level 
innovation capability independent from innovation processes occurring within the business units. 
Corporate managers act as facilitators focused on removing hindrances to innovation and 
improving existing processes. 
 In the Collaborative CIF model, corporate managers seek to enrich the variation process 
by matching previously underutilized external and internal variation with opportunities in the same 
or other business units. To introduce external ideas, corporate managers create an organizational 
climate conducive to what Chesbrough (2006) described as an open innovation environment. Main 




of alliances with start-ups (Rothaermel, 2001), and scouting for ideas in unrelated industries 
(Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007). Internally, corporate managers focus on empowering high-potential 
innovators who might be reluctant to engage in the innovation process without receiving corporate 
support. Main mechanisms involve encouragement of autonomous innovation through internal 
venturing (Burgelman, 1983a), provision of safe experimental spaces (Dombrowski et al., 2007), 
and removing hindrances to switching between exploitative and explorative career paths (Cohen, 
McClure, and Yu, 2007). Further, corporate managers strive for variation efficiency through 
training in ideation at the individual employee level (Roffe, 1999), support for rapid 
experimentation (Thomke, 2003), and the creation of an organizational climate tolerant to failures 
stemming from innovation pursuits (McKee, 1992). 
 In the collaborative CIF model, corporate managers lessen the influence of middle 
managers in the selection process in three ways. First, corporate managers get directly involved in 
early stages of the novel-ideas evaluation process before novel ideas face the scrutiny of middle 
managers. This verticalization of corporate context enables corporate managers to detect novel 
ideas that fit the corporate context and eliminate low-value ideas early on. The pre-selected ideas 
are given resources for their development into more defensible innovation initiatives (Knudsen & 
Levinthal, 2007). Second, corporate managers sponsor the development of social innovation 
platforms and the formation of informal networks composed of middle managers and subject 
matter experts supporting individual innovators (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). These two networking 
mechanisms provide ways for individual innovators to present their novel ideas, get early feedback 
on the merit of their novel ideas, and access resources for their further development. Third, 
corporate managers seek to introduce selection mechanisms operating below the middle manager 
level (e.g., pairwise scoring - comparison of relative merit of two randomly selected ideas). 




business units, with corporate managers providing additional implementation resources in cases 
when unforeseen implementation hurdles arise. Further, corporate managers fulfill two longer-
term retention roles. First, corporate managers focus on innovation sustainability by proactively 
monitoring the innovation pipeline in terms of the numbers, stages, and types of innovation 
initiatives. Corporate managers proactively address deviances between the current state of the 
innovation pipeline and the intent of the corporate context. Second, corporate managers act as a 
memory for selected innovation initiatives that turn out to be non-implementable in the near future 
by safeguarding their codified blueprints (Zollo, 1998) for potential future reactivation. 
4.5.2 THE PARALLEL-CAPABILITY CIF MODEL 
 In the parallel-capability CIF model, corporate managers develop a completely separate 
innovation capability from the innovation capability residing at the business unit level. As the 
business unit level innovation capability follows the Bower-Burgelman model described above, in 
the following sections we focus our discussion on variation, selection and retention processes 
occurring at the corporate level.  
 Variation process at the corporate level is focused at the development of forward-looking 
innovation sensory capability, orienting the firm’s absorptive capacity toward future opportunities 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This forward-looking sensory capability is gained through the 
establishment of innovation teams responsible for identifying, understanding, and codifying 
(Zollo, 1998) technologies developed within innovation clusters. A number of the sampled firms 
established a presence in Silicon Valley, even though their core business was unrelated to Silicon 
Valley’s technological landscape. Another mechanism for exploring distant opportunity 
landscapes was the establishment of ideation labs, which allowed for experimentation with 
radically new ideas through, for instance, creation of concept products potentially relevant to 




 Marginson and McAulay (2008) argued that corporate managers are more inclined to short-
termism (i.e., preference for projects with more certain outcomes) than middle managers due to 
capital market pressures. Yet they failed to find empirical support for their prediction suggesting 
the need for further research on the relationship between risk-taking behavior and hierarchy. In 
our observations related to the corporate selection process in the parallel-capability CIF model, 
corporate managers pro-actively sought to allow high-value/high-risk innovation projects to get 
selected. A key mechanism at the corporate level allowing for the selection of high-value/high-
risk innovation projects was the dynamization of corporate context. Corporate managers pro-
actively sought to understand distant opportunity landscapes, which allowed them to better assess 
the risks associated with identified innovation opportunities and make an informed selection 
decision. Thus, in contrast to the prediction made by Marginson and McAulay (2008), in the 
parallel-capability CIF model corporate managers seek to select radical, as opposed to incremental, 
innovation initiatives for retention.  
 Retention in the parallel-capability CIF model occurs at the corporate level until the desired 
outcome is reached. Discretionary corporate innovation resources facilitate the overcoming of 
unexpected retention hurdles. Once the desired outcome is obtained, corporate managers make a 
top-down decision about which business units are given the responsibility for exploiting the 
retained innovation initiative. 
4.5.3 THE SPONSORSHIP CIF MODEL 
 In the sponsorship CIF model, corporate managers develop an incomplete innovation 
capability for driving their own innovation agenda through variation and selection, yet remain 
dependent on business units for the retention of innovation initiatives generated at the corporate 
level. Parallel variation and selection capabilities coexist at both corporate and business unit levels, 




managers need to pitch their selected initiatives to business units for sponsorship and retention 
through implementation. 
4.5.4 THE INNOVATION EFFICIENCY FRONTIER 
 A critical question that remains is whether a firm, at the same time, can minimize both type 
I and II innovation errors. Figure 2 synthesizes our arguments of how different configurations of 
the CIF affect firm-level innovation performance, expressed as the incidence of type I and II 
innovation errors. The collaborative CIF model is effective in aligning business unit innovation 
effort with the corporate context, thus reducing type I innovation errors. In the collaborative CIF 
model, the cognitive effort by corporate managers is directed at aligning business unit-level 
innovation activities with the imperatives of the corporate context, which is backward-looking and 
constrained by the limits of managerial cognition (Cyert & March, 1963). Thus, paradoxically, the 
incidence of type II innovation errors is high given that autonomous innovation initiatives 
deviating from the corporate context have fewer opportunities to develop into defensible projects 
(Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). 
 In contrast, in the parallel-capability CIF model, corporate managers proactively encourage 
innovations deviant from the imperatives of current corporate context, which reduces the incidence 
of type II innovation errors. In effect, corporate managers act as a buffer between high-potential 
and high-risk innovation initiatives and the business unit-level selection pressures. Yet, as 
corporate managers devote less attention to innovation initiatives at the business unit level, the 
incidence of type I innovation error increases, as the selection decisions by middle managers face 
less scrutiny from corporate managers. 
 In the sponsorship CIF, the incidence of type I innovation errors is even higher than in the 
parallel-capability CIF model, as corporate managers are dependent on middle managers’ 




corporate managers toward low-risk and low-return innovation selection choices made by middle 
managers. On the contrary, we expect the incidence of type II innovation errors to be the lowest 
among the three CIF models, as corporate managers do not lose connection to the autonomous 
bottom-up high-risk/high-value innovation initiatives as is the case in the parallel-capability CIF 
model. This cross-fertilization of top-down and bottom-up high-risk/high-return innovation 
initiatives drives down the likelihood of type II innovation errors. 
Figure 2: The Innovation Efficiency Frontier 
 
4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Our investigation into corporate engagement in intra-organizational innovation processes 
enabled us to construct a detailed account of how corporate managers develop and deploy the 
capability to influence how innovation occurs in their firms. By disentangling corporate 
engagement in the variation, selection, and retention of novel ideas at the corporate, middle 
manager, and individual innovator levels of analysis, our findings shed light on mechanisms and 



















innovation capabilities in multidivisional firms. In the following section, we outline the theoretical 
and managerial implications of our findings. 
4.6.1 EXTENDING THE COMPLEMENTARITY VIEW OF TOP-DOWN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 
 Relatively little is known about the interaction among innovation processes operating at 
different levels of analysis involving actors having varying degrees of agency in innovation 
management (Garud et al., 2013), as “Both the generation of ideas purely at the level of the SMT 
[senior management team] and the receipt and treatment of ideas by SMTs proposed upwards to 
them have received scant attention in the innovation literatures to date despite the crucial position 
held by senior managers to facilitate or stifle innovation” (Anderson et al., 2014, p. 1321). This 
dominance in the extant innovation literatures of studies examining innovation processes operating 
at lower organizational levels could be attributed to tacitness of the phenomenon of corporate 
involvement in innovation, related to the general lack of understanding of what corporate managers 
actually do (Collis, Young, and Goold, 2007). In our study, we address this gap in in the literature 
and build on emerging research that suggests that top-down and bottom-up innovation processes 
are complimentary (Birkinshaw et al., 2011). In our study, we unpack the relationship between the 
top-down and bottom-up innovation processes and mechanisms used by corporate managers to 
influence how variation, selection, and retention of novel ideas occurs at the individual innovator, 
middle manager, and corporate levels of analysis. 
 During our investigation, we found that corporate managers were cognizant of the need not 
to actively influence bottom-up innovation management, sometimes even by heavy-handed top-
down micromanagement of business unit processes. Corporate managers sought to build on extant 
innovation processes and design new ways for driving innovation capabilities, capacity, and 
outcomes. 




behavior, corporate managers preferred workarounds to increase the overall firm innovation 
performance, as changing organizational culture at the business unit level was considered 
ineffective. Further, the nature of corporate engagement in innovation management was in most 
cases ad-hoc and tactical, as opposed to planned and strategic. Corporate managers, assigned 
responsibility to drive innovation, were typically given few pointers about how to build and then 
deploy corporate innovation capabilities. Consequently, we did not observe that top-down 
corporate involvement would substitute for bottom-up innovation processes. Instead, we generally 
observed rather cautious top-down approaches aimed at augmenting the best elements of existing 
bottom-up innovation processes and complementing them with top-down innovation processes. 
 The boundary condition for the complementarity relationship between the top-down and 
bottom-up innovation processes manifested by our observation of the parallel-capability CIF 
model. When corporate managers recognized that bottom-up innovation processes are unlikely to 
result in higher-risk/higher-potential innovation initiatives, they built a separate corporate-level 
innovation capability sheltered from business unit-level selection pressures. 
4.6.2 THE EFFECT OF CIF ON THE INCIDENCE OF TYPE I AND TYPE II ERRORS 
One of the reoccurring themes among the observed processes was the proactive effort by 
corporate managers to influence how individual innovators, middle managers, and corporate 
managers themselves engage in risk-taking behavior associated with innovation activities. 
Further, corporate managers were influencing how these three levels of employees interacted with 
relation to innovation-related activities. In the following paragraphs, we discuss how the observed 
processes map into corporate managers’ efforts to promote risk-taking behavior across 
hierarchical levels, filter risk-taking behavior, and ultimately transform risk-taking behavior into 





Figure 3: Effects of the Corporate Innovation Function on the Incidence of Type I and II 
Innovation Errors 
 
4.6.2.1 Promotion of Internal Risk-Taking Behavior 
 The wiliness of individual employees to engage in innovation activities declines with their 
increasing embeddedness in formal organizational roles (Van de Ven, 1986). Current literature 
emphasizes the importance of open innovation (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009; Chesbrough, 2006) 
in enabling firms to remain innovative by leveraging external high-potential novel ideas. Our study 
extends and enriches the open innovation literature by uncovering processes aimed at discovering 
underutilized internal innovation talent and using it as a supplementary source of high-potential 
novel ideas. We observed two approaches undertaken by corporate managers for achieving this 
goal. 
 First, corporate managers focused on creating an intra-organizational environment tolerant 
of the risks associated with innovation related behavior. The uniformization of innovation 
definition (1), involving the interaction of corporate managers with employees across hierarchical 
levels, enabled corporate managers to define what types of innovations and associated risks are 
desirable. Elevation of innovation into corporate strategy (2) established innovation as an equal 
source of growth alongside expansion of the core business, pursuit of M&A, or establishment of 
alliances (Capron & Mitchell, 2013). All of these processes increased legitimization of employees’ 


















strengthened when corporate managers codified (Zollo, 1998) the elevation of innovation into the 
corporate strategy by formulating a corporate innovation strategy setting out overall firm 
performance targets related to innovation. 
 Second, corporate managers enacted processes aimed at discovering and utilizing 
innovation slack already existing within the organization, complementing the open innovation 
process. Decentralization of risk-taking (10) increased options for individual employees to engage 
in innovation activities, lowering the threshold for justifying innovation activities, as well as risks 
for individual careers in the case of failure. Corporate managers were cognizant that not every 
employee in their organization has the option or capability to productively engage in innovation 
activities. To address this limitation to the decentralization of risk-taking, corporate managers 
engaged in channeling of risk-taking (11) to increase chances that employees with high potential 
to innovate engage in autonomous innovation. 
 Promotion of internal risk-taking behavior increases the incidence of type I innovation 
error, while it reduces the incidence of type II innovation error. Type I innovation error is increased 
as legitimization of innovation-related risk-taking increases the generation of low-value innovation 
proposals, reflecting consistent comments by our narrators that not every employee has the 
aptitude to contribute to the innovation process. Further, several narrators reported that their firms 
were trapped in the “innovation maximization fallacy” (Anderson et al., 2014, p. 1320) whereby 
the top-down promotion of the risk-taking behavior resulted in abundant low- to negative-value 
creativity. The incidence of type II innovation error is reduced as top-down guidance on desirable 
innovation areas encourages innovation mental effort of talented employees who would otherwise 
remain in their exploitative roles. 
4.6.2.2 Filtering of Risk-taking Behavior 




understood (Reitzig & Sorenson, 2013). Previous research focused on factors inhibiting selection 
of the highest-value ideas by middle managers, such as personal agendas (Bower, 1970), strategic 
context (Burgelman, 1983a), and psychological biases (Reitzig & Maciejovsky, 2015). Our 
observations resonate with the view that middle managers are not the ideal evaluators, from the 
overall firm’s perspective, of high-value/high-risk novel ideas. Narrators consistently considered 
that middle managers can block innovation just by doing their job, which provided them with the 
formal authority to say no to high-value/high-risk novel ideas. 
 Our observations expand the discussion on the selection of novel ideas within a 
multidivisional firm by uncovering top-down mechanisms lessening the negative effects of 
corporate managers’ risk aversion for autonomous innovation. Verticalization of corporate context 
(5) increased corporate managers’ involvement in early selection decisions concerning merits of 
novel ideas that increased monitoring of middle managers’ selection decision-making. Mitigation 
of strategic context agency (11) introduced selection mechanisms operating below middle 
managers’ hierarchical levels, decreasing the number of low-value novel ideas and increasing the 
viability of high-value novel ideas through early detection, endorsement, and development from 
the embryotic stage into defensible innovation initiatives (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). The rules-
based nature of these sub-middle manager selection processes increases their robustness vis-à-vis 
behavioral and personal biases (Rietzig & Maciejovsky, 2015). Creation of alternatives to strategic 
context (14) decreased opportunities for middle managers to dismiss these pre-selected high-value 
ideas, as individual inventors had other means to access resources needed for further development 
of their ideas. In particular, informal innovation networks set up by corporate managers served as 
conduits for autonomous innovation, counterbalancing the skepticism toward high-value/high-risk 
novel ideas within formal selection networks (Gulati & Puranam, 2009). By playing an active role 




knowledge of the characteristics of the internal innovation pool, allowing them to continuously 
update their mental models about the innovation opportunity landscape. This dynamization of 
corporate context (6) process lessens corporate managers’ dependency on middle managers for 
inputs needed for the reformulation of corporate strategy (Burgelman, 1994) and allows corporate 
managers to maintain awareness of shifts in the opportunity landscape (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). 
 Filtering of risk-taking behavior reduces the incidence of both type I and II innovation 
errors. Top-down involvement in the selection process, as well as the introduction of rules-based 
sub-middle manager selection, eliminates low-value projects from the onset. Further individual 
innovators are less likely to continue in innovation activities when their proposals are consistently 
dismissed. Thus, the incidence of type I innovation error is reduced. Our narrators commented that 
the vast majority of employees produce mediocre novel ideas, while a few employees generate 
consistently high-value novel ideas. Filtering of risk-taking enables corporate managers to identify 
these innovation high performers and support their innovation efforts, thus reducing type II 
innovation error. 
4.6.2.3 Transformation of Risk-taking Behavior 
 Implementation of selected novel ideas is a complex process with many hurdles that 
selected novel ideas must overcome (Klein & Sorra, 1996). Resonating with the work by Noda 
and Bower (1996), our observations highlighted the importance of staggered resource allocation 
in the process of transforming selected novel ideas into valuable outcomes for the firm. In several 
of the sample firms, corporate managers established discretionary innovation resources under their 
control (i.e., corporate innovation resources). The allocation of these corporate innovation 
resources was flexible (17), as corporate managers were allocating them based on each project’s 
unforeseen needs, and not based solely on a pre-determined plan. Top-down flexibilization of 




transformation of highly risky innovation initiatives into desired outcomes. 
 Several structural changes initiated by corporate managers increased the likelihood that 
selected novel ideas will be of value to the firm. Corporate managers redesigned evaluation 
structures for middle managers to include innovation performance measures (15) linked to 
accomplishing innovation targets. The establishment of a permanent corporate-level innovation 
team (7) increased the likelihood that the corporate innovation strategy would be achieved. Further, 
it also increased the chances that knowledge blueprints for selected novel ideas, which in the end 
cannot be implemented, are archived for later reactivation and knowledge recombination (9). 
 The process of transformation of risk-taking behavior significantly reduces type I 
innovation error, as the merits of each novel idea are further scrutinized during the flexible resource 
allocation process. There is no significant effect on the incidence of type II innovation error, as no 
new novel ideas are selected at this stage. However, there is an inter-temporal (9) reduction in type 
II innovation error, as archived ideas may lead to breakthroughs over the long-term. 
 
4.6.3 LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The importance of linking corporate actions to type I and II innovation errors stems from 
the trade-off organizations face between aligning innovations with the current corporate strategy 
and supporting innovations disrupting it (Garud et al., 2013). This research focused on the question 
of how corporate managers exert influence on innovation processes occurring at lower hierarchical 
levels in multidivisional firms. Based on an inductive multiple-case research design, we developed 
a framework for a CIF, thus far unexplored in the literature. We explained the process of CIF 
conceptualization, creation, and deployment, as well as its effects. By exploring the processes 
through which the CIF is established, we were able to derive a theory of the effect of the CIF on 




 The inductive nature of our study, as well as our data, limits the generalization of the CIF 
theory in several ways. First, we did not identify the actual triggers for the establishment of the 
CIF. In our data, we identified mainly economic and founder influences on corporate realization 
of the need to become more actively involved in the management of innovation. Future research 
should investigate the origin of the corporate decision to innovate, as well as the determinants of 
corporate innovation ambition. Second, we focused on structural elements of the CIF. More work 
is needed to understand the behavioral underpinning of corporate involvement in innovation, 
especially as corporate involvement in business-unit processes can potentially encounter strong 
opposition grounded in emotional, rather than cognitive, responses. It could be that group-based 
emotions may be significant determinants of corporate managers’ involvement in innovation 
processes. Another limitation is a lack of observation in our data of CIF performance implications. 
Our informants and archival data converge on implicating that innovation occurring at the 
corporate level focuses on more radical and forward-looking innovation opportunities, while 
innovation capability at the business unit level aims to develop innovations closer to the current 
core products and services. 
 An additional limitation is that our sample is skewed toward firms that have established 
the CIF, leaving out firms that may have considered establishing the CIF, but have instead decided 
against it. Similarly, our data did not allow us to assess the degree of adoption of the CIF in the 
organizational population. Future studies employing large sample approaches should investigate 
whether the CIF constitutes a sustained competitive advantage. 
 Further, the establishment, deployment, and maintenance of the CIF requires allocation of 
corporate-level resources needed for supporting the agenda of a corporate level innovation 
executive, the staffing of a corporate innovation team, and the financing of a discretionary 




innovation may trigger tensions within the C-level team, given that these resources are likely to be 
taken from other C-level functions. Thus future studies should explore the resource allocation 
process at the corporate level to increase our understanding of decision making concerning 
governance of corporate headquarters.  
4.6.4 MANAGERIAL RELEVANCE 
 As a process study, this research generated new insights into how corporate managers 
influence innovation processes at the business unit level. Yet, as the establishment and deployment 
of the CIF involves changes and significant commitment across all organizational levels and is 
highly context-dependent, we remain cautious in providing normative prescriptions. Further, 
several lessons to be drawn from our study are as follows. First, in most of our sampled firms, 
corporate involvement in innovation represented a significant departure from established practices. 
As such, corporate involvement in innovation was often met with initial resistance, which suggests 
that a gradual and consultative approach across all three main innovation processes is going to 
increase the chances that corporate innovation objectives are attained. Second, the formal 
introduction of the CIF requires adjustments to existing organizational culture. We suggest that, 
rather than trying to significantly modify organizational culture, it will be beneficial to identify 
which cultural characteristics are supportive of corporate involvement in innovation and then fully 
leverage them. Finally, not all employees showed an equal motivation and ability to innovate. 
Identifying those employees willing to support and contribute to corporate involvement in business 
unit innovation and then deploying these individuals as boundary-spanning change agents is likely 
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CHAPTER 5 DYNAMIC CORPORATE INNOVATION CAPABILITY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 How do the actions of corporate managers in large multidivisional firms lead to the 
establishment of innovation routines conducive to continuous discovery, evaluation, and 
monetization of distant innovations (i.e., dynamic corporate innovation capability)? Distant 
innovations encompass destructive (Schumpeter, 1940/1954), radical (Dewar and Dutton, 1986), 
and architectural (Henderson and Clark, 1990) innovations which are novel to the firm and markets 
in which the firm operates (Katz and Allen, 1982). Some large multidivisional firms develop 
dynamic corporate innovation capability (Lawson and Samson, 2001), while many once dominant 
multidivisional firms fail to adapt to rivals taking advantage of technological innovations 
(Christensen, 1997), business model innovations (Markides, 2006), or shifts in consumer 
preferences (Henderson, 2006). To continuously adapt to disturbances to market equilibrium—
caused by either established rivals or new entrants (D’Aveni, 1999)—multidivisional firms need 
to develop innovation routines conducive to the generation of distant innovations (Martins and 
Terblanche, 2003). 
 Studying how managerial actions lead to the development of dynamic corporate innovation 
capability is important as it allows firms to counterbalance biases towards exploitation that 
permeate large organizations (March, 1991) and pursue both exploitation and exploration 
concurrently (Greve, 2007). Through the continuous generation of distant innovations, firms gain 
the agency to shape the industries in which they operate (Teece, 2007), endogenously impacting 
their own profitability (McGahan and Porter, 1999). The recent rapid decline of wireless email 
pioneer BlackBerry provides an illustration of just how suddenly a former innovation champion 
can fail when an innovative rival transforms an entire industry. Would BlackBerry’s failure to 




corporate managers had been more proactive in developing dynamic corporate innovation 
capability? Similarly, have traditional automakers such as Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors 
established a dynamic corporate innovation capability allowing them to keep pace with automotive 
industry disruptors Google, Tesla, and Uber? And most recently, have traditional food retailers 
established the capability to quickly level the innovation playing field with Amazon after its 
sudden and disruptive entry into their arena? 
 The above examples highlight that a firm’s innovation capability is principally an 
adaptation process (Gupta, Tesluk, and Taylor, 2007) through which a firm attempts to maintain 
its environmental fitness (Helfat et al., 2007). A firm maintains its environmental fitness by 
continuously identifying and taking advantage of new opportunities (Teece, 2007) and preempting 
disruptive moves by competitors (D’Aveni, 1999). Ultimately, a firm’s innovation capability 
allows for sequential and/or parallel pursuit of incremental, radical, and architectural innovation 
types (Tushman, 1997; Shilling, 2008) alongside the exploitation of extant core businesses (March, 
1991). 
 Previous research has paid little attention to the role of corporate managers in the 
development of innovation capability, in contrast to the rich body of scholarship exploring bottom-
up innovation processes (see Anderson, Potocnik, and Zhou, 2014 and Garud, Tuertscher, and Van 
de Ven, 2013 for recent reviews). Corporate managers were assumed to be passive influencers of 
innovation capability through the definition of missions and goals guiding bottom-up innovation 
activities (Amabile, 1988; Damanpour, 1991). Relatedly, corporate managers were thought to be 
mainly engaged in resource allocation decision making detached from product-/market-facing 
activities (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983). Overall, the idea that corporate managers can play a 




predominantly focused on bottom-up innovation processes (Birkinshaw, Bouquet, and Barsoux, 
2011). 
 I address this bias in the extant literature towards bottom-up explanations of how 
innovation occurs in large multidivisional firms by leveraging a hand-collected dataset to study 
how the work of senior innovation managers results in a multidivisional firm’s dynamic corporate 
innovation capability. I find that senior innovation managers support local innovation by 
connecting past innovation successes with present innovation opportunities related to core 
businesses. To encourage generation of distant innovation, senior innovation managers champion 
processes facilitating localization and absorption of knowledge unrelated to a firm’s core 
businesses. Senior innovation managers’ actions mitigating innovation risk at the individual 
inventor, middle manager, and organizational levels augment a firm’s capacity to continuously 
generate distant innovations and regulate the resource allocation between local and distant 
innovation projects. 
 By proposing the concept of dynamic corporate innovation capability, I make three 
theoretical contributions. First, in contrast with the notion of a rational senior executive leading in 
a top-down directive manner (Porter, 1980), I find that the role of a senior innovation manager is 
subjected to political headwinds undermining its legitimacy at both the corporate and business unit 
levels (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Further, I uncover that most senior innovation managers 
lack a clear blueprint for accomplishing their main mission of generating more growth from 
innovation and their actions, resulting in reliance on trial-and-error approaches. 
 Second, the results of my study contribute to the scholarly discussion on the sourcing of 
novel knowledge by large multidivisional firms. My findings confirm that the use of external 
knowledge (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough and Crowther 2006) is an important element of 




open innovation is hindered by its costs and long investment-benefit conversion cycles. As a result, 
senior innovation managers initially rely on leveraging internal bottom-up sources of knowledge, 
using open innovation as a weak complement, rather than a strong substitute, to sourcing novel 
knowledge internally. Over time, as actions of senior innovation managers increase the internal 
capability to absorb external knowledge, the use of open innovation increases, often pushed 
through a top-down impetus to overcome sources of internal resistance to external knowledge. 
 Third, I show how senior innovation managers’ top-down interventions weaken intra-
organizational hindrances to self-organized, bottom-up, grassroots innovation initiatives with the 
potential to generate distant innovations. This result complements innovation scholarship studying 
the effects of innovation centralization (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 
2014) as this study shows that the decoupling of innovation activities from the needs of core 
businesses can be induced at the business unit level, reducing the need for innovation centralization 
in order to generate distant innovations. 
5.2 INNOVATION MANAGEMENT IN MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRMS 
5.2.1 CONDITIONS FOR INNOVATION IN MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRMS 
 Large multidivisional firms are directed by corporate managers who possess agency over 
several business units operating in distinct markets (Rumelt, 1974). In each business unit, day-to-
day activities are carried out by product-/market-facing employees (Burgelman, 1983), who are 
overseen by middle managers (Huy, 2001). Several characteristics of the multidivisional 
organizational form have caused scholars to argue that large multidivisional firms would excel at 
innovation. These attributes include rich resource bases (Schumpeter, 1940/1954), organizational 
slack (Penrose, 1959/1995), protections against the full effects of market selection forces 




 However, despite the possession of these attributes, the survival odds of large 
multidivisional firms have been steadily deteriorating (Credit Swiss, 2017). Scholars have argued 
that one of the main reasons for this decay is a multidivisional firm’s tendency to channel resources 
towards the exploitation of core businesses (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Tushman and Anderson, 1986) at the expense of exploration (March, 1991). Internal biases 
towards exploitation stem from managerial “short-termism” (Laverty, 1996; Marginson and 
McAulay, 2008), managerial cognitive myopia (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), application of an 
exploitation mindset to exploration (Gilbert, 2006), structural suffocation of exploration (Puranam, 
Singh, and Zollo, 2006), insufficient incubation periods for novel ideas (Knudsen and Levinthal, 
2007), and collective fear (Vuori and Huy, 2016). These internal biases towards exploitation are 
exacerbated by external pressures related to corporate raiders threatening inefficient management 
teams (Walsh and Kosnik, 1993), core business lock-in due to the demands of existing customers 
(Christensen, 1997), and the investor community’s dictates for consistency in financial results 
(DesJardine and Bansal, 2014). 
5.2.2 INNOVATION AS A DYNAMIC CAPABILITY  
 Firms can counterbalance exploitative biases by developing dynamic capabilities (Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Dynamic capabilities are “specific strategic and organizational 
processes like product development, alliancing, and strategic decision making that create value for 
firms within dynamic markets by manipulating resources into new value-creating strategies” 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000: 1106). The dynamic capabilities construct builds upon the resource-
based argument that “firms need to find those resources which can sustain a resource position 
barrier, but in which no one currently has one, and where they have a good chance of being among 
the few who succeed in building one” (Wernerfelt, 1984: 175). Acquisition of such resources, 




(i.e., VRIN resources), enables the development of a firm’s value, creating sustained competitive 
advantage which present and future competitors cannot replicate (Barney, 1991).  
 A sustained competitive advantage requires not only the accumulation of VRIN resources, 
but also their management through recombination (Henderson and Clark, 1990) and redeployment 
(Teece et al., 1997). Further, the maintenance of a sustained competitive advantage is contingent 
on a firm’s ability to identify and exploit new profitable ventures ahead of competitors (Teece, 
2007). This forward-looking innovation-sensing capability necessitates that corporate managers 
develop an internal capability to tap into external sources of knowledge (Chesborough, 2003) and 
combine them with internal sources of knowledge at the level of business units (Bowman and 
Ambrosini, 2003). Thus, a multidivisional firm’s ability to continuously scout for both internal 
and external knowledge and transform it into valuable outcomes leveraging, reconfiguring, and 
maintaining VRIN resources constitutes the essence of dynamic corporate innovation capability. 
5.2.3 DYNAMIC CORPORATE INNOVATION CAPABILITY: THE ROLE OF A SENIOR MANAGER 
 The dual imperative for the firm to reach out into the unknown and continuously convert 
identified opportunities into value for the firm indicates the need for the appointment of corporate 
executives having the qualities of strategic leaders who “utilize and interchange tacit and explicit 
knowledge on both the individual and organizational levels, and [who] use both linear and 
nonlinear thinking patterns.” (Rowe, 2001: 87). Increasingly, some of the most prominent Fortune 
500 firms have been creating a strategic leadership role in innovation at the corporate level (Forbes, 
2017). 
 For instance, in 2017, the Coca-Cola Company announced that it was “appointing a Chief 
Innovation Officer to elevate Global Research & Development into a standalone innovation 




the company’s growth plans.”15 Despite this rise in the appointments of senior innovation 
managers, extant scholarship offers limited insight into their role (Collis, Young, and Goold, 
2007). Intriguingly, McGahan and Silverman refute the stylized fact of a negative relationship 
between a firm’s maturity and its declining innovation activity and call for “theory characterizing 
how transitions out of maturity occur.” (2001: 1143). Understanding what the goals of senior 
innovation managers are and how they achieve them may contribute to the elaboration of such 
theory. 
 As Coca-Cola’s announcement suggests, the main mission of a senior innovation manager 
is to generate additional growth beyond what is possible with and/or at the expense of growth 
through organic, M&A, and alliance options (Capron and Mitchell, 2012). Firm-level resource 
constraints (Penrose, 1959/1995) give rise to a resource allocation trade-off between non-
innovation- and innovation-based growth (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 1990). This trade-off is 
exacerbated by a firm’s tendency to “diversify into a business as its technical strength applicable 
to that business increases” (Silverman, 1999: 1115). Given these resource allocation tensions, a 
senior innovation manager is likely to engage in multilevel resource allocation negotiations (Arrlet 
et al., 2015). In addition, to decrease their dependency on the outcome of these negotiations, senior 
innovation managers are likely to exert effort to identify and utilize existing organizational slack 
for innovation (Adner and Helfat, 2003; Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003; Penrose, 1959/1995). 
 Another cue from the Coca-Cola announcement is the centralization of innovation-related 
decision making at the corporate level, which resonates with the portrayal of innovation as 
disrupting extant businesses (Schumpeter, 1940/1954). As business unit managers are unlikely to 
disrupt their core competencies, top-down involvement may be necessary to support the 
identification, development, and implementation of Schumpeterian disruptive innovations. Recent 
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empirical findings support this view that centralization of innovation results in innovation 
outcomes that are more distant from a firm’s core businesses, in contrast to innovations supported 
at the business unit level (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014). 
Similarly, Chesbrough and Crowther (2006) argue that top-down involvement in innovation is 
necessary for sourcing high-potential novel ideas from outside of organizational boundaries.  
5.3 METHODS 
 This study draws on an in-depth exploration of the role of a senior innovation manager 
working in the context of a multidivisional firm. Over a period of four years, I embedded myself 
as an observer in the milieu of conferences serving as a platform for senior innovation managers 
to present and discuss their work. 
5.3.1 RESEARCH SETTING 
 Large multidivisional firms provide a suitable research context for studying how dynamic 
corporate innovation capability is developed through managerial actions, given the inherent 
complexity of managing various innovation maturity models across multiple markets embedded 
in different environments (McGahan and Silverman, 2001; Utterback, 1971). This innovation 
complexity increases the need for corporate managers to devise innovation routines (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982), which guide innovation activities at lower hierarchical levels but can also be 
adapted to changing environmental conditions (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). 
5.3.2 THEORETICAL SAMPLE 
 To reconcile these contrasting views of the role of corporate managers in innovation 
management, I sought narratives containing rich descriptions of the work of senior innovation 
managers in large multidivisional firms over a period of several years. In total, I developed 14 




significant new insights (Yin, 2014). To triangulate findings from the narrative dataset, I gained 
interview access to three large multidivisional firms and conducted semi-structured interviews 
with employees involved in innovation management across hierarchical levels. 
While it was not possible to name the industries and countries of domiciliation, in order to 
keep firms anonymous (Strike and Rerup, 2016), findings were largely replicated across the 
narrative sample and were strongly supported by the interview data. Firms were anonymized using 
the names of U.S. national parks for the narrative dataset and Canadian national parks for the 
interview dataset. Table 6 provides a descriptive overview of both the narrative and interview 
datasets. 
Table 6: Dynamic Corporate Innovation Capability: Overview of Case Studies 
 
Code name Data Firm type Firm age (years) Employees # of Divisions Employee level
Acadia Narrative Public 50-100 50,000-100,000 5-10 Corporate manager
Arches Narrative Private 50-100 10,000-50,000 <5 Corporate manager
Biscayne Narrative Public 100-150 50,000-100,000 5-10 Corporate manager
Canyonlands Narrative Private <50 10,000-50,000 <5 Corporate manager
Denali Narrative Public 50-100 50,000-100,000 10-15 Corporate manager
Everglades Narrative Public 100-150 50,000-100,000 10-15 Corporate manager
Glacier Narrative Public 50-100 10,000-50,000 10-15 Corporate manager
Haleakalā Narrative Public 100-150 10,000-50,000 5-10 Corporate manager
Katmai Narrative Public 100-150 10,000-50,000 <5 Corporate manager
Olympic Narrative Public <50 1,000-10,000 <5 Corporate manager
Redwood Narrative Public >150 50,000-100,000 5-10 Corporate manager
Sequoia Narrative Public 100-150 10,000-50,000 <5 Corporate manager
Voyageurs Narrative Public <50 >100,000 <5 Corporate manager
Yellowstone Narrative Public 50-100 >100,000 <5 Corporate manager
Yosemite Narrative Public 50-100 10,000-50,000 5-10 Corporate manager
Zion Narrative Public >150 50,000-100,000 5-10 Corporate manager
Banff Interview Public 50-100 >100,000 <5 Middle manager
Jasper Interview Public 100-150 50,000-100,000 5-10 Corporate manager
Jasper Interview Public 100-150 50,000-100,000 5-10 Senior innovator
Jasper Interview Public 100-150 50,000-100,000 5-10 Senior innovator
Jasper Interview Public 100-150 50,000-100,000 5-10 Junior innovator
Yoho Interview Public >150 >100,000 5-10 Corporate manager
Yoho Interview Public >150 >100,000 5-10 Middle manager




5.3.3 DATA COLLECTION 
 I obtained the granular data required for this study by attending electronically 17 chief 
innovation officer summits from 2013 until 2017. The summits were organized by Innovation 
Enterprise, a firm which organizes summits on topics relevant to senior managers. At each summit, 
between 15 and 25 senior innovation professionals working for private firms, public organizations, 
and consulting firms gave oral presentations about their work. Often, these presentations ended 
with a Q&A session and were supported by PowerPoint documents offering an additional level of 
detail.  
 In total, I collected over 200 hours of recorded narratives and produced over 600 pages of 
high-fidelity transcripts. From this initial dataset, I constructed my theoretical sample discussed 
above. For a narrative to be included in the dataset used for this study, it had to fulfil the following 
requirements: (1) the narrator was a senior innovation manager; (2) the narrator worked in a for-
profit multidivisional firm; (3) the narrator provided an overview of his or her work over the period 





Table 7: Narrative Data Biases and Mitigating Measures 
Potential Data Biases/Issues Mitigating Measures 
Narrator exaggerated the impact of corporate 
involvement in innovation. 
The focus of the study was on the process; 
reported quantified results were not coded 
and were not part of the analysis. 
Narrator was biased towards description of 
actions applying to the corporate level only. 
Only narratives providing a multilevel 
overview of the involvement of corporate 
managers in innovation management were 
included in the dataset. 
Narrator was aware of the purpose of the study 
and engaged in self-censoring, resulting in the 
loss of comprehensiveness of the account. 
While all narrators agreed to their 
presentations and supplemental materials 
being used for general research purposes, 
they were unaware of this specific study. 
Narrator was influenced by researcher’s leading 
questions. 
No contact was made with any of the 
narrators. 
Narrator’s firm used a consulting firm to guide 
the corporate involvement in innovation. 
Narratives which contained signs of being 
influenced by a consulting firm were not 
included in the dataset. 
Narrator withheld key information due to 
confidentiality/competitive reasons and/or 
provided false information. 
Narrative data was triangulated through 
alternative sources. Given that these 
narratives are available on a fee basis, it is 
unlikely that provided information was 
untrue given potential legal ramifications. 
 
To ensure proper data triangulation, the interview data was collected only after the collection 
and initial analysis of the narrative data. In addition, firms included in the interview data sample 
did not form part of the narrative data sample. In total, 10 interviews were conducted from October 
2017 to January 2018. 
5.3.4 ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
 I combined inductive data analysis (Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2013) with analytical 
methods used to study narratives (Pentland, 1999). The inductive data analysis was used to derive 
initial codes, second-order concepts, and ultimately, aggregate themes. The narrative analytical 
methodology served to get beyond the surface and code aspects of narratives relevant to the 




 To ensure analytical rigour, I conducted the narrative analysis in stages. First, I captured 
each story in a write-up (including the transcript of the oral presentation, the information contained 
in the accompanying PowerPoint document, the narrator’s work history details) and triangulated 
this data using information from the company’s website as well as the firm’s public disclosures 
(Yin, 2014). Second, I constructed a detailed history of the role of each individual senior 
innovation manager, paying close attention to actants interacting in the story (Latour, 2005), 
sequences of events, plots, and relationships (Pentland, 1999). Third, I generated a prototypical 
role of a senior innovation manager by capturing underlying first-order codes, formulating 
emerging second-order concepts, and conceptualizing aggregate constructs (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). Fourth, based on my understanding of the role of corporate innovation managers uncovered 
in the second and third stages, I constructed a full emergent process model of dynamic corporate 
innovation capability. 
Interview data used for triangulation was initially analyzed using an approach similar to 
the first analytical stage described above. After this first stage was completed, I systematically 
compared and contrasted narrative and interview data segments (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). While 
no major differences were identified, this iterative process enabled me to uncover nuances in the 
narrative data and ultimately elaborate the nature and effects of senior innovation managers’ 
actions. 
5.4 AN ACCOUNT OF THE ROLE OF A SENIOR INNOVATION MANAGER 
 To help the reader become acquainted with the data in a way that is as easy and authentic 




working in a large multidivisional firm. This account combines information from this narrator’s 
biography, her oral presentation, the Q&A session, and the supporting PowerPoint document. 
5.4.1 ONE STORY 
 I have been working at my company for close to two decades in several different roles. In 
my current role as a senior manager for innovation and quality, I am responsible for providing 
customers with innovative solutions for meeting their needs and ensuring that our company is 
always in the leading position in the technological developments concerning our products. I enjoy 
the complex relationship between process and culture which enables innovation to take place in 
large organizations. I am an engineer by profession and prior to my employment with this firm, I 
worked as a scientist in various new product development roles. 
 My dual role as an innovation and quality executive may be seen as a dichotomy at first, 
but it gives me the opportunity to drive both perfection and motivation for improvements. Some 
people are better at each of the ends of the spectrum. My job is to ensure the right balance. My 
company has done this for over 100 years. […] Our job is to make the innovation function feed 
better products to the marketplace, yet most of our resources are focused on operations. Most of 
our employees work within very short timeframes; thus, the concept of innovation and the type of 
required timeframes are very difficult for them to understand. 
 We have other issues. Our firm is a little like civil service—an old and rigid organization. 
Our structure is that of a big complex organization. Yet, innovation does not like organizational 
silos. These silos are great for generating new ideas, but you need to mix them with ideas coming 
from other silos. My job is mainly about breaking down these barriers and implementing processes 
enabling cross-fertilization of ideas across silos to create better products. 
 Different types of innovations coexist in my firm: incremental, step-change, process, and 




projects that are operating across these spectrums. We have to make sure we have a constant flow 
of innovations in the organization. We have a 10% success rate of innovations: from 50 ideas, we 
get 10 projects, and 2 successful products. Yet, [the company’s leaders] say, “We want only 
successful innovation and more innovation.” They do not realize it does not work like that. You 
need to work through the ideas, kill the low-prospect ideas, and focus on a selected high-potential 
idea group. […] 
 I started by establishing the agreement on what type of innovation is required (incremental 
versus step change versus process versus business model), what it looks like, and how it is going 
to be achieved. Innovation leaders need to get this right first before going into businesses. […] 
Design cross-functional innovation training; a lot of people associate innovation with ideation, but 
no, you need to understand all of the innovation process! Employees from different functional 
areas attended this course. They did not participate as a business unit, but as a collective cutting 
across businesses. We clarified what their role was to enable a bit of risk taking; their typical 
mindset is that their role is about mitigating risk, not embracing it. […] 
 You need to set long-term goals and design platforms to provide structure, information 
flow, and the possibility of measuring success. We conduct formal reviews of the innovation 
processes. Senior visibility is also critical. […] 
 Most of our innovations come through partnerships, but more radical innovations are 
sourced internally. In today’s world, it is not about product innovation, process innovation, or 
system innovation, it is about all of them put together. We operate in a more disruptive space than 
previously. It is both the best and worst time to be an innovation officer. It is difficult to be a senior 
innovation manager as there is no book to read, no process to follow for large organizations to 
innovate fast enough in the world we live in today. The real question is how do we get all parts of 




throughout the organization? It is a [challenge] to get innovation perpetuated in the organization, 
and it is even more difficult to do this during an economic downturn. 
5.5 THE PROTOTYPICAL ROLE OF A SENIOR INNOVATION MANAGER 
 I used individual narratives to construct a more generic description of a prototypical role 
of a senior innovation manager. As depicted in Figure 4, the main elements of the role of a senior 
innovation manager which emerged from this analysis were the establishment of senior innovation 
manager legitimacy, the generation of corporate innovation ambition, the design of corporate 
innovation processes, and the development of corporate innovation routines supporting both local 
and distant innovation activities. 
Figure 4: Dynamic Corporate Innovation Capability Data Structure 
 
5.5.1 SENIOR INNOVATION MANAGER LEGITIMACY 
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5.5.1.1 Respected Innovation Leadership 
 Most of the senior innovation managers had an insider background, having worked for their 
organizations for years prior to assuming an innovation leadership role. The career of the senior 
innovation manager of Biscayne, who had held increasingly senior marketing positions across 
several divisions and countries, was representative of the career journeys of other senior innovation 
managers in the sample. Long organizational tenure provided them with intimate knowledge of 
both formal and informal organizational structures. Broad access across organizational layers and 
structures enabled senior innovation managers to transcend intra-organizational boundaries in their 
quest to instil dynamic corporate innovation capability within their organizations. 
 Long intra-organizational tenure accorded some level of authority to the senior innovation 
manager herself, but the senior innovation manager role was initially in a weak position vis-à-vis 
other formal organizational roles. First, senior innovation managers had to position themselves in 
relation to their peers, who would often consider innovation as being within their sphere of 
influence. Second, senior innovation managers were dependent on powerful heads of business 
units for innovation resources and execution. These middle managers would often consider 
innovation as their responsibility, yet they were primarily focused on the exploitation of core 
businesses. Given the political power held by these counterparts embedded in the formal 
organizational structure, senior innovation managers had to engage in role maneuvering, as 
opposed to claiming innovation leadership by solely relying on their title. The senior innovation 
manager at Acadia explained: 
I needed to establish objectives for the innovation function to define how it will operate among 
well running divisions […]. The way to position the innovation function was to tell divisional 
unit heads that while they are busy running their businesses and fulfilling annual plans, 
somebody needs to have time to think [about] and conceptualize that next big opportunity on 
the horizon as divisional heads cannot compete in terms of innovation with challengers coming 
from outside of the core business. 




 The need for continuous top-down endorsement of the role of senior innovation managers 
was universal across the sample. Top-down support for the role was necessary given that senior 
innovation managers acted as change agents by disrupting established routines and behaviours, 
putting these managers in conflict situations with intra-organizational actors who preferred the 
status quo. Yet, continuous top-down support for innovation was not automatic and had to be 
enacted by senior innovation managers. A common mechanism employed by senior innovation 
managers for eliciting support was the identification and communication to the most senior leaders 
within the organization of environmental shifts with potential to render extant core businesses 
obsolete. The senior innovation manager of Denali commented: 
We need to look ahead. 10 years ahead. It energizes the organization and shows you care about 
the future. I showed 10-20 megatrends to the board of directors. The storyline needs to keep 
the board of directors awake at night in a positive way, but it also needs to feel like if you do 
not act today, it will hurt. You need to follow up as it is difficult to persuade the board of 
directors about innovation that will not bear immediate fruit. 
 Resourcing of the senior innovation manager role occurred in a staggered manner. Most 
senior innovation managers reported initial resource scarcity to support their role, which required 
their resource acquisition creativity. They were asked to generate growth from innovation without 
diverting resources from other sources of growth. Thus, senior innovation managers initially used 
small supporting teams which could be scaled as needed. As high-impact innovation projects were 
identified, senior innovation managers borrowed resources from business units to work full time 
on specific innovation projects, yet with the understanding that once the project was completed, 
resources would be returned to business units. 
 Another common approach was to create and leverage networks of resources by locating 
and connecting innovation assets scattered across the organization. The creation of focused 
innovation resources was a reaction to the discovery of the ineffectiveness of large-scale top-down 
innovation events, which generated mostly low-potential ideas, wasting organizational resources. 




deployed more efficiently compared to the “boiling the ocean” approach of unfocused, large-scale 
innovation events. While focused innovation resources led to the identification and 
conceptualization of high-potential innovation projects within the senior innovation manager 
realm, the implementation was often delegated back to business units. The senior innovation 
manager of Biscayne elaborated: 
We created the “Innovation Centre” which allowed us to consolidate all innovation resources 
under a common team. […] Focused resources can move projects faster. We reduced the 
previous time from concept to launch from 10-15 years to less. We generated more 
breakthrough innovations. People were using the same language; no more misunderstandings 
that the true focus is consumer innovation and nothing else. […] You need to put together the 
right skills mix for the specific problem to move the innovation project further. Brands are 
separate from the innovation teams; they act as sponsors. 
5.5.2 CORPORATE INNOVATION AMBITION 
5.5.2.1 Goal Setting 
 Innovation was not new to the sampled firms. All of the firms had well-resourced R&D 
programs that represented a significant percentage of annual revenues. Thus, the goals of the senior 
innovation manager role had to be clarified vis-à-vis these traditional R&D programs by following 
annual planning cycles and focusing on the needs of core businesses. Without such goal 
determination, organizational actors supporting the allocation of more funds to the traditional R&D 
effort could undermine the need for the senior innovation manager role. The PowerPoint document 
accompanying the narrative of Zion’s senior innovation manager contained the following 
description: 
The corporate innovation unit addresses the challenges and opportunities for innovation at our 
firm. Our mission in the corporate innovation unit is to transform existing sectors or even build 
new sectors, unlock a culture of innovation within our firm, and build global reputation for our 
innovation. Our sectors annually drive several billions worth of routine innovation through 
efficient, risk-controlled R&D; the corporate innovation unit focuses on disruptive, radical, and 
architectural innovation. It builds on the overall expertise at our firm to drive cross-sectoral 




 In most sampled firms, quantitative high-level performance targets were set at the inception 
of the senior innovation manager role. These were meant to be stretch goals that could not be 
achieved by simply increasing innovation activity around core businesses. Quantitative 
performance goals were set as well, and were related to the generation of incremental revenue at a 
minimum profitability within a set period. Performance goals were largely agnostic to whether 
innovations should be the product or the process type; yet, they were largely skewed towards 
disruptive, radical, and architectural types of innovation. In contrast, the end goals of the senior 
innovation manager role were mostly abstract and related to the routinization of the innovation 
processes associated with the senior innovation manager role in terms of their replicability, 
reliability, and sustainability over time. The PowerPoint document accompanying the narrative of 
Arches’ senior innovation manager stated, 
Our current innovation issues are inconsistency, repeatability, and lack of sustained success. 
The end goal is to create a repeatable capability across the organization, producing consistent 
winners and high-level performance. 
5.5.3 CORPORATE INNOVATION PROCESSES 
5.5.3.1 Connecting Past to Present 
 One asset that all sampled firms possessed was a history of prior innovations which led to 
the success of current core businesses. In some cases, firms’ founders were prominent innovators. 
Accounts of the innovation history existed in the form of stories, archival documents, preserved 
blueprints, and employees’ memories. Senior innovation managers used innovation history to get 
clues about what made their firm innovative in the past in order to inform current and future 
innovation efforts. The senior innovation manager of Everglades reflected: 
It is so easy to constrain yourself to your core business. We are looking around to learn from 
other industries and bringing [that learning] to our own business. We are also looking 
backwards to build on experiences and lessons learned in the past, especially in older 
businesses; the way they did stuff in the old days without all the fancy tools, how somebody 




the city where the business started. In fact, innovation is largely about timing. Customers are 
often not ready. When that happens, we archive the idea so that it can be potentially revisited 
in the future. 
 Senior innovation managers codified innovation history by transforming it into stories of 
past innovation achievements. Innovation storytelling provided a connection between past 
innovation success and present innovation opportunities, and served as a strong motivational tool. 
It also legitimized innovation in that if it was permissible to innovate in the past, this signalled 
innovation’s permissibility in the present. Storytelling was also used to maintain momentum in 
innovation projects in which partial achievements were made, but the overall success was still 
distant. The senior innovation manager of Olympic remarked, “To overcome resistance in the 
organization, you must tell stories. Whenever you have successes, these need to be shared to create 
the myth of success, which often comes ahead of the actual success.” 
5.5.3.2 Managing Innovation Risk 
 The issue of failure management was a sensitive topic across all cases and hierarchical 
levels. It was understood that the pursuit of innovation, especially high-value innovation, leads to 
a high degree of failed outcomes. Yet, organizational DNA in most sampled firms was not set up 
to absorb a continuous stream of failures. Consequently, senior innovation managers had to 
introduce mechanisms to manage failure at the individual inventor, middle manager, and corporate 
manager levels. On the individual inventor level, senior innovation managers engaged in changing 
the narrative surrounding failure through failure rhetoric. Failure outcomes were narrated as 
“learning opportunities,” which could be celebrated and valued to the same degree as innovation 
successes.  
 The objective of failure rhetoric was to entice employees to overcome their fear of failure 
and formulate and put forward their ideas. To achieve actual mitigation of failure consequences 




heads to work on specific innovation projects. This mechanism dissociated the consequences of 
failure from employees’ formal roles, distributed failure consequences among several employees 
pulled to together to work on a specific innovation project, and redirected the potential failure 
blame towards senior innovation manager. The senior innovation manager of Everglades 
commented, “I explain the importance of risk taking (i.e., trying out a lot of new ideas) and that 
the consequences of failure are not that bad. Failure is called a ‘non-expected outcome.’” 
 Prior to the establishment of the senior innovation manager role, most heads of business 
units were focused on exploitation and incremental innovation around the core business (Argyres 
and Silverman, 2004). Dedicating their attention and business unit’s resources to breakthrough 
innovation (the results of which may not be directly attributable back to their business units) went 
against middle managers’ own interests. Yet, as innovation gained legitimacy through the actions 
of senior innovation managers, it became harder and politically costly for middle managers to 
oppose innovation activities using their formal authority. The innovation empowerment of 
product-/market-facing employees, the emergence of self-organizing innovation communities, the 
deployment of social platforms bypassing middle managers, and a top-down push for more open 
innovation were common factors that reduced middle managers’ formal authority to say no to 
innovation without objective justification. The senior innovation manager of Canyonlands offered 
the following account: 
Overcoming risk aversion is a journey, but it is difficult as you have established people saying 
“I have been here for 20 years and I just do not believe in the idea.” Sometimes, people reject 
“outside” ideas which are at the same time in their responsibility domain, as it creates a tension 
for them. Should they take the idea into their own department using their own budget, or should 
they allow somebody else outside their control and influence [to develop the idea]? We have a 
standardized process to evaluate the merit of ideas consulting experts and the patent 
department. If it is a good idea, the corporate innovation department helps innovators to get 
some budget and buy-in. Despite my approach being a largely bottom-up one, here I would use 
a top-down approach to force businesses to take in ideas from the outside to change the way 




 With their large multidivisional firms possessing established brands and reputations for the 
reliability of their products, senior managers at sampled firms were concerned about innovation 
failures negatively impacting core businesses. Senior innovation managers established two 
structural mechanisms to manage innovation risk at the organizational level. The fail-fast approach 
enabled by rapid prototyping (Von Hippel, 1994) and early rule-based selection increased the 
number of ideas that could be considered and decreased the likelihood of resources being used 
inefficiently on low-value ideas and/or premature ideas. Selected high-risk/high-value innovation 
projects were then often pursued within a separate innovation department to contain spillover 
effects in the case of failure. 
5.5.3.3 Connecting Future to Present 
The timeframes for local and distant innovation projects differed considerably. Local 
innovation projects, which were centred around core businesses, took months to a few years to 
become cash flow positive. The invention-to-cash flow duration of incremental projects was 
shortened by the pre-existence of the underlying knowledge which enabled invention. This 
knowledge often already existed within the firm. The relatively small time span differential 
between local innovation projects and exploitation projects led to frequent embedment of local 
innovation projects within business units. Distant innovation projects required significantly 
longer time spans for the innovation investments to start generating positive cash flows. The 
long duration of distant innovation projects stemmed from the need to first undertake 
fundamental research to generate knowledge, which could eventually be turned into invention. 
Interestingly, the use of open innovation did not guarantee considerable shortening of the 
timeframe needed for distant innovation projects, as is reflected in the comment made by the 




Developing disruptive innovation requires an innovation horizon that is at least 10 years long. 
[…] We separated the corporate innovation centre from business groups. In the innovation 
centre the time horizon is five years longer than that of the heads of business units. […] We 
need open innovation to tap into the global knowhow and acquire complementary capabilities. 
When using open innovation, it took us 10 years from investment to being cash flow positive. 
We also encountered another killer of open innovation: we are open, but in reality, doors are 
closed. 
 Recognizing the need to allow both top-down and bottom-up innovation projects to happen 
concurrently within the firm, senior innovation managers created different innovation paths 
customized to the origin of the innovation projects. Top-down innovation projects were marked 
by problem-driven initiation, centralization of decision making, positioning within formal 
organizational structures, and attempts at replicability. In contrast, the environment for grassroots 
innovation projects was solution driven, energized by the intrinsic interests of individual 
employees, and largely self-governed, with only limited rules provided by senior innovation 
managers. The senior innovation manager of Katmai described the bifurcation of top-down and 
bottom-up innovation paths as follows: 
The best ideas do not come from corner offices, but from people who touch the customer, 
deliver the product. […] Product-/market-facing employees may not be the best ones to identify 
the problem, but they are the best at identifying solutions. […] In our experience, only one out 
of every four good ideas come from planned processes. Innovation is unstructured and spread 
throughout the organization. […] We provided a social innovation platform; employees had to 
decide how they would use the platform. There was no top-down direction on how they should 
use the platform. Within about two years after launch, 600 communities were formed across 
the organization. Employees create their own work groups and can selectively bring in third-
party people without giving them access to internal intellectual property. […] In contrast, our 
open innovation platform was business/unit organizationally driven, [and] adopted a 
centralized approach to technology and processes with decentralized delivery and execution, 
to establish a fast and replicable model across global enterprise. […] We view top-down and 
bottom-up approaches to innovation as complementary and necessary. 
 “Future” was defined broadly by senior innovation managers as either yet-to-be-fully-
understood environmental shifts with the potential to transform many industries at once, and/or 
already existing environmental conditions that shaped unrelated industries and that could disrupt 




 In terms of the environment, senior innovation managers were mostly concerned with 
disruptions due to technological progress and changes in customer needs and/or preferences. A 
key challenge for senior innovation managers was the sourcing of knowledge, allowing their firms 
to start understanding how environmental changes could be converted into innovations for their 
firms’ adaptation. Open innovation was recognized as an important source of such knowledge, but 
it came at a price and was often seen as too slow as product introduction cycles shortened. 
 Thus, most of the sampled senior innovation managers gradually developed several internal 
capabilities for environmental knowledge acquisition used in conjunction with and/or 
complementing the use of open innovation: corporate venturing combined with start-up alliance 
programs, frontier technology scouting combined with rapid prototyping (Von Hippel, 1994), 
alternative realities simulation, extant knowledge recombination, and high-potential grassroots 
innovation activities facilitation. In the case of Yellowstone, the start-up process was combined 
with open innovation: 
We integrated start-up processes in our enterprise and decisions are done by experiment, not 
by bureaucracy, PowerPoint, persuasion, position, or power. We run these experiments quickly 
and fail fast and celebrate. We embraced the minimal viable product approach: we focus on 
features, no gold plating, no perfection. For partnerships and open innovation, we run 
experiments with existing operational partners to test new processes and new technologies. We 
also explore other industries, engage in virtual innovation, partner with universities and design 
schools, and seek inspiration by meeting with other successful innovators in their workplaces, 
labs, and studios in diverse creative fields and industries. 
5.5.4 CORPORATE INNOVATION ROUTINES 
5.5.4.1 Local Innovation Projects 
 Senior innovation managers recognized the importance of incremental innovation centred 
around the core business as a building block for potentially generating breakthrough innovations 
(Clark and Henderson, 1990). Surprisingly, narrators mentioned that what was often missing in 




customer needs. Frequently, innovation was done for the sake of innovation without broader 
relevance and applicability. Equally puzzling was the mental entrapment of employees in their 
technological comfort zones without considering the employment of knowledge readily available 
in closely related fields. Therefore, often, the first step taken by senior innovation managers was 
to make employees’ minds more receptive to customer needs and innovation opportunities existing 
in the outside environment. The senior innovation manager of Voyageurs commented: 
The challenge was accepting technologies from the outside, from other industries. The 
company’s CEO decided to create my position as a new role reporting directly to him—it did 
not exist before. Prior to [creating the role], we had risk and technology functions, but this was 
not enough to instil a dynamic corporate innovation capability. My main mission was not to 
create technological innovation, but to create a culture/mindset of innovation throughout the 
company to make sure we are more open and agile to accept technologies coming from the 
outside. What was lacking previously was the understanding of the needs of customers to 
develop the best products for the market. 
5.5.4.2 Countermeasures against Exploitative Forces 
 Over time, strong tendencies towards exploitation fuelled by systemic risk aversion 
developed in most sampled firms. For instance, the senior innovation managers of both 
Canyonlands and Everglades reported that their firms started to operate like civil service entities. 
To counter exploitative tendencies, senior innovation managers’ efforts led to the emergence of a 
comprehensive system of incentives utilizing both extrinsic and intrinsic motivators. Extrinsic 
motivators included the introduction of performance metrics related to innovation into middle 
managers’ evaluation. Intrinsic motivators included linking initial innovation effort with the 
appreciation of senior managers, awarding innovation rewards for ideas which made it to the 
product stage, and celebrating innovation effort regardless of outcomes. The senior innovation 
manager of Voyageurs remarked that “the real reward for innovators is when their idea makes it 
into the final product.” 
 The emergence of informal innovation networks permanently lowered the ability of formal 




and being evaluated using an objective set of criteria. The behind-the-scenes functioning of these 
networks made it difficult for innovation opponents to disrupt them or shut them down entirely. 
The senior innovation manager of Canyonlands commented: 
We started a guerilla initiative: spreading innovation guerilla style through the network of 
innovation-minded employees who incentivize people to generate great new ideas that are hard 
for other people to immediately put down; this is a reaction to the finding that middle managers 
may not be that receptive to spreading innovation. Thus, we created this network of guerilla 
innovators to explain what type of innovation is sought and what kind of rewards are given. 
People became very receptive. 
 Reducing the formal authority and empowerment of product-/market-facing employees led 
to the emergence of self-organizing teams. These teams were created organically from the bottom 
up around an idea, and their membership was fluid as the idea developed and members left or 
joined. Social innovation platforms provided innovation tools, but also allowed these teams to 
transcend organizational silos and geographical distances. Informal networks connected these 
teams with objective/impartial sources of evaluation and seed resources. The PowerPoint 
document accompanying the narrative of Yosemite’s senior innovation manager stated, “If we 
don’t disrupt ourselves, somebody else will! We moved to lean governance and rapid product 
development. We empowered “self-organizing teams,” removing the hierarchical decision-making 
process to allow decision making at the lowest possible level.” 
5.5.4.3 Distant Innovation Projects 
 The idea of using Google’s approach to allocate unstructured time to employees for 
exploration resonated among senior innovation managers. However, most of the sampled firms 
operated in regulated industries over many decades and developed strongly hierarchical 
approaches to both exploitation and exploration activities. Consequently, their employees were not 
accustomed to diverting their effort outside of their formal roles. Corporate innovation processes 




at lower hierarchical levels. Further, some employees were offered experimentation-focused career 
paths, especially when entrepreneurial ventures were acquired. The senior innovation manager of 
Canyonlands commented: 
When we asked people to identify the biggest innovation successes over the past 10 years, the 
examples given often started as small grassroots projects with one to two people working on 
them, as opposed to coming from a big top-down initiative. Thus, we identified as the main 
hurdle to grassroots innovation people’s fear or inability to dedicate a little bit of their time to 
experimentation to try out new ideas. […] We just acquired a small company and its founder 
obviously has a lot of new ideas. It was a challenge for us to exploit these ideas as the founder 
was not used to working in an environment with a boss and in a structured organization. We 
needed to give him a role which was still innovative. We instituted a new scientific (expert) 
career path so that certain employees can climb the organizational hierarchy without having 
responsibility for 100-200 people. These employees have the freedom to pursue their ideas and 
seek external collaboration. [This arrangement] created a cultural clash as internal R&D people 
do not like to have people with such freedom around; it is a challenge. 
5.6 NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ACTIONS BY SENIOR INNOVATION MANAGER 
 I further analyzed actions by senior innovation managers in terms of their execution nature 
and effects on formal structures. I found that corporate innovation processes varied along two 
spectrums. The former spectrum was anchored by mechanistic and experimental extrema. The 
latter spectrum was anchored by augmenting and disrupting extrema. The mix of nature of 
execution and effects on formal structures varied across cases, reflecting the heterogeneity of 
sampled firms’ external and internal situations, as well as differences in the maturity cycle of their 
innovation systems across markets in which the sampled firms operated. 
5.6.1 NATURE OF CORPORATE INNOVATION PROCESSES 
5.6.1.1 Mechanistic Corporate Innovation Processes 
 Mechanistic corporate innovation processes were marked by their rule-based nature and 
wide acceptance of their utility, which facilitated their adoption and diffusion within the 




themselves, bestowing on them a “hygienic” characteristic. Often, they were already introduced 
prior to the establishment of the senior innovation manager role, and the senior innovation 
manager’s influence was directed towards making them more efficient and more widely adopted 
throughout the organization. When mechanistic corporate innovation processes were seen as an 
end in themselves, they consumed considerable resources without generating corresponding value. 
For instance, several senior innovation managers reported that large-scale ideation jams (Bjelland 
and Wood, 2008) produced many low-value ideas, overwhelming the innovation system. 
5.6.1.2 Autocratic Corporate Innovation Processes 
 Autocratic corporate innovation processes were marked by their top-down non-
consultative nature. For example, in some cases, the use of open innovation had to be mandated 
by senior innovation managers due to internal resistance to outside ideas (Katz and Allen, 1982). 
Another example was the establishment of a corporate innovation centre operating outside of the 
realm of business units, which was often also separated from formal R&D structures. Considering 
the scholarly debate about the benefits and costs of proximity in innovation (Boschma, 2005), 
another interesting example was the top-down decision to lower the geographical distance between 
centres of innovation and product-/market-level activities. 
5.6.1.3 Resource Scaling Corporate Innovation Processes 
 Resource scaling corporate innovation processes were characterized by resource bricolage 
(Baker and Nelson, 2005), as senior innovation managers often had to work with few available 
resources. Resource constraints kept corporate innovation teams small. Over time, senior 
innovation managers developed mechanisms for scaling their corporate innovation teams on a 




innovation projects from business units and guaranteed their return into their formal roles within 
a pre-agreed timeframe. 
 Other mechanisms for scaling up innovation resources included non-equity partnerships 
with start-ups that involved trading a firm’s marketing and distribution capabilities in exchange 
for a start-up’s frontier knowledge. Such non-equity partnerships limited the monetary cost to the 
firm for acquiring external knowledge and, at the same time, did not result in a long-term 
commitment for the firm, increasing its future partnership options. The trading nature of non-
equity partnerships, whereby both partners gained a valuable resource, increased the chances of 
the partnership being formed relative to corporate venturing (Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009). 
Further, the fact that the non-equity partnership did not involve deep organizational integration 
reduced the risk of structural suffocation of exploration (Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006). 
5.6.1.4 Experimental Corporate Innovation Processes 
 Experimental corporate innovation processes were marked by their trial-and-error nature, 
which enabled the search for the right approach when the path to follow was unknown. On the 
level of novel ideas, senior innovation managers encouraged as much product/market 
experimentation as possible to efficiently assess an idea’s potential value. In terms of selecting 
novel ideas, senior innovation managers introduced pairwise scoring, which pitted two randomly 
selected ideas against each other to determine relative value. On the level of implementation, 
senior innovation managers preferred rapid prototyping (Von Hippel, 1994) over striving for 
perfection to assess a novel idea’s real value. At the corporate level, several senior innovation 
managers engaged in trial-and-error approaches, in contrast to the notion of a rational senior 
executive leading in a top-down directive manner (Porter, 1980). 




5.6.2.1 Augmenting Corporate Innovation Processes 
 Augmenting corporate innovation processes drew upon formal structures embedded in the 
organizational culture. Very early in the process of establishing the senior innovation manager 
role, senior innovation managers recognized that they could not go head-on against elements of 
established organizational culture. Thus, these managers tried to identify and leverage elements of 
corporate culture conducive to their mission of fostering distant innovations.  
 Eventually, senior innovation managers were able to use elements of the organizational 
culture which underpinned its stability, such as “imagination, vicarious experiences, stories, [and] 
simulations” (Weick, 1987: 113), to induce higher organizational tolerance for uncertainty and 
change related to the pursuit of innovation activities. Another related effect was the decrease of 
ease with which the political power rooted in formal structures could be used by organizational 
insiders to undermine the legitimacy of the work done by senior innovation managers. 
5.6.2.2 Parallel Corporate Innovation Processes 
 Parallel corporate innovation processes bypassed formal structures. When senior 
innovation managers identified elements of corporate culture which were critical for senior 
innovation managers’ mission, but which could not be changed to be more receptive to innovation, 
they created parallel alternatives. One example was the introduction of selection mechanisms that 
could be self-administered by individual innovators, which kept them outside of the influence of 
middle managers (e.g., pairwise scoring, rapid prototyping). Another example was the creation of 
staggered innovation resource pools outside of the formal R&D budgeting process. These resource 
pools could be flexibly deployed to support ad hoc and accidental innovation initiatives (Austin, 
Devin, and Sullivan, 2012) without the need to engage in a formal process of resource solicitation. 




One particularly interesting aspect of the corporate innovation managers’ actions observed in the 
data was the use of informal organizational structures (Gulati and Puranam, 2009) to mitigate the 
influence of elements of organizational culture that were programmatically hostile to innovation. 
One such informal organizational structure established by senior innovation managers was the 
innovation network whose members often employed guerilla-type approaches to circumvent 
formal opposition to innovation. Over time, these informal innovation networks often established 
direct links to the highest managerial echelons, including the CEO and the board of directors. 
Senior innovation managers’ support for self-organization at the lowest possible hierarchical level 
also challenged formal structures and authority flows. 
5.7 AN EMERGENT PROCESS MODEL OF DYNAMIC CORPORATE INNOVATION CAPABILITY 
The findings reveal the difficulty for senior innovation managers to generate more growth from 
innovation without making changes to organizational structures and behaviours of employees 
operating at different hierarchical levels. At the same time, the senior innovation managers 
recognized that mandating these changes through top-down directive decision making would 
amplify resistance to innovation embedded within multidivisional firms programmed and 
pressured towards efficient exploitation of core businesses. As a result, senior innovation managers 
had to pace and sequence their interventions. 
 In this way, senior innovation managers were coordinating three interdependent and 
concurrent phases of the development of dynamic corporate innovation capability: (1) connecting 
past to present; (2) managing innovation risk; and (3) connecting future to present. Based on my 
findings, I elaborate a grounded process theory of the development of dynamic corporate 




I employed the system dynamics approach used to study complex organizational processes (e.g., 
Rudolph, Morrison, and Carroll, 2009; Strike and Rerup, 2016). 
 Figure 5 depicts the establishment of the senior innovation manager role. “Senior 
innovation manager legitimacy” is a stock variable which establishes the ability of the senior 
innovation manager to influence intra-organizational innovation processes. It positively influences 
another stock variable, “corporate innovation ambition.” “Innovation risk mitigators space” 
represents a reservoir of options for reducing risks associated with the pursuit of innovation. The 
valve depicted as “T” regulates the flow from the innovation risk mitigators space into 
“countermeasures against exploitative forces,” which is a stock variable. The flow is increased by 
“managing innovation risks at the individual inventor, middle manager, and corporate levels,” 
which is an ongoing process variable, in turn negatively impacted by the “time needed to manage 
innovation risks” variable, representing the complex nature of innovation risk management. An 
increase in the stock of countermeasures against exploitative forces increases the “senior 
innovation manager legitimacy” stock, creating a “reinforcing innovation acceptance loop (A),” 




Figure 5: Innovation Acceptance Loop 
 
 Figure 6 depicts the senior innovation manager role’s influence on both local and distant 
innovation. “Local innovation projects” as a stock variable. “Local” refers to the proximity of 
innovation projects to core businesses caused by a combination of external pressures on short-term 
results, cognitive limitations of middle managers, and incentive systems geared towards 
exploitation of core businesses. “Innovation space close to core businesses” is a stock variable 
representing innovation opportunities related to core businesses. The innovation space around core 
businesses is assumed to be objective in nature, reflecting the fact that most innovations are derived 
from extant knowledge. The valve depicted as “T” regulates the flow from the innovation space 
close to core businesses into the local innovation projects stock. “Connecting past to present” is 
an ongoing process variable through which senior innovation managers increase the flow by 
connecting past innovation achievements with present innovation opportunities. The rate of 
connecting past innovation achievements with present innovation opportunities decreases with the 
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innovation sensemaking. “Growth from local innovation” represents quantifiable contributions to 
revenue growth from commercialization of local innovation projects. The increase of revenue 
growth from commercialization of local innovation projects creates a “reinforcing local innovation 
loop (L),” which increases the flow of resources to local innovation projects as growth from local 
innovation increases. 
  “Distant innovation projects” is equally a stock variable. “Distant” refers to the structural, 
cognitive, and temporal separation between the knowledge stock of the focal firm and sources of 
knowledge required to pursue distant innovation. “Innovation space distant to core businesses” is 
a stock variable representing innovation opportunities distant to core businesses. Like the 
innovation space close to core businesses, innovation space distant to core businesses is assumed 
to be objective in nature.  
 The valve depicted as “T” regulates the flow from the innovation space distant to core 
business into the distant innovation projects stock. “Connecting future to present” is an ongoing 
process variable through which senior innovation managers increase the flow by lowering the 
distance between the firm and distant knowledge. The rate of connecting future to present 
decreases with the parameter “time needed to make the connection,” which captures the 
complexity of forward innovation sensemaking. “Growth from distant innovation” represents 
quantifiable contributions to revenue growth from commercialization of distant innovation 
projects. The increase of revenue growth from commercialization of distant innovation projects 
creates a “reinforcing distant innovation loop (D),” which increases the flow of resources to distant 




Figure 6: Local and Distant Innovation Loop 
 
 Figure 7 represents the full emergent process model of dynamic corporate innovation 
capability. As the countermeasures against exploitative forces stock grows, it increases the flow 
from the innovation space close to core businesses into the local innovation projects stock. The 
dotted line represents a weaker link, reflecting the finding that relatively little resistance existed to 
innovation projects close to core businesses, as all sampled firms had routinized R&D programs. 
Similarly, growth in countermeasures against exploitative forces increases the flow from the 
innovation space distant to core businesses into the distant innovation projects stock. Growth from 
both local and distant innovations increases the stock of corporate innovation ambition, which 
















































 Under the assumption of resource constraints to exploration at the firm level, growth from 
distant innovation decreases the flow from the innovation space close to core businesses into the 
local innovation projects stock, and vice versa. Dotted lines represent the weak agency of senior 
innovation managers to obtain additional exploration resources during a given period, reducing 
this local-distant innovation substitution effect. On the other hand, a senior innovation manager 
also has the agency to both balance the local-distant innovation ratio and/or reduce the need for 
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 This study contributes to innovation management scholarship by elaborating on an 
empirical phenomenon, the dynamic corporate innovation capability, which has been 
underexplored in prior literature. The concept of dynamic corporate innovation capability explains 
how corporate managers support local innovation and use innovation risk management across 
hierarchical levels to induce distant innovation. Prior research has uncovered that “the process for 
moving from a firm’s reservoir of technical knowledge to the initiation of a project with potentially 
game-changing opportunity appears to be almost capricious” (O’Conner and Rice, 2001: 109). 
More recent studies have hinted at the possibility that corporate managers can reduce this ad hoc 
nature of distant innovation generation in large multidivisional firms by integrating bottom-up and 
top-down innovation processes (Birkinshaw, Bouquet, and Barsoux, 2011). Relatedly, other 
innovation management scholars have noted that “new structures must be created to support these 
breakthrough ideas. The issues surrounding such transformational processes deserve more 
inquiry” (Garud, Tuertscher, and Van de Ven, 2013: 802). 
 I argue that the senior innovation manager role is one such structure, and make a theoretical 
contribution by unpacking the senior innovation manager role and showing how various corporate 
innovation processes enacted by senior innovation managers influence continuous generation of 
distant innovations. I also explain that senior innovation managers are not a simple addition to the 
corporate team who can drive distant innovation by relying on their formal authority only. Instead, 
senior innovation managers engage in a highly political process, augmenting, bypassing, and 
disrupting elements of formal organizational structures using mechanistic, autocratic, resource 
scaling, and experimental approaches to managing innovation. Overall, this study shows that the 
influence of senior innovation managers unfolds over time as a multilevel process marked by 
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interdependencies and contingencies, as opposed to being a top-down, one-time structural 
adjustment to how innovation is managed within large multidivisional firms. 
5.8.1 THE ROLE OF A SENIOR INNOVATION MANAGER 
 This research project started with only a limited understanding of the role of a senior 
innovation manager. Findings in this study revealed that the senior innovation manager role is 
marked by several specific challenges, which, taken together, paint an image of a boundedly 
rational corporate executive (Cyert and March, 1963) operating through often unconventional 
methods, in contrast with the portrayal of a corporate manager acting based on analytical foresight 
(Porter, 1980).  
 First, generation of more growth from innovation required an increase in the 
exploration/exploitation ratio (March, 1991). Yet, the existence in large multidivisional firms of 
“the system of constraints [which] forces managers to choose policies within a narrow range of 
profit opportunities compatible with stockholders or creditor interests” (Herman, 1981: 20) 
required senior innovation managers to employ untraditional ways for increasing exploration, 
without significantly reducing ongoing exploitation and related profitability. To achieve this goal, 
senior innovation managers engaged in resource scaling and bricolage (Baker and Nelson, 2005), 
as well as in resource slack scouting (Penrose 1959/1995). Further, resource flexibility gained 
through these non-traditional means increased senior innovation managers’ flexibility in 
responding to unpredictable creativity (Austin, Devin, and Sullivan, 2012). 
 Second, responsibility to generate growth from innovation often already formed part of the 
job of other senior managers and/or was delegated to business unit managers. As such, senior 
innovation managers had to engage in political maneuvering to get accepted by their peers 
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Moreover, often, business unit-level managers were 
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subordinated to senior innovation managers implicitly rather than explicitly, which required 
additional political maneuvering by senior innovation managers. 
 Third, concrete blueprints for senior innovation roles rarely existed, in contrast to 
established corporate functions related to finance, information technology, or M&A. This factor 
required senior innovation managers to engage in trial-and-error approaches and experiments, and 
to be highly entrepreneurial in general in their roles. Senior innovation managers also relied 
heavily on informal networks to counter the biases towards exploitation embedded in formal 
organizational structures. 
5.8.2 EXTERNAL VERSUS INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE SOURCING 
 The concept of open innovation of leveraging external knowledge to augment intra-firm 
innovation effort (Chesbrough, 2003) has gained significant scholarly and managerial interest over 
the last two decades. The argument that open innovation enables firms to pursue distant 
innovations is frequently made by scholars. Interestingly, the CEO of 3M, a consistently highly 
innovative firm, has remarked that 3M has always used relatively little open innovation, yet is now 
considering increasing its usage in the future (Berger et al., 2009). Similarly, this study uncovered 
that while open innovation was an important element of the sampled firms’ overall innovation 
management systems, the costs and long investment-benefit conversion cycles associated with 
open innovation meant that senior innovation managers initially focused their effort on leveraging 
internal sources of knowledge, using open innovation as a weak complement to—rather than a 
strong substitute for—sourcing novel knowledge internally. 
 The leveraging of internal resources for generating distant innovation is directly related to 
the link between organizational slack and a firm’s growth introduced by Penrose (1959/1995). 
Penrose conceptualizes the firm as a portfolio of resources functioning within an administrative 
framework, arguing that a firm’s growth is related to managers’ desire to “do something” using 
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human and other resources controlled by the firm. My study builds on this seminal insight in the 
context of innovation management: initially, senior innovation managers develop mechanisms 
facilitating the temporal, cross-silo, cross-business unit, cross-geography recombination of 
knowledge which is under administrative control of the firm, while encouraging the augmentation 
of the internal knowledge sourcing with open innovation. As the senior innovation manager role 
matures, sub-capabilities developed within the dynamic corporate innovation capability 
framework (e.g., extraction of knowledge from early stage start-ups, future sensing) decrease the 
cost and time intensity differentials between external and internal knowledge sourcing.  
 At the same time, maturation of the senior innovation manager role likely results in internal 
knowledge reservoir depletion, which may also lead to the increased use of external knowledge 
sourcing. In sum, firms must have a well-developed internal innovation management capability to 
leverage and fully exploit innovation opportunities sourced through open innovation. 
5.8.3 INDUCED BOTTOM-UP DISTANT INNOVATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CENTRALIZATION OF 
INNOVATION 
 The centralization of innovation activities within a multidivisional firm has also received 
significant scholarly attention. Sorenson and Stuart (2000) show the tendency of large firms to 
innovate using internal resources. Building on this research, Argyres and Silverman (2004) and 
Arora, Belenzon, and Rios (2014) demonstrate that centralization of innovation activities results 
in more distant innovations, in contrast to when innovation activities are contained at the business 
unit level. Consistent with these results, most senior innovation managers in the sampled firms 
created a dedicated corporate innovation unit to generate distant innovations. 
 Yet, findings in this study offer a more nuanced view of innovation centralization as they 
show how senior innovation managers use innovation resources located at both centralized and 
decentralized locations within the firm to generate distant innovations. Initially, senior innovation 
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managers borrow resources embedded in business units and insert them into a more centralized 
innovation domain on a temporary basis. Over time, these managers decrease firms’ reliance on 
centralized innovation alone to generate distant innovations by introducing mechanisms allowing 
individual innovators operating with the realm of business units to self-organize on an ad hoc basis 
and access centralized innovation resources remotely on a demand basis. 
 Further, as stocks of senior innovation managers’ legitimacy and countermeasures to 
exploitation grow, senior innovation managers’ ability to use more directive top-down approaches 
to generate distant innovation within business units increases. In sum, this study’s findings show 
that distant innovation gradually occurs through both top-down and bottom-up corporate 
innovation processes. 
5.8.4 BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 
 Large multidivisional firms are typically mature organizations focused on exploitation at 
the expense of exploration, and as such, they represent a subset of organizational structures. It is 
likely that firms with less mature innovation cycles experience less severe internal biases towards 
exploitation, and therefore have a lower need for developing dynamic corporate innovation 
capability. As I employed a cross-industry sample, the presented findings represent a coherent 
account of the role of senior innovation managers in innovation management in large 
multidivisional firms, as opposed to explaining inter-industry differences in the development of 
dynamic corporate innovation capability. 
5.8.5 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
5.8.5.1 Effects of Dynamic Corporate Innovation Capability on Innovation Performance 
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 This study focused on the process of developing dynamic corporate innovation capability, 
and not on the outcomes of this process. Further research should explore the impact that dynamic 
corporate innovation capability has on firm-level innovation output. 
5.8.5.2 Automation of Dynamic Corporate Innovation Capability 
 The study confirmed the importance of traditional approaches to innovation, such as the 
Stage Gate process. As the data collection progressed over the span of five years, the relevance of 
more advanced innovation-supporting systems that leverage machine learning and artificial 
intelligence increasingly entered the discourse at the chief innovation summits. Advances in these 
areas are likely to both accelerate the pace of technological change and offer new ways for firms 
to sense opportunities and take advantage of them. 
5.8.5.3 Early Selection versus Incubation 
 The introduction of selection mechanisms very early on in the innovation’s incubation 
stage was problematic, as many high-potential innovations required significant time to crystalize 
into defensible projects. How to reconcile the need to deselect low-value projects early on with the 
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CHAPTER 6 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 THE EXPLOITATION VERSUS EXPLORATION TENSION IN A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM 
I introduced my dissertation with a quote by March (1994: 47) about the existence of some 
possibilities available to managers to optimize the ratio between exploitation and exploration 
activities coexisting within a firm’s boundaries. It is my hope that my research has contributed 
towards the knowledge about the nature of some of these possibilities. 
In Chapter 2, I show that, contrary to the dominant view in the literature, top-down 
interventions in innovation management are not merely passive, but are often purposeful actions 
instigated by corporate managers to influence how innovation occurs at the corporate manager, 
middle managers, team, and individual inventor hierarchical levels across variation, selection, and 
retention of knowledge. In addition, I demonstrate that a specific action instigated by corporate 
managers often operates across levels of analysis and evolutionary phases of the innovation 
process. Specifically, I synthesize extant knowledge on top-down interventions in intra-
organizational innovation processes (i.e., corporate innovation activism (CIA)) into structuring, 
nudging, and routinizing categories. By identifying important gaps and unresolved tensions in the 
extant knowledge on CIA, I set the stage for both theoretical and empirical exploration of CIA’s 
rationale, genesis, and evolution. 
In Chapter 3, I deductively establish the rationale for the existence of CIA within a 
multidivisional firm. I show that a careful reconsideration of foundational corporate strategy 
literature allows for the relaxation of the assumption of corporate managers’ passivity in the 
management of innovation. Building on the knowledge base built in Chapter 2, together with the 
insights derived from the reconsideration of the foundational literature, I argue that CIA can 
manifest itself through efficiency gains in innovation processes and/or value added above and 
beyond what is achievable when the management of innovation is confined to business units alone. 
While corporate innovation synergy and corporate innovation value added are deductive 
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theoretical constructs, by elaborating on them, I establish the possibility that CIA is present across 
the universe of existing multidivisional firms.  
In Chapter 4, I proceed to empirically examine the genesis of CIA. Using a proprietary 
dataset on corporate interventions in the management of innovation in large multidivisional firms, 
I confirm the existence of CIA by uncovering 17 CIA processes operating across hierarchical levels 
and evolutionary phases. To bring my findings closer to the realities of real-world multidivisional 
firms, I synthesize 17 CIA processes into three configurations, reflecting several options for the 
distribution of elements of CIA between the corporate centre and business units. Mapping these 
three configurations onto the innovation efficiency frontier allows me to link the CIA to the trade-
off that corporate managers face as they attempt to optimize the ratio between low-risk/low-return 
innovation projects and high-risk/high-potential innovation options. 
In Chapter 5, I make another empirical examination focused on linking CIA’s managerial 
aspects to the transformation of discrete top-down interventions into an organizational capability 
to continuously discover, evaluate, and monetize distant innovations (i.e., dynamic corporate 
innovation capability (DCIC)). For this purpose, I assemble another proprietary dataset by 
longitudinally mapping the work of senior innovation managers in large multidivisional firms. I 
uncover a process giving rise to DCIC that is comprised of legitimacy building for the role of a 
senior innovation manager, the establishment of corporate innovation ambition, and the 
transformation of corporate innovation processes into corporate innovation routines. To generate 
understanding about how these sub-processes dynamically interact as corporate managers attempt 
to optimize the balance between exploitation and exploration, I use system dynamics modelling to 
create an emergent model of DCIC. In the model, I conceptualize innovation acceptance, local 
innovation, and distant innovation self-reinforcing loops, and propose several regulating 
mechanisms that corporate managers can use to manage the ongoing tension between exploitation 
and exploration on the organizational level. 
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6.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
In addition to contributing to the scholarly discussion about the role of corporate managers in 
co-managing exploration and exploitation activities within a multidivisional firm, I make several 
other original theoretical contributions in my dissertation that are worth highlighting. 
6.2.1 INNOVATION AS A CORPORATE FUNCTION 
The dominant view in the literature has been that innovation in a multidivisional firm occurs 
through bottom-up processes which should be disrupted by top-down interventions (Amabile, 
1983; Damanpour, 1991). Relatedly, Bower (1970) argues that corporate managers play a passive 
role in innovation management as providers of funds to innovation projects, rubber-stamping 
recommendations by trusted middle managers. Burgelman (1983a, 1983b) builds upon Bower’s 
(1970) work and posits that corporate managers retroactively rationalize innovation successes as 
being the result of corporate actions, while in fact, they result from actions taken by middle 
managers. Hence, Burgelman (1983a, 1983b) retains the view of corporate managers as being 
inherently passive in innovation management. 
Across the four papers in this dissertation, I consistently find that the passivity assumption 
surrounding the involvement of corporate managers in innovation management does not hold from 
multiple perspectives. My finding resonates with several recent calls in the literature to unpack the 
role of corporate managers in the management of innovation (e.g., Anderson, Potočnik, and Zhou, 
2014). Through a literature review and deductive theorizing, I argue in Chapters 2 and 3 for the 
possibility of innovation being a core corporate function in a multidivisional firm. In both Chapters 
4 and 5, I find strong empirical support for my assertion. 
In this way, I demonstrate that the innovation literature’s affinity towards the bottom-up 
view on how innovation occurs within a multidivisional firm is incomplete without considering 
how it is shaped by purposeful top-down managerial interventions. Unlike Birkinshaw, Bouquet, 
and Barsoux (2011), I find that the relationship between top-down and bottom-up innovation 
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processes is not solely complementary in nature, but orthogonal and parallel as well. My empirical 
findings in Chapters 4 and 5 show how managers deploy top-down interventions to augment, 
rectify, or circumvent bottom-up innovation processes to optimize innovation flows on the system 
level. 
The important insight my findings generate is that the management of innovation in a large 
and complex multidivisional organization is not only about minimizing bureaucratic interference 
in bottom-up innovation processes (Amabile, 1983), but rather, about understanding the limitations 
of these processes and addressing these limitations through purposeful top-down managerial 
interventions. Through my empirical work, I disentangle these top-down managerial interventions 
along several dimensions. In Chapter 4, I outline possibilities available to corporate managers in 
terms of structuring their interventions to allow corporate managers agency to match 
organizational design factors to desired interactions between bottom-up and top-down innovation 
processes. In Chapter 5, I delve deeper into how managers adapt the nature of their interventions 
to pursued innovation goals. Overall, my findings open up a promising avenue for future research 
that focuses on increasing our understanding of how the modulation of top-down interventions in 
the management of innovation shape bottom-up innovation processes. 
6.2.2 MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY IN A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM 
A key theme resonating across my four papers is the complex nature of the management of 
uncertainty generated by intra-organizational innovation activities. In the introduction to my 
dissertation, I highlight some of the revolutionary research that has been recently conducted in 
relation to this topic, including research on centralization of innovation activities (Argyres and 
Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014), the relationship between cost retrenchment 
and innovation capability (Lim, Celly, Morse, and Rowe, 2013), accidental innovation (Austin, 
Devin, and Sullivan, 2012), unofficial research (Criscuolo, Salter, and Ter Wal (2014), and 
vicarious learning from failures (Maslach, Branzei, Rerup, and Zbaracki, 2018). Building on 
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these pioneering research streams, as well as on the foundational literature, I make several 
original contributions to the knowledge on the management of uncertainty. 
First, in Chapter 2, based on careful synthesis of extant knowledge, I argue that corporate 
managers’ focus is not simply on mitigating uncertainty, but also on containing its negative 
aspects while harnessing its potential. In Chapter 3, I deductively argue that corporate managers 
can rearrange the loci of risk-taking behaviour to prevent innovation-associated risk from 
stopping and/or distorting innovation activities. In Chapter 4, I show how corporate managers 
modulate risk-taking behaviours to transform risk into valuable outcomes. Then, in Chapter 5, I 
develop a system-level model of top-down risk management at the organizational level. 
Second, much research focuses on how managers promote failure in their organizations. 
While I touched on this theme in my literature review in Chapter 2, through my empirical work 
in Chapters 4 and 5, I find that failure is an outcome that individual employees strongly prefer 
not to experience. Thus, paradoxically, while experiencing occasional failure is wholly 
manageable and desirable at the organizational level, I find strong resistance to failure at the 
individual employee level. The question then becomes, how can an organization encourage 
individual-level behaviour with a high probability of failure to uncover truly high-potential 
innovations, while reassuring individual employees that innovation-related failure will not 
negatively impact their future prospects within the organization? Based on my findings in 
Chapters 4 and 5, I propose several possibilities for addressing this dilemma (e.g., failure rhetoric, 
celebration of failure, codified learning from failure, and flexible career switching). As recent 
publications on the topic of failure within large organizations demonstrate (e.g., Maslach, 2016; 
Maslach, Branzei, Rerup, and Zbaracki, 2018), this research stream offers many fruitful research 
opportunities. 
Third, another strong theme resonating across and beyond my four papers is the effort of 
corporate managers to create an organizational climate conducive to experimentation (Thomke, 
2001; Thomke 2003). This sub-stream of the literature has been gaining increasing scholarly 
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attention due to the idea that in order for a multidivisional firm to remain competitive across 
multiple industries, it needs to internally maintain areas with start-up-like organizational 
environments (Ries, 2011). My overall findings show that the coexistence of start-up-like and 
more mature organizational environments is not frictionless, and requires top-down interventions. 
In Chapter 4, I uncover several mechanisms deployed by corporate managers to enable 
experimentation to occur within the constraints of established formal organizational structures 
(i.e., top-down support for autonomous innovation, availability of explorative/mixed career paths, 
provision of physical experimentation spaces, and fostering rapid experimentation). In Chapter 
5, I propose that the continuous management of risks at the individual inventor, middle manager, 
and corporate levels counterweights organizational gravitation towards exploitation and, as a 
result, supports the continuous pursuit of experimentation across organizational hierarchical 
levels. Overall, my findings point to the need for purposeful and continuous top-down support 
for experimentation in the organizational environment of a multidivisional firm marked by a 
persistent tendency to pursue short-term certainty. 
6.3 PRACTITIONER CONTRIBUTIONS 
6.3.1 OVERVIEW OF EXTANT INNOVATION MECHANISMS 
One practitioner-related outcome of my dissertation is the overview of main innovation 
mechanisms available to managers organized along hierarchical levels and innovation projects’ 
typical stages. Managers can use my overview as a reference guide to consider which top-down 
interventions in innovation management are likely to be relevant for their respective firms.  
Further, my dissertation offers managers insights about differences, yet also about 
interrelatedness among various uncovered innovation mechanisms. For instance, unstructured 
innovation worktime, hackathons, and skunk works projects can be purposefully leveraged by 
managers both in sequence and in parallel to optimize the use of scarce innovation resources. Ideas 
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continuously generated through employees’ unstructured innovation times can be developed 
further within the purposefully built innovation team environment of a hackathon, to then be 
passed on to a skunk works team working largely independently from the rest of the organization. 
Ultimately, my synthesis of uncovered innovation mechanisms allows managers to consider 
nuances of innovation management related to the need for a senior innovation manager to combine 
top-down structuring of innovation processes, psychological interventions in innovation processes, 
and routinization of some aspects of top-down and bottom-up innovation processes.  
6.3.2 THE ROLE OF A SENIOR INNOVATION MANAGER IN A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM 
Most of my informants commented on the non-linearity of the path of a senior innovation 
manager, as the role eludes easy, “how-to” prescriptive recommendations. Yet, several common 
themes resonate across my dissertation findings. These themes may be relevant for newly 
appointed senior innovation managers as they decide how to proceed in their roles. 
First, despite the oft-stated importance of innovation for an organization, the meaning of 
innovation for a specific organization is often poorly defined. Thus, I found across my cases that 
newly appointed senior innovation managers first engaged in a company-wide consultation to 
more clearly define the organization-specific meaning of innovation. 
Second, the corporate innovation function is marked by its novelty vis-à-vis other more 
established corporate functions, even with respect to more recent areas of corporate attention 
(e.g., the transition into the digital world and taking advantage of big data analytics). Therefore, 
senior innovation managers had to work hard to justify their very existence at the corporate level 
and delineate their role against other corporate-level functions. This process was complicated by 
the fact that managers in charge of more established corporate areas, such as marketing and/or IT 
management, often considered the management of innovation to be within their respective realms. 
Another frequently complication was the business unit-level opposition to the cross-business unit 
authority of the corporate innovation function, as business unit managers often consider 
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innovation efforts to be within their domain. I found that senior innovation managers were 
addressing these political issues and maneuvering through careful diplomacy and a measured 
approach based on mutual respect, as opposed to imposing their will through heavy-handed 
tactics rooted in the formal authority stemming from their function. 
Third, the corporate innovation function was often poorly resourced. Frequently, the 
directive from the CEO was to significantly increase the percentage of revenue directly linked to 
the corporate innovation effort, yet without committing to providing substantial resources from 
the onset of the creation of the corporate innovation function. Thus, most of the senior innovation 
managers included in my database had to improvise and find creative ways to resource their 
function along the way. Some mechanisms for this on-the-fly resourcing of the corporate 
innovation function uncovered through my research include assembling (initially very small) 
corporate innovation teams, temporarily borrowing resources from other organizational areas, 
and creating the perception with the CEO of a burning platform situation through skillful 
presentation of significant innovation trends and challenges which could be effectively addressed 
by increasing the funding for the corporate innovation function. 
Fourth, tangible results of the corporate innovation function would often come only after 
many years from its establishment. I found that senior innovation managers addressed this issue 
in two ways. First, they created the perception of a more abstract time dimension related to their 
work in contrast to a more mechanical time dimension associated with other activities within their 
firms. This perception of a more abstract time dimension allowed senior innovation managers 
some flexibility in terms of negotiation of milestones and deliverables. Second, the sampled 
senior innovation managers identified more easily achievable tasks and focused on delivering 
those to create the perception of some level of outputs. 
6.3.3 DESIGNING A CORPORATE INNOVATION PROGRAM  
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While the role of a senior innovation manager is marked by its non-linearity, the establishment 
of a comprehensive and sustainable corporate innovation program is an even more complex 
undertaking. In my dissertation, I open up the black box of several corporate innovation programs 
and deconstruct them into their underlying components. The uncovering of these components of a 
prototypical corporate innovation program allows CEOs and other senior executives who 
contemplate the introduction of such a program in their firms to gain awareness about the 
modularity of the process and make the right decisions suited for their specific organizational and 
environmental contexts. 
6.3.4 EMPLOYEE INNOVATION RISK MANAGEMENT 
In most large and complex multidivisional firms, a number of employees are intrinsically 
motivated to work on innovation projects (Amabile, 1988). Yet, employees may be hesitant to 
pursue their intrinsic motivations due to the inherent riskiness of innovation projects. My research 
reveals several mechanisms that can mitigate innovation -generated risk at the employee level. 
Organizations can offer guarantees to their employees that failure related to innovation 
pursuits will not negatively affect their careers. These guarantees can take form of an explicit 
contractual agreement between the firm and the concerned employee, stipulating that in case of 
a project’s failure, the employee will be able to reassume his or her formal position without a loss 
of seniority. 
In addition, organizations can structure innovation projects in a way that makes them 
transparent for employees in terms of the stage of a specific project, project’s history, project’s 
resourcing, project’s expected duration, and/or project’s expected outcomes. Such innovation 
project transparency can significantly decrease the information asymmetry between the 
organization and its employees, and increase employees’ ability to evaluate the riskiness of an 
innovation project for their own careers. 
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Further, organizations can offer their employees innovation-specific career paths which 
reduce the managerial burden on the employee, yet still offer growth in seniority contingent on 
innovation-related performance. Such career options increase the chances of employees’ success 
in innovation pursuits by allowing employees to fully focus on innovation-related activities.  
6.3.5 DEBIASING INNOVATION DECISION MAKING 
Pioneering work on decision making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman, Lovallo, 
and Sibony, 2011) has uncovered several key biases distorting organizational decision making. 
Similarly, early scholars of intra-organizational innovation processes note the existence of several 
innovation-related decision-making biases (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983a, 1983b). In my 
dissertation, I confirm the presence of biases, and uncover several mechanisms used by corporate 
managers to mitigate these biases. These mechanisms may be of importance to senior innovation 
managers who aim to debias their intra-organizational innovation processes. 
I find that corporate managers are acutely aware of biases operating at the middle manager 
level. Consequently, they may design several bypassing mechanisms to lessen the influence of 
middle managers on the evaluation of novel ideas. Once such mechanism concerns the creation of 
alternative lines of communication between individual inventors and corporate managers in cases 
when novel ideas were rejected by their superiors. Another mechanism is the establishment of an 
informal network of innovation-friendly employees, who, at the same time, retain formal power 
though their rank in the organizational hierarchy. The existence of this informal innovation 
network makes it harder for middle managers to reject a novel idea based on their personal opinions 
and/or personal agenda. The inclusion of innovation metrics into middle managers’ KPIs is another 
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